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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers on search theory. Chapter 2 studies sta-
tionary cutoff-strategy equilibria of a dynamic market model where buyers
sample sellers sequentially from an unknown distribution. Buyers learn about
the distribution from the sampled sellers and a private “trade signal”. The
trade signal reveals whether a randomly chosen seller traded yesterday. The
signal’s precision and the market distribution of options are determined in
equilibrium. Observing a trade (as opposed to no trade) is good news about
the distribution. Buyers who observe a trade use a higher cutoff than buyers
who observe no trade, despite buyers’ learning from sampled sellers that puts
a countervailing pressure on the cutoffs. The trade signal may reduce market
efficiency, while an appropriate exogenous signal increases efficiency.
Chapter 3 extends the standard sequential search model by allowing the
agent who inspects items sequentially (the “searcher”) to differ from the agent
who chooses from the set of inspected items (the “chooser”). I show for a
general joint distribution of the agents’ preferences that the searcher’s optimal
policy is a cutoff rule. The cutoff is weakly decreasing in time, i.e., exhibits
the “discouragement effect”. I characterise the cutoff and discuss some testable
implications of the discouragement effect.
Chapter 4 relaxes the standard sequential search model’s assumption that
the searching agent makes no choice mistakes. In my model, once the agent
stops the search process, she chooses the best inspected item with probability
1−ε and uniformly among the remaining inspected items with probability ε. I
show that her optimal policy is a stochastic cutoff rule and that she may both
experience regret and search longer than an agent who makes no mistakes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters, connected by a common theme: decision-
making of agents who face informational imperfections. In the models of all
three chapters agents on one side of the market (e.g., buyers or job seekers) do
not know exactly which potential partner on the other side of the market (e.g.,
seller or employer) offers which option (e.g., price or remuneration package). A
buyer samples sellers sequentially in order to discover which options the sellers
offer and chooses when to stop searching for further alternatives. Such search
models are a good description of the way people make many economically rele-
vant decisions, including job and house search, finding business opportunities,
and purchases of consumer goods. In particular, the models capture the idea
that it takes time and resources to find an option that the person likes. In the
standard sequential search model (see McCall (1970) for the seminal contri-
bution) the agent who searches knows the distribution of options that sellers
offer, makes his decisions independently of other agents, and never errs.
In the three chapters that comprise this thesis, I relax various assumptions
of the standard search model. This is important for several reasons. First,
making small changes to the assumptions allows us to evaluate the robustness
of the standard model’s results. The importance of the standard model in both
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applied and theoretical work, especially in macroeconomics, labour economics
and industrial organisation, cannot be overstated. Determining robust pre-
dictions of search models thus helps us both to build better models and give
robust policy advice. Second, relaxing the standard assumptions allows us to
analyse novel questions that are relevant in search environments. For exam-
ple, Chapter 2 of this thesis analyses the effect of different types of information
on a market by assuming that people do not know the exact distribution of
offers they face. Imperfect knowledge of the offer distribution is a reasonable
assumption of at least some people’s knowledge of some markets, but is ruled
out in the standard model. Finally, relaxing the standard assumptions allows
us to match the reality better. The standard model makes multiple assump-
tions about the search environment and process, which are often unrealistic.
In Chapter 3 I show that some of the standard model’s results no longer hold
if we assume that multiple agents conduct the search process, which is a real-
istic assumption in many organisational settings. I now explain in more detail
which assumptions I relax in the three chapters of this thesis.
In Chapter 2, Learning from Trades, I analyse the equilibria of a dynamic
market model with pairwise meetings where buyers face an unknown distribu-
tion of options. In many real markets a buyer is unsure about the distribution
of options that he faces, e.g., a house-hunter is unsure about the joint distri-
bution of houses’ attributes and prices. Often, buyers in these markets learn
about the distribution from information that reflects the frequency of trading
in the market, e.g., the house-hunter learns if a house is still advertised.
I characterise and analyse the efficiency of cutoff-strategy equilibria of the
model when buyers learn about the unknown distribution of options from a
“trade signal”. Cutoff strategy means that a buyer stops the search process if
he finds an option that yields him higher utility than a cutoff utility. The trade
signal reveals to a buyer whether a randomly chosen seller traded yesterday.
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The signal’s precision and the market distribution of options are determined
in equilibrium.
In equilibrium, observing a trade (as opposed to no trade) is good news
about the distribution. Buyers who observe a trade use a higher cutoff than
buyers who observe no trade, despite buyers’ learning from options that puts
a countervailing pressure on the cutoffs. In particular, the level of a cutoff
depends on the informativeness of both the trade signal and observing an
option equal to the cutoff. In equilibrium, observing an option just equal to
the cutoff used by buyers who observe no trade is better news than observing
an option equal to the cutoff used by buyers who observe a trade.
I show that the efficiency of a market where buyers learn from the trade
signal can be lower than of a market where buyers do not observe this in-
formation. The extra information makes buyers, on average, too optimistic
about the unknown distribution because the buyers who observe no trade are
relatively too optimistic. Optimistic buyers search longer, which is inefficient
in this model.
In contrast, the efficiency of a market where buyers observe the realisation
of a signal with an appropriate exogenously given precision is higher than both
of a market where buyers do not observe this information and of a market
where buyers know the true distribution. The paper highlights that the type
of information that buyers access is a crucial determinant of whether more
information improves market efficiency. This is an important consideration for
policy-makers and especially relevant in a computerised world as the cost of
emitting information is low.
In Chapter 3, A Two-Agent Model of Sequential Search and Choice, I study
a natural extension of the standard single-agent sequential search problem: a
two-agent (or, equivalently, a multi-selves) search problem with misaligned
preferences. One of the agents, the searcher, inspects items sequentially and
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the other, the chooser, makes the final choice among the inspected items.
Their preferences differ. Many real-world situations can be viewed as two-
party search problems: a political leader chooses a policy option from a pool
collected by his advisers, a boss hires a new worker from the application stack
compiled by the HR manager, and a person chooses from the investment op-
tions shortlisted by an earlier “self”.
I characterise the optimal stopping rule of the searcher who knows that
the final choice is made according to the chooser’s preferences. The optimal
stopping rule is a cutoff rule. The cutoff decreases weakly in time, that is,
exhibits the“discouragement effect“: the searcher is discouraged from searching
longer and for better items as time goes on. The cutoff decreases weakly in
time because of the following. At any point in time, the cutoff depends on the
items that the searcher has inspected. In particular, the searcher’s expected
value from continuing with the search process, thus, the cutoff, decreases in the
chooser’s utility from the chooser-preferred inspected item, i.e., the item that
would be chosen were the searcher to stop immediately. The result is intuitive:
an item that yields a high utility for the chooser acts as a restriction on the
searcher’s problem as he has to find an item that is even better for the chooser
in order to induce the chooser to change her choice. Since the chooser’s utility
from the chooser-preferred item weakly increases in time, the searcher’s cutoff
weakly decreases in time.
I discuss the testable implications of the discouragement effect and explain
how the characteristics of my model differ from two single-agent search models
that feature a time-varying cutoff (convex search costs or deadline). In partic-
ular, in my model the cutoff decreases endogenously over time and the finally
chosen item is never an item found earlier, in contrast to the other models.
In Chapter 4, Search with Mistakes, I analyse a single-agent sequential
search problem, where the searcher is boundedly rational in that she makes
14
mistakes when choosing. With some probability she chooses not the item that
she intended to, but any other of the inspected items. A person may choose
an unintended item because she trembles, is inattentive, or cannot determine
the utilities of items precisely
I show, first, that the agent’s optimal cutoff is history-dependent. This is
because the agent’s expected value from continuing with the search process is
affected by each new item that she inspects as each is chosen with positive
probability. The new item’s utility positively affects the continuation value: a
low-utility item (weakly) lowers and a high-utility item (weakly) increases the
continuation value. Thus, the cutoff can both decrease and increase in time.
Second, I show that, for some parameter values, the erring agent may
search longer than an unerring agent and the erring agent’s behaviour exhibits
regret. The erring agent searches longer to insure herself against trembles:
she accumulates a set of items most of which have an acceptable quality. Her
behaviour exhibits regret if she stops when her expected value from stopping
is lower than it was in the past when she chose to continue. Regret is possible
after the agent receives low-utility items that lower both her optimal cutoff
and stopping value, but in a way that makes stopping optimal.
Finally, I explain how the characteristics of the agent’s optimal behaviour
in my model differ from an unerring agent’s optimal behaviour in some other
extensions to the standard sequential search model that generate a history-
dependent cutoff. For example, neither convex search costs nor a deadline
alone generate regret. A deadline and either uncertain or costly recall together
can generate regret, but for a different reason than my model.
15

Chapter 2
Learning from Trades
2.1 Introduction
In many markets, a buyer discovers what option a seller sells (e.g., a product’s
characteristics and price) only when he visits the seller’s store or website. If
the market distribution of options is unknown to the buyer, he learns about the
distribution from the options that he observes during the visits. In many in-
stances, a buyer learns about the unknown distribution also from other sources
of information, for example, aggregate statistics, sellers’ sales talk, hearsay, and
observing if others trade.
In this paper I study how a signal about trading frequency affects the equi-
librium of a sequential search model where the market distribution of options
is unknown to buyers. A signal about trading frequency is both practically rel-
evant because it is often present in real markets and theoretically interesting
because its precision is determined in equilibrium. I characterise the model’s
equilibria and show that a market with the signal on trading frequency may
be less efficient than a market without the signal. This is among the first
papers to study a search model where buyers’ actions have both informational
and payoff externalities on other buyers. Buyers’ actions have informational
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externalities because they determine the informativeness of the signals other
buyers get and payoff externalities because the market distribution of options
(or, payoffs) is determined in equilibrium. Payoff externalities exist in reality,
are a novel feature of my model, and matter for my results.
The model that I propose describes various dynamic markets where a per-
son who searches for a good option faces an unknown distribution of options.
A person who searches for a house is often unsure about the distribution of the
characteristics of houses within his budget. A job-seeker may not know the
distribution of pay packages across firms. In these markets, first, one person’s
decisions affect the distribution of options that the others face: if a person
bought a certain house or accepted a job, it is not available to the others. Sec-
ond, people often learn about the unknown distribution by observing a signal
about trading frequency. A job-seeker learns if a vacancy is still available and
a house-hunter hears if a colleague has moved. In these markets, both the dis-
tribution of the available options and the precision of the signal are determined
by the actions of all agents in equilibrium.
In my model, an equal amount of buyers and non-strategic sellers enter the
market in each period. The distribution of options (“qualities”, for concrete-
ness) among the entering sellers (the “state”) is fixed for all periods. The state
is unknown to buyers and can be either “good” or “bad”: good means more
high-quality sellers. A buyer meets a seller and decides whether to accept the
seller’s quality. If he accepts, both he and the seller exit the market. Other-
wise, the buyer continues to search for another period. A buyer dies after two
periods, hence, he accepts any quality when “old”. A “young” buyer decides
whether to accept or continue based on the quality of the seller he met and on
the realisation of a private “trade signal”.
The trade signal reveals to a buyer whether a randomly drawn seller traded
yesterday: if the seller traded, the buyer observes a“trade”, and if the seller did
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not trade, the buyer observes “no trade”. The signal’s precision is determined
in equilibrium. This is the trade-signal regime. I also analyse two benchmark
regimes. Under the no-signals’ regime, buyers receive no signal and under the
known-state regime, buyers know the true state.
I study the model’s symmetric stationary equilibria in cutoff strategies:
a young buyer accepts a quality if it exceeds a cutoff quality (“cutoff” for
short). I focus on inefficiency due to delay in trading. Delay is the only
source of inefficiency in my model because buyers are homogeneous and receive
positive utility from all qualities, the amounts of buyers and sellers are equal,
matching is frictionless, and the quality distribution of entrants is fixed. Delay
is positively related to equilibrium cutoff(s).
The three main results of the paper are as follows. First, I characterise
the cutoff-strategy equilibrium under the trade-signal regime. The equilibrium
cutoff that a buyer uses depends on the signal realisation that he observes and
is higher if the realisation indicates the good rather than the bad state. A
trade indicates the good state because a trade is more likely in the good state.
A trade is more likely in the good state because buyers use cutoff strategies:
more qualities exceed the cutoffs in the good state.
In equilibrium, buyers who observe a trade use a higher cutoff than buyers
who observe no trade, despite buyers’ learning from sampled options that puts
a countervailing pressure on the cutoffs. In particular, the level of a cutoff
depends on the informativeness of both the trade signal and a quality equal
to the cutoff. In equilibrium, observing a quality equal to the lower cutoff is
better news about the state than observing a quality equal to the higher cutoff.
Second, for a restricted set of parameter values I show that the trade-signal
regime is less efficient than the no-signals’ regime.1 Intuitively, buyers use too
high cutoffs on average under the trade-signal regime because the lower cutoff,
1My numerical results suggest that the result holds throughout the parameter space.
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used by buyers who observe no trade, is relatively “too high”. The cutoff is
“too high” because observing a quality equal to the lower cutoff is better news
about the state than a quality equal to the higher cutoff. Thus, buyers are
on average “too optimistic” under the trade-signal regime and delay trading,
which is inefficient.
Finally, I show that an exogenous-signal regime that reveals the bad state
with one signal realisation and shrouds the state with the other realisation
is more efficient than both the no-signals’ and the known-state regimes. The
efficiency-improving exogenous signal imitates the more efficient of the known-
state and no-signals’ regimes state by state: the market is more efficient under
the known-state regime than the no-signals’ regime in the bad state and vice
versa in the good state.
Related literature. Wolinsky (1990) established the literature on learning in
dynamic markets with pairwise meetings. In Wolinsky (1990), an uninformed
agent learns about the state of the market from the bargaining position of his
partner (which is equivalent to the option that a buyer observes in my model).
At the time of making a purchase decision all buyers of the same age have the
same belief about the unknown distribution in Wolinsky (1990), but they can
have different beliefs in my model. In Section 2.6 I argue that the heterogeneity
in beliefs is an important driver of my result on the trade-signal regime. In
Wolinsky (1990) and several related models2 buyers learn only from sampled
options, but in my model learn from sampled options and an additional signal.
The idea that a buyer in a search market learns from others’ actions is
present in adverse-selection search models such as Kircher and Postlewaite
(2008), Hendricks et al. (2012), and Garcia and Shelegia (2015). In these
models a buyer learns about a single seller’s option from others’ behaviour,
while in my model he learns about the aggregate state of the market.
2See, e.g., Serrano and Yosha (1993), Isaac (2010), and Isaac (2011).
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Sequentially arriving buyers learn about the quality of a single seller from
their own experience and from additional information in other dynamic adverse
selection models such as Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009), Kim (2014), Kaya and Kim
(2015), and Lauermann and Wolinsky (2015). In these models, there are no
payoff externalities (i.e., a buyer’s actions do not affect the distribution of
payoffs that later-arriving buyers face), while payoff externalities are present
in my model. Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009) and Kim (2014) show that more
information may delay trade or hurt efficiency respectively. I show a similar
result in a novel setting, a model with informational and payoff externalities.
Models of observational learning in financial markets are also related. Mul-
tiple papers consider the effect of exogenous signals and demonstrate that
greater transparency can lead to less efficiency.3 The closest among these is
Asriyan et al. (2015). In Asriyan et al. (2015) the distribution of payoffs that
a single buyer faces essentially does not depend on the actions of other buyers,
whereas it does in my model.4
Papers on social learning where an agent’s action/outcome is observed by a
subset of the other agents, for example Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), Bala and
Goyal (1998), Araujo and Camargo (2006), and Camargo (2014), are also re-
lated.5 The most related among these is Camargo (2014). In Camargo (2014),
like in my paper, an agent learns from the action of one other randomly cho-
sen agent in the economy. The crucial difference between these social learning
models and mine is that in the former there are no payoff externalities: an
agent’s actions do not affect the distribution of payoffs that other agents face.
3See, e.g., Daley and Green (2012), Cespa and Vives (2015), and Duffie et al. (2015).
4In Asriyan et al. (2015) payoff externalities are not present in equilibrium because, by
assumption, a single seller always meets multiple buyers who bid so that the winning buyer
always receives zero expected utility (as do losing buyers).
5Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) study the long-run behaviour of agents who choose be-
tween alternatives based on a simple decision rule that depends on others’ choices. Araujo
and Camargo (2006) study the stability of fiat money in a model where an agent learns from
the experience of his “parent”. Bala and Goyal (1998) study social learning in a network.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 I introduce
the model. In Section 2.3, I analyse a single buyer’s decision problem who does
not know the true state. I then analyse the equilibria of the model with many
buyers. I introduce the equilibrium and efficiency concepts and prove the
existence of an equilibrium in Section 2.4. The known-state and no-signals’
regimes are analysed in Section 2.5. The trade-signal and exogenous-signal
regimes are analysed in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. In each section, I
first characterise the equilibrium under that regime and then compare efficiency
across regimes. Section 2.8 summarises and discusses alternative modelling
choices.
2.2 Model
Time is discrete and runs from −∞ to ∞. The market is characterised by
state s ∈ {γ, β}, which is fixed for all periods. The amount of agents in the
market is measured at the start of a period, after entry.
Sellers. In each period a mass one of infinitesimal, non-strategic, and
infinitely-lived sellers enter the market. Each seller has one unit of an in-
divisible good of quality q for sale for a given price, normalised to zero.6 If
the state is “bad”, s = β, the quality distribution among the entering sellers,
Fβ(q), is U [0, 1]. If the state is “good”, s = γ, the entry distribution, Fγ(q), is
U [0, a] with a ∈ (1, 2].7
Buyers. In each period a mass one of infinitesimal, homogeneous, risk-
neutral, and short-lived buyers enter the market. A buyer has a unit demand
and his utility from quality q is u(q) = q. He discounts future payoffs at rate
6More generally, q stands for the indirect utility that a buyer obtains from the seller
denoted by q.
7I make the assumption that a ≤ 2 to ensure equilibrium existence as explained in more
detail when I introduce the equilibrium concept, on p. 29.
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δ ∈ (0, 1).8 A buyer dies after two periods. In state s, the amount of buyers
who entered today, called “young” buyers, is one. In state s, the amount of
buyers who entered yesterday and did not exit (“old” buyers) is defined to be
Os.
9 The total amount of buyers is 1 +Os in state s.
Timing. In each period, first, new entrants enter. Second, each buyer is
matched to a seller. Third, buyers update their beliefs. Fourth, buyers who
want to purchase do so and the agents who trade exit the market. Finally, the
period ends, old buyers die, and the agents who neither traded nor died are
carried over to the next period.
Matching. A buyer is randomly matched to a seller in each period and
meets each seller with equal probability. Matching is frictionless: each seller
is matched to exactly one buyer in a period. The quality of the seller that a
young buyer meets is denoted q1 and that an old buyer meets, q2.
Information. Buyers do not know the true state s. A buyer assigns prior
probability pi ∈ (0, 1) to the event s = γ and updates his belief according to
Bayes’ rule. I denote the prior odds by ω := pi
1−pi .
A young buyer updates his belief based on two pieces of information. He
observes the quality of the seller he meets, q1, and the realisation of a private
signal with binary outcome i ∈ {G,B}.10 Conditional on the true state, the
signal realisations are i.i.d. across buyers and periods. The precision of the
signal is P (G|γ) =: pG and P (B|β) =: pB. Without loss of generality, I assume
that pG ≥ 1 − pB so that outcome G is (weakly) good news, i.e., (weakly)
indicative of state γ. A young buyer’s belief after observing quality q1 and
signal outcome i is pi(q1, i) and his private history is (q1, i). His posterior odds
are pi(q1,i)
1−pi(q1,i) .
8The assumption δ < 1 is used for efficiency comparisons, as explained on p. 30.
9I study stationary equilibria so I omit time indicators on stock and flow variables.
10The quality q1 is a signal about the state, too, if it informs the buyer about which state
is more likely. However, I restrict the term “signal” to refer to only the second piece of
information that a young buyer receives.
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An old buyer learns from the quality of the seller he meets, q2.
11 An old
buyer’s private history is (q1, i, q2).
Information regimes. The precision of the signal that a young buyer receives
differs across the four information regimes that I consider:
1. Known state. Buyers know the state. Equivalently, they receive a per-
fectly informative signal with precision pG = pB = 1.
2. No signals. Buyers receive no signals. Equivalently, they receive a per-
fectly uninformative signal with precision pB = 1− pG.
3. Trade signal. Buyers receive a “trade signal” with outcome i ∈ {T,N}: a
buyer b observes whether a randomly drawn seller (equivalently, a buyer)
traded yesterday, without observing the quality of the seller.12 If b ob-
serves that the seller traded, I say b observes a “trade” (outcome T )
and if he observes that the seller did not trade, I say b observes “no
trade” (outcome N). The signal’s precision is determined in equilibrium:
P (T |s) =: ts is the equilibrium probability that a randomly drawn seller
trades in state s. A trade is informative if the equilibrium probability of
a trade differs across states. If a trade is good news (as I will prove in
Section 2.6), then outcome T corresponds to G (and N to B) and the
signal’s precision is pG = tγ and pB = 1− tβ.
4. Exogenous signal. Buyers receive a private signal with an exogenously
given precision pG = 1 and pB ∈ (0, 1).13
11I do not specify an old buyer’s belief because it is irrelevant for his optimal decision, as
I argue shortly.
12Note that it is irrelevant whether the buyer observes the trading activity of the previous
or an earlier period because I focus on the model’s stationary equilibria, as defined in Section
2.4.
13I restrict the set of values that the precision of the exogenous signal can take because
the set (pG = 1, pB) is sufficiently rich to demonstrate that the exogenous-signal regime can
be more efficient than the known-state and no-signals’ regimes.
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Table 2.1 summarises the four regimes. When comparing the information
regimes, I use the calligraphic superscripts K, N , T , and E for the four regimes
respectively. I suppress the superscripts when there is no ambiguity about
which regime is considered.
Table 2.1: Summary of the information regimes
Regime Signal outcomes Precision
i j P (i|s = γ) P (j|s = β)
Known-state (K) G B 1 1
No-signals’ (N ) G B pG 1− pG
Trade-signal (T ) T N tγ 1− tβ
Exogenous-signal (E) G B pG pB
Strategies. A young buyer’s strategy specifies for each possible private
history whether to accept the quality he observes, q1, or to continue to search.
Search is without recall: an old buyer cannot accept the quality he was offered
when young. An old buyer’s strategy is whether to accept or reject the quality
q2 and he optimally accepts any q2. Thus, a relevant strategy only specifies
the conditions under which a young buyer accepts q1 rather than continues.
Formally, a (relevant) strategy σ is a mapping from the space of a young
buyer’s private histories to the space of all probability distributions over his
actions“accept”and“continue”, σ : [0, a]×{G,B} → Ω({A,C}), where Ω is the
set of all probability distributions over accepting q1 (A) and continuing (C). A
strategy σ is a cutoff strategy if there exists a unique number q¯i (“cutoff”) for
i = G,B such that a young buyer who has observed signal outcome i accepts
all q1 ≥ q¯i and continues after q1 < q¯i. I call this strategy σ = (q¯G, q¯B).
I describe the equilibrium concept and provide the existence result after
analysing the problem of a single buyer who faces an unknown distribution of
options.
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2.3 Single-buyer problem
In this section I present the solution to the optimisation problem of a single
buyer who does not know the market distribution of options. I also describe
how the optimal policy and the expected quality that the buyer accepts depend
on his prior beliefs. Proposition 1 summarises the results.
Proposition 1. A single buyer’s optimal policy is a cutoff rule. The optimal
cutoff q¯ is
q¯ =
δa(1 + ω)
2(a+ ω)
.
The cutoff increases in the buyer’s prior odds, ω.
The expected quality that the buyer accepts is
1
2a(1 + ω)
[a(aω + 1) + ωq¯(aδ − q¯) + aq¯(δ − q¯)],
which also increases in ω.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Consider the market described in Section 2.2 with the difference that in
total only one buyer enters the market. The buyer does not know whether the
true state s is good or bad. Since in each period the distribution of entering
sellers is Fs and there is no other buyer to buy from these sellers, the market
distribution of qualities that the single buyer faces is identical to the entry
distribution. I derive the buyer’s optimal policy.
Consider the single buyer when old. An old single buyer accepts all qualities
since he has no further opportunities to search. Thus, I only consider the
buyer’s optimal decision when young in what follows. A young buyer has to
decide whether to accept the quality of the seller he meets, q1, or to continue
to search for another period. The young buyer’s optimal policy is to accept
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all qualities that exceed his continuation value, i.e., his discounted expected
utility from continuing with the search process for another period and then
accepting any offer. Thus, the optimal policy is a cutoff rule and the cutoff
equal to the continuation value.
The continuation value of a young buyer who meets a seller with quality q1
is
δ[pi(q1)EFγ (q) + (1− pi(q1))EFβ(q)].
The first term in the squared brackets accounts for the possibility that the
true state is good, in which case the buyer expects to receive the mean quality
EFγ (q) when old. The buyer’s belief depends on q1 because all qualities are
offered with different probabilities under the two possible distributions: fγ(q)
and fβ(q) differ for all q ∈ [0, a]. The second term accounts for the possibility
that the true state is bad and is interpreted analogously. The buyer discounts
the future at rate δ. The only unknown quantity in the above expression is
the buyer’s posterior belief pi(q1).
The buyer’s posterior odds after any q1 ≤ 1 are
pi(q1)
1− pi(q1) = ω
fγ(q1)
fβ(q1)
=
ω
a
, (2.1)
because random matching means that the probability of observing any quality
q1 in state s is equal to its density. Note that the posterior belief is the same
for all q1 ≤ 1. The buyer becomes more pessimistic about the state after any
q1 ≤ 1 because these qualities are more likely in the bad rather than the good
state. The buyer knows that the state is good after any q1 > 1, i.e., pi(q1) = 1
for all q1 > 1, because sellers with such qualities do not enter the market if the
state is bad.
The buyer is indifferent between continuing to search for another period
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and accepting quality q1 = q¯ that solves
q¯ = δ[pi(q¯)EFγ (q) + (1− pi(q¯))EFβ(q)].
The RHS of this equation is constant for all q¯ ≤ 1 and the LHS increases in q¯ so
the equation has at most one solution. The equation has exactly one solution
because after any q1 ≤ 1 the buyer’s continuation value is strictly below δ even
if he knows the state to be good: the mean quality in the good state is at most
one. Thus, also the optimal cutoff q¯ is below δ.
The optimal cutoff q¯ is solved for explicitly by using equation (2.1) for
beliefs and is presented in Proposition 1. It is straightforward to check that
the optimal cutoff increases in the buyer’s prior odds that the state is good, ω
(or, equivalently, in the prior belief pi). A more optimistic buyer is willing to
forgo some medium qualities that a less optimistic buyer accepts because the
former is more hopeful that he draws a high quality when old.
The expected quality that the buyer accepts is
∑
s
P (s)[(1− Fs(q¯))EFs(q|q > q¯) + Fs(q¯)δEFs(q)], (2.2)
The first term in the squared brackets accounts for the possibility that in state s
the young buyer’s offer q1 exceeds q¯, in which case the buyer accepts the offer.
The second term accounts for the possibility that q1 falls below q¯, in which
case the buyer accepts any offer when old. Equation (2.2) simplifies to the
expression in Proposition 1 after some manipulation. The expected accepted
quality increases in the buyer’s prior odds that the state is good, ω. To see
that, consider an increase in ω, i.e., suppose that the buyer becomes more
optimistic about the state. If the buyer did not change his cutoff in response,
the effect on the expected accepted quality would be positive because the buyer
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expects to get the higher, good-state, mean quality with a larger probability.
The buyer, however, optimally also increases the cutoff he uses, which has an
ambiguous effect on the expected accepted quality. But the total effect on the
expected accepted quality is positive because the buyer could also leave the
cutoff unchanged if it were optimal.
I turn to the equilibrium analysis of the model in the subsequent sections.
The most important change that many buyers introduce is that the market
distribution of qualities that a buyer faces is different from the entry distribu-
tion, because the market distribution is partly determined by the equilibrium
behaviour of all buyers.
2.4 Equilibrium concept, existence, and effi-
ciency
In this section, I introduce the equilibrium and efficiency concepts and prove
the existence of an equilibrium in cutoff strategies.
2.4.1 Equilibrium concept
I study the model’s symmetric stationary equilibria in cutoff strategies. I focus
on cutoff strategies because, first, the unique equilibrium under the known-
state regime (for any a) is in cutoff strategies. Second, an equilibrium in
cutoff strategies exists for all parameter values under the trade-signal regime.14
Third, cutoff strategies are simple, hence, a plausible description of reality.
A strategy profile σ∗ = (q¯G, q¯B) is an equilibrium if for all (q1, i), σ∗ is
14The assumption a ≤ 2 is sufficient to guarantee that an equilibrium in cutoff strategies
exists under the no-signals’ regime (and is also sufficient for the trade-signal regime). It is
known already from Rothschild (1974) that the optimal stopping rule of a buyer who faces an
unknown distribution of options may not be a cutoff rule and depends on the distributions
the buyer considers possible.
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(a) consistent: Hs(q) =: Hs, s = γ, β, is the equilibrium distribution of
qualities in state s induced by σ∗;
(b) optimal: a buyer prefers accepting q1 to continuing for all q1 ≥ q¯i and
vice versa for all q1 < q¯i, i.e., for i = B,G,
q1 ≥ δ
∑
s=γ,β
P (s|q1, i)EHs(q2) for all q1 ≥ q¯i,
q1 < δ
∑
s=γ,β
P (s|q1, i)EHs(q2) for all q1 < q¯i;
(c) uses Bayes updating: pi(q1,i)
1−pi(q1,i) = ω
P (q1|γ)
P (q1|β)
P (i|γ)
P (i|β) , where P (x|s) is the equi-
librium probability of observing event x in state s;
(d) stationary: the equilibrium strategy σ∗ and distribution Hs, s = γ, β,
are independent of the time period.
To distinguish the equilibrium cutoffs under the four regimes, I use different
denotation for the cutoffs: q¯β and q¯γ under the known-state, q¯ under the no-
signals’, q¯N and q¯T under the trade-signal, and q¯B and q¯G under the exogenous-
signal regime.
2.4.2 Efficiency
Delay in trading is the only possible source of inefficiency in the model because
buyers receive positive utility from any quality, the quality distribution of
entrants is fixed, matching is frictionless, and the amounts of buyers and sellers
equal.15 If buyers discount future payoffs, i.e., δ < 1, an equilibrium is the less
efficient the longer the delay.16 The (expected) delay as measured across the
15Welfare is equal to a young buyer’s expected utility of participating in the market, which
is a standard efficiency measure in this literature (see Lauermann (2012)).
16If buyers did not discount, i.e., δ = 1, delay would not matter.
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possible states is
D := piOγ + (1− pi)Oβ, (2.3)
as a buyer delays trade only if he becomes old.
2.4.3 Equilibrium existence
I prove that an equilibrium in cutoff strategies exists under the four regimes.17
Proposition 2. An equilibrium in cutoff strategies exists under the known-
state, no-signals’, trade-signal, and exogenous-signal regimes. Under the known-
state regime, the unique equilibrium is in cutoff strategies.
Proof. In Appendix A.
The idea of the proof is standard. I first suppose that all buyers but one
use a cutoff strategy and show that the best response of the single buyer is to
use a cutoff strategy, too. Then I show that the equation that an equilibrium
cutoff must satisfy has a solution. Finally, I prove that under the known-state
regime the unique equilibrium is in cutoff strategies.
I have to prove existence and cannot rely on results present in the literature
because the distribution of options is determined in equilibrium in my model.
I explain the complication in more detail in Section 2.5.
2.5 Known-state and no-signals’ regimes
In this section I first present the equilibrium cutoffs and distribution of qualities
under both regimes (Proposition 3). I argue informally why a cutoff-strategy
17I cannot show that the cutoff-strategy equilibrium is unique under the trade-signal
and exogenous-signal regimes. However, as all the results of the paper (most importantly,
comparisons across regimes) hold for all of the equilibria, should there be many, I use the
singular “equilibrium” throughout the paper.
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equilibrium exists by describing a young buyer’s decision. I then characterise
the equilibria. Finally, I compare the delay under the two regimes (Proposition
4).
Under the known-state regime, buyers know the true state s. Under the
no-signals’ regime, buyers do not know the state and a young buyer learns
about the state only from the offer of the seller he meets, q1. I present the
equilibrium cutoffs and distribution of qualities in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. 1. Under the known-state regime, the equilibrium cutoffs
q¯β and q¯γ are
q¯β = δ
4− δ −√δ(8− 3δ)
2(2− δ)2 , and q¯γ = aq¯β.
The equilibrium density of qualities in state s = γ, β is
hKs (q) =

fs(q)√
Fs(q¯s)
if q < q¯s,
fs(q)
1+
√
Fs(q¯s)
if q ≥ q¯s.
2. Under the no-signals’ regime, the equilibrium cutoff q¯ solves
q¯ =
δ
2− δ
ω(1 +
√
q¯)(a−√aq¯) + (a+√aq¯)(1−√q¯)
ω(1 +
√
q¯) + a+
√
aq¯
.
The equilibrium density of qualities in state s = γ, β is
hNs (q) =

fs(q)√
Fs(q¯)
if q < q¯,
fs(q)
1+
√
Fs(q¯)
if q ≥ q¯.
Proof. In Appendix A.
In the proof, I derive the equations that the cutoffs solve and the equilib-
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rium distribution of qualities by using the equilibrium description provided in
the proof of Proposition 2. I now describe a young buyer’s decision and explain
why I need to prove existence of an equilibrium in my model.
2.5.1 A young buyer’s decision
First consider the known-state regime. A young buyer knows that the true
state is s and must decide whether to accept the quality he observes, q1, or
to continue to search for another period. An old buyer accepts any quality.
Hence, a young buyer accepts q1 only if it exceeds his continuation value: the
discounted mean quality in state s, where the expectation is taken under the
equilibrium distribution hs. For a fixed behaviour of all other buyers, the mean
quality in a given state is constant. Hence, a buyer’s optimal rule is a cutoff
rule and the cutoff q¯s equals his continuation value in state s. The cutoff is
a solution to a fixed-point equation because the equilibrium distribution of
options hs depends on the cutoff.
Now consider the no-signals’ regime. A young buyer b’s choice is the same
as under the known-state regime, except that b’s continuation value is a dis-
counted average of the mean qualities in the good and bad states because he
does not know the true state s if q1 ≤ 1.18 Buyer b optimally accepts q1 iff it
exceeds his continuation value. I show that b’s continuation value is discontin-
uous in q1 if other buyers use a cutoff strategy so that it is not evident that b’s
best response is a cutoff rule.
Suppose that all young buyers but b use a cutoff qˆ. In the continuation
value, the weight that b puts on the good-state mean quality is his posterior
18A young buyer who observes quality q1 ≥ 1 optimally accepts q1 under all information
regimes as q1 ≥ 1 exceeds the discounted expected value of quality q2, i.e., the discounted
mean quality. In equilibrium, the mean quality is less than one because a cutoff strategy
means that high qualities are accepted more often than low, so that the mean quality under
the equilibrium distribution is smaller than under the entry distribution, EHs(q) < EFs(q),
and EFs(q) ≤ 1 for s = γ, β.
33
belief that the true state is good. His posterior differs from the prior as the
probability of observing quality q1 ≤ 1 differs in the two possible states. If
all other buyers use cutoff qˆ, then observing any quality below qˆ is equally
informative about the state (because if all buyers but one use a single cutoff,
the market distribution in state s = γ, β is piece-wise constant with a jump at
the cutoff; see Proposition 3). Likewise, observing any quality below one and
above the cutoff qˆ is equally informative about the state. Thus, as a function
of q1, a young buyer’s belief about the true state (and hence his continuation
value) has a discontinuity at qˆ and it is no longer evident that the fixed-point
equation that determines the equilibrium cutoff has a solution. In Appendix
A I show that the equation has a solution.
2.5.2 Equilibrium characterisation
I describe the equilibrium distribution of qualities and establish the relative
size of the cutoffs under the two regimes. The equilibrium distribution of
qualities Hs differs from the entry distribution, Fs. In particular, since high
qualities are accepted by all buyers while low qualities are accepted by only old
buyers, high qualities are under-represented in the equilibrium distribution as
compared to the entry distribution. The difference between the mean quality
under the equilibrium and entry distributions captures the payoff externality
that other buyers impose on a single buyer.
The ratio of equilibrium densities, hγ(q1)
hβ(q1)
, captures the change in the buyer’s
belief that the state is good after observing a certain quality q1. Since this ratio
varies with q1, young buyers have heterogeneous beliefs about the state under
the no-signals’ regime. An analogous heterogeneity in beliefs drives some of the
results under the trade-signal regime, in Section 2.6. The ratio of equilibrium
densities is not monotone increasing in q1, despite the ratio of entry densities
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being monotone.
I compare the sizes of the cutoffs under the two regimes in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The buyers’ equilibrium cutoff under the no-signals’ regime is be-
tween the cutoffs used under the known-state regime: q¯ ∈ (q¯β, q¯γ).
Proof. In Appendix A.
The result is intuitive. Suppose that buyers know the state at first. The
optimal cutoff in state s equals the discounted mean quality in state s. Now
consider making the state unknown (as under the no-signals’ regime). Then the
optimal cutoff is equal to an average between the discounted mean qualities in
the good and bad states. Thus, if we ignore the effect that buyers’ actions have
on the equilibrium distributions, a buyer’s optimal cutoff under the no-signals’
regime is between the cutoffs of the known-state regime. Buyers’ actions affect
the equilibrium distributions via the equilibrium cutoff, but not enough to
overturn the intuitive effect of making the state unknown.
I show in Appendix A that in a given state, the increasing function that
maps the cutoff into the probability of becoming old is the same under the
known-state and no-signals’ regimes.19 Hence, Lemma 1 implies Corollary 1,
which I use to provide intuition for the efficiency result in Section 2.7.
Corollary 1. In the bad state the expected delay is longer under the no-signals’
than the known-state regime, and vice versa in the good state.
2.5.3 Efficiency comparison
Proposition 4 compares efficiency under the no-signals’ and known-state regimes.
19See equations (A.3) and (A.12), on p. 114 and p. 121 respectively.
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Proposition 4. The expected delay under the known-state regime is
DK =
√
q¯β,
and under the no-signals’ regime
DN = pi
√
q¯
a
+ (1− pi)√q¯.
The known-state regime is more efficient than the no-signals’ regime (i.e.,
DK < DN ) if δ > 2
3
and vice versa if δ < 2
3
.
Proof. In Appendix A.
In the proof, I show that the expected delays under the no-signals’ and
known-state regimes are equal if a = 1 and that DN increases in a if δ > 2
3
and decreases if δ < 2
3
, while DK is independent of a. Note that even the
known-state regime is not fully efficient because a buyer does not internalise
the externality that he imposes on others. A low quality that a young buyer
b rejects remains in the market until it is accepted by some (old) buyer. The
rejection by b delays the realisation of gains from trade, creating an ineffi-
ciency. In Lauermann (2012), a similar reason causes the symmetric informa-
tion benchmark to be inefficient (Proposition 2). The comparative efficiency
result in Proposition 4 is driven by the specific assumption that the entry dis-
tributions of qualities are uniform and does not extend to more general entry
distributions.
2.6 Trade-signal regime
In this section, I first present the buyers’ equilibrium cutoffs and distribution of
qualities under the trade-signal regime (Proposition 5). I then characterise the
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equilibrium in steps: I show that a trade is good news (Lemma 3), that a low
quality is better news than a higher quality (Lemma 4), and the relative size
of the equilibrium cutoffs (Lemma 5).20 The characterisation is summarised in
Proposition 6. Finally, I show for certain parameter values that this regime is
less efficient than the no-signals’ regime (Proposition 7).21
Under the trade-signal regime, a young buyer learns about the true state s
from the quality he observes, q1, and a trade signal. The trade signal reveals
to a buyer b whether a randomly chosen seller traded in the previous period,
without revealing the seller’s quality. I say that b observes a “trade” (i = T )
if the seller traded and observes “no trade” (i = N) if the seller did not trade.
Conditional on the true state s, the signal’s realisations are i.i.d. across buyers
and periods. The precision of the signal is determined in equilibrium: the
per-period probability of observing a trade in state s, ts, is the equilibrium
probability that a randomly selected seller (equivalently, buyer) trades in state
s. A buyer who observes a trade uses the cutoff q¯T and a buyer who observes
no trade, the cutoff q¯N . The trade signal is a natural way to model a type of
information that is often observed in markets: information about the trading
frequency of other agents.
Proposition 5. Under the trade-signal regime, the equilibrium cutoffs q¯T and
20Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 5 prove that the characterisation is consistent and part one of the
proof of Proposition 5 that it is unique.
21My numerical results across the grid of (δ, a, pi) suggest that the result holds for all
parameter values.
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q¯N solve the following system of equations:

q¯T =
δ
2
ω(1 +Oβ)
2 1
aOγ
[
a2 − a2−q¯2T1+Oγ −
q¯2T−q¯2N
2+Oγ
]
+ a(1 +Oγ)
2 1
Oβ
[
1− 1−q¯2T1+Oβ −
q¯2T−q¯2N
2+Oβ
]
ω(1 +Oβ)2 + a(1 +Oγ)2
,
q¯N =
δ
2
ω(2 +Oβ)
1
aOγ
[
a2 − a2−q¯2T1+Oγ −
q¯2T−q¯2N
2+Oγ
]
+ a(2 +Oγ)
1
Oβ
[
1− 1−q¯2T1+Oβ −
q¯2T−q¯2N
2+Oβ
]
ω(2 +Oβ) + a(2 +Oγ)
,
aO2γ =
q¯T + (1 +Oγ)q¯N
2 +Oγ
,
O2β =
q¯T + (1 +Oβ)q¯N
2 +Oβ
.
The equilibrium density of qualities in state s = γ, β is
hs(q) =

fs(q)
Os
if q < q¯N ,
fs(q)(1+Os)
Os(2+Os)
if q ∈ [q¯N , q¯T ),
fs(q)
1+Os
if q ≥ q¯T ,
where Oγ and Oβ are defined by the above system of equations.
Proof. In Appendix A.
In the proof of Proposition 2 I showed that an equilibrium with charac-
teristics as summarised in Proposition 6 exists. The first part of the proof
of Proposition 5 (together with Lemma 4) shows that this characterisation is
unique. The second part is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
Since trades and no trades take place in both states if cutoff strategies
are used, both cutoffs q¯T and q¯N are used under the trade-signal regime in a
given state, while a single cutoff is used under the benchmark regimes. Ac-
cordingly, under the trade-signal regime, the equilibrium density of qualities,
hs, is piecewise constant and has two downward jumps, at q¯N and q¯T .
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2.6.1 Trade is good news
A trade is good news if the probability of observing a trade is higher in the
good state than in the bad. Lemma 3 establishes that a trade is good news. I
first show that the amount of old buyers is smaller in the good state than in
the bad.
Lemma 2. The amount of old buyers is smaller in the good state than in the
bad state, i.e., Oγ < Oβ, in an equilibrium where q¯T > q¯N and tγ > tβ.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Intuitively, the amount of old buyers is positively related to the entry
amount of sellers with qualities below q¯N and below q¯T because buyers use
cutoff strategies. Fewer low-quality sellers enter the market in the good state
so a young buyer is less likely to observe a below-cutoff quality and become
old in the good state. In the context of a real-estate market, Lemma 2 sug-
gests that fewer houses remain unsold from one month to the next if many
high-quality houses become available each month.
Lemma 2 implies that a trade is good news.
Lemma 3. The probability of observing a trade is higher in the good state than
in the bad, i.e., tγ > tβ, in an equilibrium where Oγ < Oβ.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Intuitively, trades happen more frequently in the good state than in the bad
because buyers use cutoff strategies and more sellers whose qualities exceed the
cutoffs enter in the good state. In a real-estate market context, learning that a
colleague has moved is good news about the qualities of houses on the market
because a person knows that his colleague has certain standards for the house
that he wants to live in (i.e., uses a cutoff strategy).
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2.6.2 Low quality is better news than high
If a young buyer learned only from the trade signal, then a trade being good
news would imply that a buyer who observes a trade uses a higher cutoff than
a buyer who observes no trade, i.e., that q¯T > q¯N . But a young buyer learns
from both the trade signal and the quality of the seller he meets, q1. In fact,
by the definition of a cutoff, a young buyer who has observed quality q1 = q¯i
and signal realisation i must be just indifferent between accepting the offer
q1 = q¯i and continuing. The buyer’s information (q1 = q¯i and i) affects his
continuation value via his belief about the state. Thus, the good-news content
of the quality q1 = q¯i matters for the level of the cutoff q¯i, i = N, T .
A trade being good news (Lemma 3) would translate directly into a higher
q¯T than q¯N if q1 = q¯T was (weakly) better news than q1 = q¯N . But the next
Lemma shows the opposite: q1 = q¯T is strictly worse news than q1 = q¯N
because the equilibrium odds of observing q1 = q¯T are lower than of observing
q1 = q¯N . The equilibrium odds of observing a quality q1 are equal to the
equilibrium densities’ ratio of q1 because of random matching.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium with a binary signal that has outcomes B and G
and a precision such that P (B|β) > P (B|γ), if the equilibrium cutoffs satisfy
q¯B < q¯G and Oγ < Oβ, the equilibrium densities’ ratio of q = q¯B is higher than
of q = q¯G, i.e.,
hγ(q¯B)
hβ(q¯B)
> hγ(q¯G)
hβ(q¯G)
.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Lemma 4 shows that the equilibrium densities’ ratio is not monotone in-
creasing in quality (despite the ratio of entry densities being monotone in-
creasing). The intuition behind the result in Lemma 4 is that a buyer knows
that other young buyers reject the offer q1 = q¯N more often in the good state
(because good news, i.e., trades, are observed more often in the good state),
40
while no buyer rejects offer q1 = q¯T . That is, a seller of quality q = q¯N is more
likely to stay on the market in the good state than in the bad, while a seller
of quality q = q¯T stays on the market in neither of the states. Thus, observing
q1 = q¯N is relatively better news than observing q1 = q¯T . In Wolinsky (1990)
such an asymmetry in the inference from options does not happen: all buyers
of the same age must have observed the same sequence of options in the past.
2.6.3 Relative size of equilibrium cutoffs
Despite q1 = q¯N being better news than q1 = q¯T , observing q1 = q¯N and no
trade together is worse news than observing q1 = q¯T and a trade together.
Lemma 5. The equilibrium cutoff used by a buyer who has observed a trade,
q¯T , is higher than the cutoff used by a buyer who has observed no trade, q¯N , in
an equilibrium where Oγ < Oβ, tγ > tβ, and
hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
> hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Intuitively, the effect of the trade signal outweighs the effect of the quality
draw q1 because q1 is less informative than the trade signal. By definition, q1
is a single quality draw. In contrast, the trade signal aggregates the experience
of many buyers and their respective quality draws. Since most quality draws
are informative, the aggregate is more informative than the single draw. As a
result, the equilibrium cutoff used after a trade is higher than the cutoff used
after no trade.
The equilibrium characterisation result is summarised in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Under the trade-signal regime, in equilibrium
(i) the cutoff used after a trade is higher than the cutoff used after no trade,
i.e., q¯T > q¯N ,
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(ii) the lower quality q = q¯N is better news than the higher quality q = q¯T ,
i.e., hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
> hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
, and
(iii) a trade is good news, i.e., tγ > tβ.
Proof. Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 5 prove that the characterisation is consistent. Its
uniqueness is proven in the proof of Proposition 5.22
2.6.4 Trade signal can reduce efficiency
Now I show that (for certain parameter values) the trade-signal regime is less
efficient than the no-signals’ regime.23
Proposition 7. The expected delay under the trade-signal regime is
DT = piOγ + (1− pi)Oβ,
where Oγ and Oβ are defined by the system of equations in Proposition 5.
A sufficient condition for the no-signals’ regime to be more efficient than
the trade-signal regime (i.e., DN < DT ) is that ω = 1 and a ≤ a¯(δ), where
a¯(δ) := 2δ
4− δ −√δ(8− 3δ)
(2− δ)2 .
Proof. In Appendix A.
In the proof I show by a series of approximations that a lower bound on the
expected delay under the trade-signal regime is greater than the expected delay
22The only proof that relies on the assumption that fγ and fβ are uniform is Lemma 4. In
the proof of Proposition 5 I show that the only alternative characterisation of an equilibrium
in a model where
fγ(q)
fβ(q)
increases in q is that a trade is good news and the cutoff used after
a trade is higher than the cutoff used after no trade, but a lower quality q = q¯N is worse
news than a higher quality q = q¯T .
23My numerical results suggest that the result holds throughout the parameter space.
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under the no-signals’ regime. Note that a necessary condition for a ≤ a¯(δ) to
hold is that δ > 2
3
.
Intuitively, under the trade-signal regime buyers use “too high” cutoffs, in
particular q¯N , on average as compared to the cutoff used under the no-signals’
regime. As explained above, in equilibrium, observing the quality q1 = q¯N
makes a buyer more optimistic than the quality q1 = q¯T . Accordingly, under
the trade-signal regime the equilibrium cutoff used after no trade is relatively
“too high” as compared to the cutoff used after a trade, which leads to a
longer delay under the trade-signal than the no-signals’ regime. Proposition
7 suggests that trades could happen faster in a real estate market if people
would not share their experiences on the market with each other.
Allowing buyers to observe options from a continuum, or, more precisely,
from a set with more than two elements, is important for the efficiency result.
Recall that in Wolinsky (1990), at the time of making a purchase decision,
all buyers of the same age hold the same beliefs about the state. I show in
Appendix A (Claim 1, p. 144) that in a version of my model that corresponds
most closely to Wolinsky (1990), i.e., with two possible qualities, where buyers
of the same age have the same beliefs, the trade signal can improve efficiency.
Finally, I comment on the importance of payoff externalities for the ef-
ficiency result. Payoff externalities arise because the market distribution of
options is determined in equilibrium. The equilibrium distribution of options
determines the informativeness and good-news content of a certain option.
The asymmetric good-news content of different options leads to “too opti-
mistic” buyers on average under the trade-signal regime. In fact, if payoff
externalities are ignored (i.e., if we assume that the distribution of options
that buyers face is identical to the entry distribution) then the trade signal
does not change market efficiency as compared to the no-signals’ regime (the
proof is in Appendix A, Claim 2, p. 148).
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2.7 An exogenous signal that improves effi-
ciency
The aim of this section is to show that the trade signal is special: there exist
precisions of a private signal that improve upon market efficiency as compared
to both the no-signals’ and known-state regimes (Proposition 9). Before pre-
senting the result, I derive the buyers’ equilibrium cutoffs and distribution of
qualities under the exogenous-signal regime (Proposition 8).
Under the exogenous-signal regime, young buyers learn about the true state
s from q1 and a private signal with realisation i ∈ {G,B}. The precision of the
private signal is exogenously given: pG := P (G|γ) = 1 and pB := P (B|β) ∈
(0, 1). Realisation B reveals the bad state and realisation G is good news as
pG > 1− pB.
Proposition 8. Under the exogenous-signal regime with pG = 1 and pB ∈
(0, 1), the equilibrium cutoffs q¯G and q¯B solve the following system of equations:

q¯G =
δ
2
ω(1 +Oβ)(a−√aq¯G + q¯G) + (a+√aq¯G)(1− pB)q¯B
ω(1 +Oβ) + (a+
√
aq¯G)(1− pB) ,
q¯B =
δ
2Oβ
[
1− 1− q¯
2
G
1 +Oβ
− pB(q¯
2
G − q¯2B)
pB +Oβ
]
,
O2β =
(1− pB)Oβ q¯G + pB(1 +Oβ)q¯B
pB +Oβ
.
The equilibrium density of qualities in state s = γ, β is
hs(q) =

fs(q)O
−1
s if q < q¯B,
fs(q)(Os + P (B|s))−1 if q ∈ [q¯B, q¯G),
fs(q)(1 +Os)
−1 if q ≥ q¯G.
where Oβ is defined by the above system of equations and Oγ =
√
q¯G
a
.
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Proof. In Appendix A.
The proof of Proposition 8 is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.
The equilibrium densities have similar features under the exogenous-signal
and trade-signal regimes: both feature downward jumps at the two relevant
cutoffs in each state. Under the exogenous-signal regime, the cutoff used after
signal realisation G is higher than the cutoff used after realisation B, i.e.,
q¯G > q¯B. A buyer is maximally pessimistic after B because he knows that the
state is bad, while G leaves a buyer uncertain about the state.
I now prove that precisions for the exogenous signal exist such that the
exogenous-signal regime is more efficient than both the known-state and the
no-signals’ regime.
Proposition 9. The expected delay under the exogenous-signal regime is
DE = piOγ + (1− pi)Oβ,
where Oγ =
√
q¯G
a
and Oβ is defined by the system of equations in Proposition
8.
Precisions of the exogenous signal exist such that the exogenous-signal regime
is more efficient than the more efficient of the no-signals’ and known-state
regimes.
Proof. In Appendix A.
The proof shows that if pB is close to one, the exogenous-signal regime is
more efficient than the known-state regime for all δ. I show separately that
if δ < 2
3
and pB is close to zero, the exogenous-signal regime is more efficient
than the no-signals’ regime (recall Proposition 4: the no-signals’ regime is more
efficient than the known-state regime if δ < 2
3
).
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The intuition behind the result in Proposition 9 is the following. Recall
Corollary 1: in the bad state, delay is shorter under the known-state regime
than under the no-signals’ regime and vice versa in the good state. The
efficiency-improving exogenous-signal regime tries to mimic the more efficient
of the known-state and no-signals’ regimes state by state. The exogenous sig-
nal reveals the state in which buyers trade quickly if they know the state (i.e.,
the bad state) and shrouds the state where buyers trade slowly if they know
the state (i.e., the good state).
The trade signal cannot be more efficient than the more efficient of the
known-state and no-signals’ regimes because it cannot mimic the more efficient
of the two extreme information regimes state by state. In particular, the trade
signal can never reveal one state. Any optimal strategy prescribes that a young
buyer rejects some qualities (e.g., q1 = 0) and accepts others (e.g., q1 = 1) so
trades and no trades take place in both states. Hence, rather than inducing
the buyers to shift towards using the more efficient cutoff state by state, a
trade signal moves the buyers’ cutoffs in the same direction in the two states:
towards the no-signals’ cutoff as compared to the known-state cutoffs and
towards the known-state cutoffs as compared to the no-signals’ cutoff. Not
surprisingly, this cannot be better than the more efficient of the known-state
and no-signals’ regimes.
In fact, the precision of the trade signal is such that the regime is less
efficient than the no-signals’ regime even if the no-signals’ regime is less efficient
than the known-state regime (i.e., for δ > 2
3
). Recall the intuition: the cutoff
used after no trade, q¯N , is too high as compared to the other cutoff, q¯T , because
observing the low quality q1 = q¯N is better news than observing the higher
quality q1 = q¯T . In contrast, the similar discrepancy between the good-news
content of q1 = q¯B versus q1 = q¯G has no effect on the cutoff q¯B under the
exogenous-signal regime because pG = 1: the buyer knows that the state is
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bad after B. Hence, q¯B is not too high relative to q¯G.
I argued in Section 2.6 that if payoff externalities are ignored (i.e., if we as-
sume that the distribution of options that buyers face is identical to the entry
distribution) then the trade signal does not change market efficiency as com-
pared to the no-signals’ regime. In fact, if the payoff externalities are ignored,
neither the trade signal nor the exogenous signal change market efficiency as
compared to the no-signals’ regime (see Claim 2 in Appendix A, p. 148).
2.8 Conclusion
I summarise the paper and then discuss some alternative modelling choices.
In many markets, buyers do not know exactly the distribution of options
they face. In a model of such a market, I analyse the effect a signal about
trading frequency (“trade signal”) on the model’s cutoff-strategy equilibrium.
In equilibrium, observing that another market participant traded is good news.
Buyers who observe a trade use a higher cutoff than buyers who observe no
trade, despite buyers’ learning from relevant sampled options that puts a coun-
tervailing pressure on the cutoffs. Contrary to the intuition that more informa-
tion increases market efficiency, the trade signal can reduce market efficiency as
compared to a market without this signal. That is, a real estate market could
be more efficient if people would not talk to each other about their experiences
on the market. The reason is that buyers are “too optimistic” on average in a
market with the trade signal and delay trade, which is inefficient. Conversely,
a private signal with an appropriately chosen precision increases market effi-
ciency as compared to both a market without this signal and a market where
buyers know the distribution of options.
This exogenous signal is less likely to arise endogenously in a market than
a trade signal because the informational requirements for generating the ex-
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ogenous signal are much larger. Generating the exogenous signal requires the
knowledge of the true distribution of options while a trade signal requires
sellers to report their own past trading behaviour. The exogenous signal
with the efficiency-improving precision can be implemented, for example, by a
consumer-protection agency. If the true distribution is bad, the agency some-
times (but not always) produces a condemning report about the qualities in
the market. No report is produced if the distribution is good. Hence, a con-
demning report reveals the bad distribution, but no report leaves the buyers
in darkness about the true distribution.
Strategic information transmission. I argue that strategic sellers would
emit and strategic buyers acquire the information provided by a trade signal,
leading to an outcome that is worse for all impatient agents on the aggregate.
First, impatient sellers would emit information on trades. High-quality
sellers trade in their entry period and prefer (weakly) not to reveal that they
traded. But low-quality sellers may not trade in their entry period and prefer
strictly to reveal not trading. Buyers understand that signal realisation“trade”
or no information can come from a high-quality seller and “no trade” comes
from a low-quality seller (just like in my model). Hence, “no trade” makes
a buyer more willing to accept a low quality, which is in the interests of a
low-quality seller.
Second, buyers would acquire information on trades. Since a trade signal
informs the buyer about the true state and improves his assessment of his
continuation value, he would optimally acquire it.
General entry distributions of sellers. Suppose that the quality distribu-
tions of the entering sellers, Fγ and Fβ, are some continuous distributions with
a common positive support and Fγ first-order stochastically dominates Fβ. The
equations that describe an equilibrium in cutoff strategies are straightforward
to derive, but the cutoffs do not have closed-form solutions.
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However, I expect the three main results of the paper (the equilibrium char-
acterisation, that a trade signal can reduce welfare as compared to no signals,
and that an appropriate exogenous signal improves welfare as compared to
both no signals and known state) to continue to hold. I showed in Section 2.6
that under the assumption that Fγ first-order stochastically dominates Fβ, the
only alternative cutoff-strategy equilibrium characterisation to the one pro-
vided in Proposition 6 is that a trade is good news, the cutoff used after a
trade is (weakly) higher than after no trade, and the lower quality q = q¯N is
worse news than the higher quality q = q¯T . Two crucial asymmetries in the
model drive the two other results. The first asymmetry, between updating
after q1 = q¯N and q1 = q¯T , drives the result that the trade signal can reduce
efficiency. This asymmetry continues to exist (unless the ratio fγ
fβ
grows too
quickly) because a cutoff strategy affects the equilibrium distribution asym-
metrically under a private signal regime. The second asymmetry, that delay is
shorter in the bad state under the known-state than the no-signals’ regime and
vice versa in the good state, drives the result that an exogenous signal with
precision pG = 1 and pB ∈ (0, 1) improves efficiency. I expect this asymme-
try to continue to exist because I expect the cutoff used under the no-signals’
regime to be between the two cutoffs used under the known-state regime.
More possible states. Many possible quality distributions means that a
buyer has a distribution of beliefs over all the possible states and updates this
distribution when new information arrives. I expect the three main results
to continue to hold because there is no argument above that relies on the
assumption that only two distributions are possible.
Long-lived buyers. If buyers live infinitely, then the existence of a stationary
equilibrium in cutoff strategies fails, but can be restored with an additive search
cost. If buyers live for ∞ > L > 2 periods, the analysis of the model does
not change substantially. In each life period, a buyer uses some cutoff that
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depends on his belief. The three main results of the model should continue to
hold.
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Chapter 3
A Two-Agent Model of
Sequential Search and Choice1
3.1 Introduction
Standard sequential search models with recall build on the assumption that the
search and choice stages comprise an undivided whole: the person who searches
can stop and choose an item from the accumulated choice set at any time during
the search process. This is an innocuous assumption if the preferences of the
person are stable over time. In this paper, I extend the standard search model
by allowing the preferences according to which the final choice is made to differ
from the preferences according to which search is conducted. The set-up has
two natural interpretations. First, the preferences belong to different parties:
a “searcher” compiles a choice set via sequential search and a “chooser” chooses
from the collected choice set. Second, the preferences belong to one individual,
but change between the search and choice stages. I show that the searcher’s
optimal policy is a cutoff rule and characterise the cutoff.
1A version of this chapter was published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 2016, vol. 123, pp. 122–137, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.12.010.
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Examples of such search problems are an HR manager collecting applica-
tions for a boss who wants to hire a new worker and a real estate agent collect-
ing offers for a client interested in buying a flat. An example involving a person
and a set of individuals is a spouse looking for a job that determines the living
place of the couple. A person who is interested in the return while search-
ing for an investment opportunity, but later tempted to invest in an option
that involves the least paperwork is a “multi-selves” example. More generally,
many household decisions, organisational decisions involving different phases
and multiple agents, choice processes partially outsourced to external partners,
and political decisions involving advisers feature one party compiling a choice
set for another party via search.
In this paper I analyse the optimal policy of a searcher who compiles a
choice set for a chooser. I describe the model as a two-agent search problem.
The searcher (he) and the chooser (she) have preferences over all items in
some grand set of alternatives and the preferences are distributed according
to a general full-support distribution function. The searcher has access to an
arrival process. In each period, one item arrives and the searcher discovers how
much utility both he and the chooser receive from the item if it is chosen. The
searcher decides in each period whether to stop or continue the search process.
If he stops the process, all the items that have arrived are presented to the
chooser. The chooser then chooses the best item in the choice set according
to her preferences, unless all the items in the set yield her less utility than her
exogenous outside option. Utilities are realised when an item or the outside
option is chosen. The process ends after the chooser moves. The searcher’s
problem is to choose an optimal policy, knowing the chooser’s choice rule.
First, I derive and characterise the searcher’s optimal policy. His optimal
policy is a cutoff rule and the cutoff depends on the item that would be chosen
by the chooser were the searcher to stop immediately, xm. The searcher’s
52
cutoff is the lower the higher the chooser values this item because it acts as a
restriction for the searcher: if he is unsatisfied with the utility he would receive
from xm, a new item is chosen only if the chooser’s utility from it exceeds her
utility from xm. This has two implications. First, if the searcher finds an
item that has a very high value for the chooser, he optimally stops searching
regardless of the value that the item yields him. Second, the observed cutoff
that the searcher uses weakly decreases in time, although the search horizon is
infinite and the search environment stationary. I call this the “discouragement
effect”. The discouragement effect is present because the restriction that xm
poses on the searcher’s problem becomes more stringent over time: as time
passes, the searcher is less and less likely to find an item that the chooser values
higher than the chooser-preferred item in the choice set. The searcher is thus
optimally willing to accept a lower-value item. The time-decreasing cutoff is
in contrast with the standard single-agent search model where a stationary
environment translates into a stationary cutoff. The searcher’s cutoff in my
model is defined implicitly by a differential equation. I use a specific joint
distribution where the utilities’ correlation is captured by a single parameter to
numerically show that an increase in the correlation parameter unambiguously
increases the searcher’s cutoff, in line with intuition.
Second, I compare the optimal cutoff of the searcher in the main model
with imperfectly correlated preferences to the benchmark where the agents’
preferences are perfectly aligned. I first show that in the main model the
searcher’s cutoff is always lower than in the benchmark: the searcher is “less
picky”. The reason is that the chooser chooses according to her preferences not
the searcher’s, which lowers the latter’s continuation value, thus, his cutoff. I
then provide an example where, as a result of a mean-preserving spread, the
searcher’s cutoff decreases in the main model, while it always increases in the
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benchmark: the searcher is “more conservative” in the main model.2 A mean-
preserving spread increases the probability that an item arrives that yields
very high utility to the chooser, which restricts the searcher and lowers his
continuation value.
Third, I explain how the model’s characteristics differ from those of two
single-agent search models that feature a cutoff that varies in time. The first
model has convex search costs and the second, a deadline. Both models result
in an optimal cutoff that decreases over time (for a fixed searcher-preferred item
in the choice set) because they assume non-stationarity of the environment.
My model features a time-decreasing cutoff in a stationary environment. Also,
in those models returning to an item found earlier is possible, while search
always stops with the item found last in my model. The searcher returns to
an item found earlier in the models with convex search costs or a deadline
because his cutoff decreases exogenously over time. In my model, the decrease
is endogenous: it happens only if there is a change in the item that would be
chosen if the searcher stopped. I suggest three tests on data that allow us to
reject one or more of the three models.
Finally, I extend the model to allow the searcher to hide items. The searcher
can hide an item only upon its arrival and succeeds with some given probability
that is strictly less than one. He observes whether he succeeded before making
the decision whether to stop or continue. As in the main model, I find that
the searcher’s cutoff is unambiguously decreasing in the value that the chooser
receives from the chooser-preferred item in the choice set. For independent
uniform utilities, I show that the cutoff is strictly increasing in the probability
that the searcher succeeds in hiding. The constraint of having to account
for the chooser’s preferences becomes the less restrictive the likelier that the
searcher can ignore those preferences.
2The terms“less picky”and“more conservative”are borrowed from Albrecht et al. (2010).
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Related literature. This paper is closely related in spirit to other papers
on multi-agent search. In “committee” search problems the committee has a
common arrival process and must agree on when to stop.3 In “couple” search
problems each person has his own arrival process, but they pool income.4 In
these papers some part of the entire search process is joint, while distinct
parties are engaged in distinct stages of the process in my paper. I borrow
the terms “less picky” and “more conservative” in their specific meaning from
Albrecht et al. (2010) (AAV henceforth). AAV analyse a committee search
problem, where M members of an N -member committee must agree in order
to stop the search process. They find that a committee is both less picky and
more conservative than a single searching agent. I find that the searcher is
both less picky and more conservative if his and the chooser’s preferences are
misaligned as opposed to when they are perfectly aligned. These results echo
those of AAV, but the reasons behind the results are somewhat different, as I
explain in Section 3.5.
The paper is also related to the literature on delegated choice in a principal-
agent set-up.5 In these papers an agent makes the final choice and the principal
either restricts the set of items that the agent can choose from or designs a
contract. The available set of items is assumed to be given so the problem is
static, unlike in this paper.
Finally, the paper is related to a recent literature on delegated search,
where an agent conducts search on behalf of the principal in a principal-agent
set-up, by Postl (2004), Armstrong and Vickers (2008), Lewis (2012), Kova´cˇ
et al. (2014), and Ulbricht (2016). These models study how the principal can
3For example, see Albrecht et al. (2010), Compte and Jehiel (2010), Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki (2011), Kamada and Muto (2015), and Moldovanu and Shi (2013).
4For example, see Dey and Flinn (2008), Ek and Holmlund (2010), Flabbi and Mabli
(2012), and Guler et al. (2012).
5For example, see Holmstro¨m (1977), Armstrong (1995), Alonso and Matouschek (2008),
Armstrong and Vickers (2010), Amador and Bagwell (2013), and Kova´cˇ and Kra¨hmer (2015).
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direct the agent to conduct search in the best possible manner for her, whereas
here I focus on the “agent’s” optimal policy in the case when the “principal”
cannot affect the search process directly. In Postl (2004), Lewis (2012), and
Ulbricht (2016) utility is transferable, the agent does not receive direct utility
from a chosen item, and the focus is on the principal’s optimal contracts. In
the other two papers, which are the most closely related to mine, utility is non-
transferable. I point out how the modelling choices in Armstrong and Vickers
(2008) (AV henceforth) and Kova´cˇ et al. (2014) (KKT henceforth) result in a
simpler optimal policy for the agent in AV and KKT than in my paper. In
AV, the working paper version of Armstrong and Vickers (2010), the agent
makes the final choice and the principal permits the choice among a subset
of all items. In an extension to the main model of AV, the agent collects the
items via costly search. The most important aspect of my paper that sets
it apart from AV is that the final choice is made by the “principal”, whereas
in AV it is made by the agent. In AV the agent’s cutoff is constant in time.
In KKT the agent’s preferences differ cardinally, but not ordinally, from the
principal’s and the final choice is made by the principal. They solve for the
principal’s optimal mechanism. The most important aspect of my paper that
sets it apart from KKT is that the agent and principal do not necessarily agree
on which item is the best, whereas they do in KKT. The latter assumption
together with assuming that the agent wants to stop with any item trivialises
the unrestricted agent’s optimal stopping rule in KKT, unlike in this paper.
The next section contains the details of the model. Section 3.3 intro-
duces the benchmarks: the searcher’s optimal policy when the chooser’s pref-
erences are either perfectly aligned or opposed to his. Section 3.4 solves for
the searcher’s optimal policy when the agents’ preferences are arbitrarily im-
perfectly correlated. Section 3.5 characterises the solution. The final section
concludes. All omitted proofs are in Appendix B.
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3.2 Model
A “chooser” (“she”) has to choose an item. The chooser makes the final choice
from a choice set, but the choice set is compiled by someone else, a “searcher”
(“he”). The final choice determines the agents’ payoffs. The searcher compiles
the choice set over time via sequential search. He chooses when to stop and
take the accumulated choice set to the chooser.
The arrival process. Time, t, is discrete and t = 1, 2, ...,∞. The searcher
uncovers one new item in each period. He cannot affect how frequently or
which items arrive. Search costs c > 0 per period for the searcher.6
Preferences. The t’th item that arrives, xt = (ut, vt), is worth ut to the
searcher and vt to the chooser. The xt are independent draws from a time-
invariant distribution H(u, v) with support [0, 1]2. The marginal distributions
of u and v are Fu(·) and Fv(·) respectively. The conditional distribution of
u is G(u|v). The associated pdfs are h, fu, fv and g, with fu(u) > 0 for all
u ∈ [0, 1]. I assume that the cost of search is relatively low, c < E[u], so that
at least one period of search is desirable for the searcher. In the main part
of the paper, Section 3.4, the joint distribution H has full support. In the
benchmarks of Section 3.3, the preferences are either perfectly aligned (i.e.,
P (v = u) = 1 and u ∼ Fu) or opposed (i.e., P (v = 1 − u) = 1 and u ∼ Fu).
The chooser has an outside option v¯ ∈ [0, 1].
Actions. In period t the searcher chooses an action at ∈ {S,C}. If the
searcher continues (at = C), the chooser does not get to act in period t. If the
searcher stops (at = S), he takes the accumulated choice set to the chooser.
He cannot hide or lie about items.7 Let the v-maximal item in a choice set
be denoted xm = (um, vm). From any non-empty choice set brought to the
6The main results of the paper are not sensitive to the assumption of an additive search
cost as opposed to discounting. I will comment on the result that does change in Section
3.4.
7The assumption of no hiding is relaxed in Section 3.6.
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chooser, she chooses xm if vm ≥ v¯, which yields utility vm to the chooser and
um to the searcher. If vm < v¯, the chooser chooses her outside option, which
yields utility v¯ to her and zero utility to the searcher. The entire process ends
after the choice of an item or the outside option.
Timing. In each period, first, the searcher uncovers an item and pays the
search cost. Second, he chooses whether to stop or continue to search. If the
searcher stops searching, the chooser chooses an item from the choice set or her
outside option, after which utilities are realised and the entire process ends. If
the searcher continues search, the process moves to the next period.
Problem. The searcher’s problem is to maximise his expected utility from
the search process, taking as given the chooser’s outside option and her choice
rule. The searcher refuses to start the search process if his expected utility is
negative.
3.3 Two benchmarks
In this section, I derive the searcher’s optimal policy in two benchmark versions
of the model: in the first benchmark, the chooser’s preferences are perfectly
aligned with the searcher’s, and in the second, her preferences are perfectly
opposed to the searcher’s.
3.3.1 Perfectly aligned preferences
Suppose that the chooser’s preferences are perfectly aligned with the searcher’s,
i.e., v = u with probability one and u ∼ Fu. If the chooser’s outside option
is zero, the searcher’s problem is equivalent to the standard single-agent se-
quential search problem (see McCall (1970) for the seminal contribution). In
the standard search model, the searcher’s optimal policy is a cutoff rule and
the optimal cutoff is equal to the searcher’s expected value from starting the
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search process (if the value is positive).
The presence of the outside option changes the analysis, but not consid-
erably. The searcher’s optimal policy is a cutoff rule because of the standard
argument: if it is optimal for the searcher to stop with some item which yields
him u, then it is optimal for him to stop with any item that yields him u′ > u.
If the u-value of an item that he finds exceeds the cutoff, he stops and the
chooser chooses this item; the searcher continues otherwise. The cutoff does
not depend on time as the problem is stationary. Since the chooser has an
outside option worth v¯, the searcher must wait for an item that exceeds the
outside option to receive non-zero utility from the search process. The searcher
uses one of two possible cutoffs depending on the size of the chooser’s outside
option. First, if the outside option is low, the cutoff equals u˜, the optimal
cutoff in the standard single-agent sequential search problem. This cutoff is
optimal if v¯ ≤ u˜. McCall (1970) shows that u˜ solves
∫ 1
u˜
u− u˜ dFu(u) = c.
The cutoff decreases in the cost of search, in line with intuition.
Second, if the chooser’s outside option v¯ is higher than u˜, the searcher is
restricted by v¯ in the sense that in the absence of it he would stop with items
with u ∈ [u˜, v¯), but has to continue in the presence of v¯. Then the searcher
optimally searches until he finds the first item that exceeds the chooser’s out-
side option (if his expected payoff from search is positive). His expected payoff
from the search process, Ua(·), is
Ua(v¯ > u˜) = P (u ≥ v¯)E[u|u ≥ v¯] + P (u < v¯)Ua(v¯ > u˜)− c. (3.1)
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) accounts for the possibility that
59
the first item’s value exceeds the outside option, in which case the searcher
stops and receives u. If the value of the first item is lower than the outside
option, he continues and his expected continuation value is the same as at the
start of today. The searcher also pays the search cost c. The expected payoff
decreases in the cost of search and the chooser’s outside option. If the outside
option is very high, i.e., v¯ > v∗a where v
∗
a solves Ua(v
∗
a > u˜) = 0, the searcher
refuses to search because his expected payoff from searching is negative.
3.3.2 Perfectly opposed preferences
The chooser’s preferences are perfectly opposed to the searcher’s if v = 1 − u
with probability one and u ∼ Fu. I argue that the searcher’s optimal cutoff is
zero: he stops with any first item acceptable to the chooser, if he searches at
all.
The searcher knows that the chooser chooses according to v. As a result,
he optimally stops after uncovering the first item which satisfies v ≥ v¯ if he
searches at all. The reason is as follows. Without loss of generality, suppose
that v1 ≥ v¯. Then for any realisation of u1, x2 satisfies one of the following.
Either v2 ≥ v1 (so that u2 ≤ u1) or v2 < v1 (so that u2 > u1). If the searcher
stopped after observing the second item, in the former case the chooser would
choose x2 and in the latter case x1. Since u2 ≤ u1 in the former case and the
searcher would end up getting x1 at an extra search cost in the latter case, he
prefers stopping after x1 for any realisation of x2.
The searcher’s expected payoff from stopping with the first item which
satisfies v ≥ v¯, Uo(·), is
Uo(v¯) = P (v ≥ v¯)E[1− v|v ≥ v¯] + P (v < v¯)Uo(v¯)− c.
The equation is interpreted analogously to equation (3.1), except that here the
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searcher receives u = 1 − v when he stops. The searcher’s expected payoff is
decreasing in the cost of search and the chooser’s outside option. The expected
payoff from searching is positive if v¯ < v∗o where v
∗
o solves Uo(v
∗
o) = 0. If the
expected payoff from searching is negative, the searcher refuses to search and
receives zero.
The results of the first two sections are summarised in the following:
Lemma 6. (i) If the agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned, the searcher’s
optimal policy is a cutoff rule and the cutoff is max{u˜, v¯}, where u˜ solves
∫ 1
u˜
u− u˜ dFu(u) = c.
(ii) If the agents’ preferences are perfectly opposed, the searcher’s optimal
policy is a cutoff rule and the cutoff is zero.
3.4 Imperfectly correlated preferences
In this section the searcher’s preferences, u, are imperfectly correlated with
the chooser’s preferences, v. The only assumption I make is that their joint
distribution H(u, v) has full support. I derive the first main result of this paper:
the searcher’s optimal policy is a cutoff rule, the cutoff is u¯ = max{0, u¯(vm)},
and decreases in vm.
The searcher’s optimal policy is a cutoff rule because of the standard argu-
ment: if it is optimal for the searcher to stop with some item x = (u, v) (which
yields him u), then it is optimal for him to stop with any x′ = (u′, v) with
u′ > u. The searcher stops if the utility that he receives from the item that
would be chosen by the chooser if the searcher was to stop immediately (i.e.,
from the v-maximal item in the choice set) exceeds the cutoff, and continues
otherwise. The optimal cutoff u¯(·) is equal to the searcher’s value from con-
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tinuing, U(·), if the value is positive as in the standard search problem (and
zero if the value is negative).
The cutoff differs from the standard search problem’s in several ways. Re-
call that xm = (um, vm) is the v-maximal item in the choice set. First, the
cutoff is defined only if the choice set contains at least one item with v ≥ v¯,
i.e., if vm ≥ v¯. If no such item exists in the choice set, the searcher optimally
continues for all um (if it was optimal for him to start the search process).
Second, the positive part of the cutoff u¯(·), or, equivalently, the searcher’s con-
tinuation value U(·), depends on vm if vm > v¯, but not on um. Suppose that
the v-maximal item in the choice set is xm = (u
′, v′) with v′ = vm > v¯. If
the searcher stops, xm is chosen and he receives u
′. If he is not satisfied with
u′, i.e., if u′ < u¯(·), he continues. I argue that his continuation value depends
on v′, but not on u′. The first part is simple: the continuation value depends
on v′ because a new item x′′ = (u′′, v′′) is chosen only if v′′ > v′. The second
part requires considering two scenarios. Suppose a new item (u′′, v′′) arrives.
If v′′ > v′, then vm changes to v′′: the new item would be chosen if the searcher
stopped. Hence, u′ is irrelevant. If v′′ ≤ v′, then vm stays v′. But then nothing
has changed as compared to the previous period (when the searcher continued)
so that u′ < u¯(·) must still hold. In neither of the cases does the searcher’s
continuation value depend on u′. Hence, the expected value of continuing de-
pends only on vm so I write U(vm) and u¯(vm). Third, the cutoff is weakly
positive for vm ∈ [v¯, v∗]. The lower bound v¯ is explained above. The upper
bound v∗ is present because vm acts as a restriction: if vm is very high, finding
an item with v > vm becomes so unlikely that the searcher’s continuation value
becomes negative and he is better off accepting any positive um. The upper
bound is defined as u¯(vm = v
∗) = 0 and v∗ ∈ [0, 1] is guaranteed to exist for
all c > 0 because of the full support assumption.
I solve for the searcher’s continuation value for various values that vm can
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take. Suppose first that vm ≤ v¯. Then no item in the choice set is acceptable
to the chooser. The searcher’s expected value from continuing (equivalently,
starting) the search process is
U(v¯) =
∫ 1
v¯
∫ 1
0
max{u, U(v)}h(u, v) du dv +
∫ v¯
0
U(v¯)fv(v) dv − c, (3.2)
if the next item that he finds is (u, v). The first term on the RHS accounts for
the possibility that v exceeds the chooser’s outside option: the item would be
chosen if the searcher stopped. The searcher chooses optimally whether to stop
or continue, where the continuation value is now a function of v. The second
term on the RHS accounts for the possibility that v is below the chooser’s
outside option: the searcher continues and the continuation value is the same
as at the start of today. The last term accounts for the search cost. As U(v¯) is
also the searcher’s expected payoff from the entire search process, he optimally
starts search if and only if U(v¯) ≥ 0.8
Suppose now that vm > v¯. The searcher’s expected value from continuing
is
U(vm) =
∫ 1
vm
∫ 1
0
max{u, U(v)}h(u, v) du dv +
∫ vm
0
U(vm)fv(v) dv − c, (3.3)
which is interpreted analogously to (3.2), except that v¯ in (3.2) is replaced by
vm in (3.3).
As argued above, the searcher’s optimal cutoff u¯(·) is equal to his continu-
ation value U(·) if the latter is positive, which is true for vm ∈ [v¯, v∗] for some
v∗ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies U(v∗) = 0. The optimal cutoff is zero if the continua-
tion value is negative, i.e., if vm > v
∗. Thus, by substituting U(vm) = u¯(vm)
8If I assume discounting instead of an additive search cost, then the searcher optimally
starts search for all v¯ < 1 as U(v¯) > 0 for all positive discount factors. This is the only
result that qualitatively changes in a model with discounting.
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into equation (3.3) and using the fact that the agent continues for x = (u, v)
s.t. v > vm and u < u¯(v), I can rewrite (3.3) for vm ∈ [v¯, v∗] as
u¯(vm) = [1− Fv(vm)]−1
∫ v∗
vm
[∫ u¯(v)
0
u¯(v)h(u, v) du+
∫ 1
u¯(v)
uh(u, v) du
]
dv,
(3.4)
where v∗ satisfies
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
v∗ uh(u, v) dv du = c. As search becomes more costly,
i.e., c increases, v∗ decreases. Intuitively, if search becomes more costly, it
becomes unprofitable for the searcher to continue searching at lower values of
vm. Note that the function u¯(vm) does not depend on v¯: the chooser’s outside
option affects the searcher’s expected payoff from the entire search process,
but does not affect his optimal policy for vm > v¯. The above integral equation
can be converted into an ODE by differentiation:
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= − fv(vm)
1− Fv(vm)
∫ 1
u¯(vm)
u− u¯(vm) dG(u|vm). (3.5)
On the RHS of the equation, the first term is the hazard rate, i.e., the proba-
bility that an item with v = vm arrives, given that such an item has not arrived
earlier. The integral term is the utility that the searcher expects to get from
the new item, u, in excess of the continuation value u¯(vm), which is realised
only if u exceeds the continuation value. The slope of the cutoff depends on
the search cost c indirectly via the level of the cutoff u¯(vm), because the level
depends on the search cost via v∗ (see equation (3.4)).
Equation (3.5) does not, in general, have a closed form solution (I provide
a closed form solution for an example below; further examples can be provided
under the assumption that u and v are independent). However, equation (3.5)
together with the initial condition u¯(v∗) = 0 fully pin down the function u¯(vm),
which proves the first main result of this paper.
Proposition 10. If the agents’ preferences are imperfectly correlated, the
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searcher’s optimal policy is a cutoff rule. The cutoff is u¯ = max{0, u¯(vm)},
where u¯(vm) solves
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= − fv(vm)
1− Fv(vm)
∫ 1
u¯(vm)
u− u¯(vm) dG(u|vm),
for vm ∈ [v¯, v∗], where v∗ satisfies u¯(v∗) = 0.
The cutoff u¯(vm) is clearly decreasing in vm for any joint distribution of
u and v with full support. The chooser’s value from the v-maximal item in
the choice set, vm, acts as a restriction on the searcher’s problem because a
new item x′ = (u′, v′) is chosen only if v′ > vm. The stricter the restriction,
the lower the searcher’s expected payoff from the process. I provide sufficient
conditions for the cutoff u¯(vm) to be concave in the Appendix.
The fact that the cutoff u¯(vm) decreases in vm means that the searcher
does not start searching for high enough outside options for the chooser, v¯.
The chooser’s outside option acts as a similar restriction on the searcher’s
problem as vm. If the outside option is very high, i.e., v¯ > v
∗, the searcher
prefers to receive payoff zero to starting the process and making a loss in
expectation. The critical outside option above which the searcher prefers not
to start searching is lower if the agents’ preferences are misaligned as opposed
when they are perfectly aligned (v∗ < v∗a), in line with intuition.
Example 1 (Analytic solution). Suppose the utilities are independent and h
uniform on [0, 1]2. The searcher’s expected value from continuing, equation
(3.4), simplifies to
u¯(vm) =
1
2
(1− vm)−1
∫ v∗
vm
1 + u¯(v)2 dv,
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Figure 3.1: Searcher’s cutoff as a function of vm if utilities are independent
and uniform for v¯ = 1
10
and c = 1
8
. Dashed line: u˜.
and the associated ODE (3.5) to
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1(1− u¯(vm))2. (3.6)
In Appendix B I solve equation (3.6) in detail using a standard method and
the initial condition u¯(v∗) = 0. The explicit solution is
u¯(vm) = 1−
[
1
2
ln
(
1− vm
1− v∗
)
+ 1
]−1
, (3.7)
where the value v∗ has a simple closed form: v∗ = 1− 2c. The conditions that
guarantee that u¯(vm) is concave in vm are satisfied. An example of the cutoff
as a function of vm is depicted in Figure 3.1.
3.5 Characterisation
In this section, I first prove that the cutoff policy exhibits the “discouragement
effect” and derive testable implications of my model (Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2).
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I then show that, as compared to when the agents’ preferences are perfectly
aligned, if the preferences are misaligned, the searcher is “less picky” and “more
conservative” (Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4).9 These two results echo the results
of AAV, but the mechanisms are slightly different as I explain below. I then
provide a numerical example where a higher correlation of preferences results
in an unambiguously higher cutoff. Finally, I show how the implications of
my model differ from two models that extend the standard single-agent search
model and generate a cutoff that varies over time. Omitted details are in
Appendix B.
3.5.1 The cutoff exhibits the discouragement effect
I present the second main result of the paper, that the searcher’s cutoff exhibits
the discouragement effect.
Definition 1 (Discouragement effect). A cutoff policy exhibits the discourage-
ment effect if the cutoff weakly decreases in time.
I call a time-decreasing cutoff the discouragement effect because the longer
the searcher searches, the lower-utility items he is willing to accept and the
more likely he is to stop: he is discouraged from searching longer and for better
items as time goes on.
Proposition 11. The cutoff policy u¯(vm) exhibits the discouragement effect.
Proof. The cutoff u¯(vm) is weakly decreasing in time if and only if vm is weakly
increasing in time because ∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
< 0 (by Proposition 10). Since vm is the
maximum utility that the chooser gets from a choice set collected up to some
time t, vm is formally the tth (or largest) order statistic of the choice set at time
t: vm = max{v1, v2, ..., vt}. But the tth order statistic must weakly increase in
9The terms “less picky” and “more conservative” are borrowed from AAV.
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t: for any vm at date t, either vt+1 ≤ vm, in which case vm is left unchanged,
or vt+1 > vm, in which case vm takes on the new, higher value vt+1.
Proposition 2 states that he searcher’s cutoff stochastically weakly decreases
over time, despite the search environment being stationary. This is in contrast
to the standard sequential search model where a stationary environment trans-
lates into a stationary cutoff.
The source of the discouragement effect in my model is an endogenous
restriction on the searcher’s problem that becomes more stringent over time.
In particular, the v-value of the v-maximal item in the choice set, vm, acts as
a restriction on the searcher’s problem. The value vm restricts the searcher
because he has to uncover a new item that yields higher utility to the chooser
than vm in order for her to choose the new item. The higher vm, the less likely
is the searcher to uncover an item with a v-value that exceeds vm. But vm
weakly increases in time because it is the largest order statistic of the choice
set according to the chooser’s utility. If search has gone on for long enough, vm
is high and the searcher optimally stops after uncovering any new item (u, v)
with v > vm regardless of how low u is. Suppose that the HR manager in the
example in the Introduction cares about the amiability of a future colleague
and the boss about the new worker’s qualifications. The discouragement effect
means that if the HR manager receives the application of a highly qualified
worker who does not seem like an amiable colleague, he stops looking for other
applicants since he anticipates that the boss hires the highly qualified applicant.
3.5.2 Testable implications of the discouragement effect
I describe the testable implications of my model and especially the discourage-
ment effect. I assume that we have data on multiple search instances involving
the same (or a group of representative) searcher(s) and the same chooser.
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Each search instance is identified with an observation i. I assume that each
observation contains information on the duration of search (denoted Di), the
identity of item that is the final choice (denoted Mi), and on the searcher’s and
chooser’s utility from the finally chosen item xMi = (uMi , vMi). Data on utili-
ties is unlikely to occur in field settings, but can be generated in a laboratory
experiment. The model has three testable implications.
1. uMi and vMi are negatively correlated across i. This is a direct impli-
cation of the negatively-sloped cutoff. If at any point during the search
process vm is low, the searcher only stops if um is high. Conversely, if
vm is high, then a low um is sufficient for the searcher to stop. Across
many instances, the utilities from the finally chosen item should, thus,
be negatively correlated.
2. Di and uMi (vMi) are negatively (positively) correlated across i. The
longer the searcher searches, the more likely is vm to be high. But when
vm is high, the searcher accepts items with lower u-values as compared
to when vm is low. Across many instances, the search duration and the
searcher’s utility from the finally chosen item should, thus, be negatively
correlated.
3. Di = 1 for some observations i. The searcher stops after any first item
x1 if v1 > v
∗. In this case, the utility that he gets from the item, u1, is
irrelevant for his stopping problem and he stops immediately.
I explain in Section 3.5.6 how my model’s implications differ from the impli-
cations of two other models with a time-varying cutoff.
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3.5.3 The searcher is less picky if the preferences are
misaligned
I borrow the terminology from AAV and say that a searcher with a lower cutoff
is “less picky” than a searcher with a higher cutoff.
Proposition 12. The searcher is less picky if the agents’ preferences are mis-
aligned as compared to when they are perfectly aligned, i.e., max{u˜, v¯} > u¯(vm)
for all vm.
Proof. In Appendix B.
The reason why the searcher whose preferences differ from the chooser’s is
willing to accept a lower utility item is that his search process is restricted by
the chooser’s preferences: an item that the searcher “likes” is chosen only if
the chooser “likes” it, too. If their preferences are not perfectly aligned, the
agents “like” the same item with a probability less than one. This reduces the
searcher’s value from continuing with the search process, hence, his optimal
stopping cutoff. In terms of the hiring example, if amiable people have higher
qualifications, then the HR manager is optimally satisfied with a more ami-
able new colleague as opposed to when amiability and qualifications are not
perfectly correlated, despite the HR manager’s preferences not changing.
In AAV, a committee is less picky than a single searcher because the com-
mittee members need to compromise. In my model, the searcher is less picky
if his and the chooser’s preferences are misaligned because choice is made ac-
cording to the chooser’s not the searcher’s preferences.
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3.5.4 The searcher is more conservative if the prefer-
ences are misaligned
I say that the searcher is “more conservative” if his cutoff may decrease as
a result of a mean-preserving spread (MPS) to the distribution of utilities,
following AAV. In order to make the comparison between the benchmark and
full model and give an unambiguous meaning to a MPS, I assume in this
section that the marginal distributions of u and v equal: Fu = Fv =: F . I
show by example that the searcher is more conservative if his and the chooser’s
preferences are misaligned as compared to when they are perfectly aligned.
Proposition 13. If Fu = Fv and the joint distribution of the utilities is sub-
jected to a mean-preserving spread, the searcher’s cutoff always increases when
the preferences are perfectly aligned, but for a certain set of parameter values
the cutoff decreases when the agents’ preferences are misaligned.
Proof. (a) If the joint distribution of the utilities is subjected to a mean-
preserving spread, the searcher’s cutoff u˜ always increases when the pref-
erences are perfectly aligned. For proof, see e.g., AAV.
(b) If the joint distribution of the utilities is subjected to a mean-preserving
spread, the searcher’s cutoff may decrease when the agents’ preferences
are misaligned.
By example: I provide an example where a MPS leads to a decrease in
u¯(vm). Assume that u and v are independent and have the same uniform
marginal U [a, b] for 0 < a < b. An example of a MPS for the distribution
is U [a′, b′] such that 0 < a′ < a, b′ > b and a+ b = a′ + b′.
The cutoff of the searcher satisfies the ODE
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= − (b− u¯(vm))
2
2(b− a)(b− vm) .
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The searcher prefers continuing to accepting any item if his value from
continuing is higher, i.e., if U(vm) ≥ a. Define v∗ by U(v∗) = a, or
u¯(v∗) = a. The closed form is v∗ = b− 2c. Then I can solve the ODE by
using similar methods as in the proof of Claim 3 (in Appendix B). The
result is
u¯(vm) =
2(b+ a)− 2b− b ln[ b−v∗
b−vm ]
2− ln[ b−v∗
b−vm ]
.
Differentiating the expression with respect to b while keeping a+ b con-
stant gives
∂u¯(vm)
∂b
= 4vm − 2(a+ b) + (b− vm)
(
ln
[
b− v∗
b− vm
])2
.
This is negative, for example, if b = 3, a = 1, vm = 1.5 and c =
1
4
.
The reason why a MPS leads to an unambiguous increase in the searcher’s
optimal cutoff in a single-agent search problem is that a MPS increases the
option value of searching by making really high (and really low) draws possible.
The gain from the really high draws outweighs the loss from the really low
draws because the latter are not accepted.
But if the searcher’s and chooser’s preferences are misaligned, the searcher’s
optimal cutoff may decrease under a MPS: the searcher behaves more conser-
vatively under more risk by accepting lower-utility items. Two counteracting
effects lie behind the result. On the one hand, a MPS of the u-value distribu-
tion benefits the searcher through the same mechanism as in the single-agent
setup: the option value of searching increases and the cutoff rises. On the
other, a MPS increases the probability of items with high v-value occurring. A
high v-value acts as a stricter constraint for the searcher, thus decreasing his
value of continuing and his cutoff. In the example in the proof of Proposition
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13, the negative effect outweighs the positive.
In AAV, a committee is more conservative than a single searcher. The
result emanates from one committee member exerting a negative externality
on another, e.g., in a unanimity committee a member can veto stopping in a
case where everyone but the vetoing member would receive a high utility from
the last item. The externality can become more severe under a MPS. Here, the
result emanates from the fact that under a MPS, the searcher is more likely to
find an item with a v-value that restricts him more.
3.5.5 The searcher prefers more aligned preferences
I use a simple parametric family of joint distributions to demonstrate numer-
ically that the searcher is unambiguously better off as the agents’ preferences
become more aligned. Analytic results are not available even for this simple
family. Let the marginals of u and v be uniform on [0, 1] throughout. The
family of distributions deals with positive and negative correlation separately.
For positive correlation, let the correlation be governed by parameter q ∈ [0, 1].
The conditional distribution of u given v is
u|v =
 v with probability q,∼ U [0, 1], u |= v −′′− 1− q.
The searcher’s optimal cutoff is the solution to a system of two differential
equation that have the form
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1[A(1− u¯(vm))2 +B(vm − u¯(vm))],
where A and B depend only on q. I provide the exact differential equations in
Appendix B, but omit them here as they do not possess closed form solutions
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that could be interpreted.
For negative correlation, let the correlation be governed by parameter r ∈
[0, 1]. The conditional distribution of u given v is
u|v =
 1− v with probability r,∼ U [0, 1], u |= v −′′− 1− r.
The searcher’s optimal cutoff is the solution to a system of at most two differ-
ential equations, with a general form given by
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1[A(1− u¯(vm))2 +B(1− vm − u¯(vm))],
where A and B depend only on r. Again, I provide the exact differential
equations in Appendix B.
The positive and negative correlation parameters q and r can be comprised
in a single parameter ρ: ρ = q for q ≥ 0 and r = 0, and ρ = −r for r ≥ 0 and
q = 0. I show numerically that u¯(vm) increases in ρ. The result is illustrated
in Figure 3.2 (a lower curve corresponds to a lower level of correlation). The
dashed grey line corresponds to u˜ = 1−√2c. The intuition behind the result is
simple: if the utilities become more correlated, then the searcher is better off as
his continuation value, thus, his cutoff, increases. An increase in ρ affects the
cutoff via several channels. First, a higher ρ directly increases the searcher’s
value from stopping because a high v is more likely to be accompanied by
a high u. Second, a higher ρ indirectly increases the searcher’s continuation
value both through the decreased likelihood that a high v is restrictive and
through the increased future value of stopping.
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Figure 3.2: Searcher’s cutoff u¯(vm) at correlation levels ρ =
−0.9,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 0.9 (from lowest to highest curve respectively; dashed
line: u˜), for v¯ = 0, c = 1
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3.5.6 Differences with other models with time-varying
cutoffs
Here, I first explain how the characteristics of my model differ from two single-
agent search models that feature a time-varying cutoff. I then explain how
data allows us to test between the three models. Recall that in my model the
searcher’s cutoff decreases (weakly) over time because vm increases (weakly)
over time. Extensions to the standard single-agent search model that produce
a time-varying cutoff are, for example, a finite horizon, i.e., a deadline, (see
Gronau (1971) and Lippman and McCall (1976)) or convex search costs (see
Stiglitz (1987)). For a fixed u-value of the u-maximal item in a choice set
(denoted uw), the cutoff in these models is decreasing over time.
First, I compare the reasons behind the decreasing cutoffs. The reason be-
hind a decreasing cutoff (for a fixed uw) in all the models is that the searcher’s
value of continuing decreases over time. However, the deeper reasons differ.
In the case of a deadline, the decrease is due to the exogenous end of search
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possibilities beyond the deadline. In the case of convex search costs, the de-
crease is due to search becoming exogenously more expensive over time. In
fact, in these models the environment is non-stationary to start with (so that
a non-stationary optimal policy is expected), contrary to my model.
Second, for a fixed uw, the time path of the cutoff in a model with a deadline
or convex search costs is strictly concave in time (for infinitesimally short time
periods) whereas it is not concave in time in my model. In a model with a
deadline, the cutoff is concave in time because for a fixed time increment, the
loss of future search opportunities for the searcher becomes larger the closer
the deadline. In a model with convex search costs, the cutoff is concave in the
number of items (equivalently, in the number of time periods). In my model,
the cutoff is not concave in time because with positive probability, a new item’s
v-value does not change vm, in which case the cutoff is constant in time, thus,
not concave. The time path of the cutoff cannot be constant in time in a model
with either a deadline or convex search costs.
Third, the models generate different outcomes. In my model, the item that
is finally chosen is always the one uncovered last. This is because the cutoff
decreases only if the v-maximal item changes. If a new item becomes the v-
maximal item in the choice set, it changes the cutoff u¯(vm), and the new item
may be attractive for the searcher to stop with (if um ≥ u¯(vm)). Alternatively,
the new item does not become the v-maximal item in the choice set and the
u-value of the v-maximal item still falls below the cutoff. In contrast, there
may be return to an item uncovered earlier in a model with either a deadline
or convex search costs. This is because in those models the cutoff can decrease
independently of the changes in the choice set. An item that yielded too little
utility to warrant stopping in the past may exceed the decreased cutoff. In
sum, in my model the final choice is always the item uncovered last despite
the searcher’s decreasing cutoff.
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Finally, I explain how data allows to test between the three models. For
this exercise, let us first assume that each observation i in the data corresponds
to a search instance and contains information on the duration of the search
process, Di, and the identity of the item that is the final choice, Mi. Suppose
we have data on i ≥ 1 of such search instances. Then the following predictions
are made.
1. If in any observation the finally chosen item is not the last item, i.e., Mi 6=
Di for an i, we can reject my model. This prediction is a straightforward
implication of the last of the three differences between the three models
that I discussed above.
2. If the deadline in the deadline model is some known number Ti for each
observation and the duration of search exceeds the deadline in any ob-
servation, i.e., Di > Ti for some i, we can reject the deadline model.
If each observation would additionally contain information about the utilities
of all the items that the searcher has observed, a further prediction is made.
3. If the finally chosen item does not have the highest utility for the searcher
among all the observed items, i.e., if for some i, uMi 6= argmaxx∈CDi u(x),
where CDi is the choice set collected until the process ends, we can reject
the deadline and the convex search cost models. In my model, the final
choice is made according the chooser’s preferences, v, but is made ac-
cording to the searcher’s preferences, u, in the two other models. Thus,
in the two models the final choice must be the u-maximal item, but not
in my model.
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3.6 An extension: hiding
Suppose that the searcher can hide the items that he wants to at the arrival of
the items, but is not always successful.10 The searcher takes two actions in any
period: a1t ∈ {H,D} and a2t ∈ {S,C}, where H stands for for trying to hide,
D for not trying to hide, S for stopping, and C for continuing. In particular,
after an item xt arrives and the searcher has found out its utilities (ut, vt),
he can attempt to hide the item xt. He succeeds with probability p ∈ (0, 1).
After taking the hiding action and observing its outcome, he chooses whether
to stop or continue.
I derive the searcher’s optimal hiding and stopping policy. In sum, the
searcher (weakly) prefers hiding all items that he does not want to stop with.
He prefers stopping to continuing if his value from stopping exceeds the value
from continuing. Let us consider all the possible cases that the searcher may en-
counter. Suppose that the v-maximal item found until today is xm = (um, vm),
the searcher decided to continue yesterday (so that um < U(vm)), and the item
found today is x = (u, v). I describe the searcher’s optimal policy for all pos-
sible values of xm and x. If v < vm, the searcher continues (with or without
attempting to hide x) because xm is chosen if the searcher stopped (so that his
continuation value is definitely U(vm)) and um < U(vm) still holds. If v ≥ vm,
it must be that U(v) ≤ U(vm) because a higher vm is a greater restriction
for the searcher (I verify later that this property holds). Then the maximum
continuation value that the searcher can achieve is, after successfully hiding x,
U(vm). Hence, if u > U(vm) it is optimal for the searcher to not to hide the
item and stop. Suppose that u < U(vm): the searcher would like to continue if
he could guarantee himself the continuation value U(vm). Hence, the searcher
attempts hiding, a1t = H, and if he succeeds, continues as um < U(vm). If
10I thank Ludo Visschers for proposing this particular hiding technology.
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he fails, he compares u to his continuation value U(v): if u ≥ U(v), he stops,
and continues otherwise. In sum, the optimal sequence of actions for the agent
after receiving x = (u, v) with v ≥ vm is
(a1t, a2t) =

(D,S) if u ≥ U(vm),
(H,C) if u < U(vm) and hiding succeeds,
(H,S) if u ∈ [U(v), U(vm)) and hiding fails,
(H,C) if u < U(v) and hiding fails.
(3.8)
The optimal sequence of actions for the agent after receiving x = (u, v) with
v < vm is
(a1t, a2t) = ({H,D}, C). (3.9)
Thus, the optimal policy of the searcher can no longer be characterised by a
cutoff only, but the buyer’s continuation value U(vm) is sufficient to describe
his optimal policy.
Note that if vm is very high, then the searcher’s continuation value is neg-
ative for the same reason as in the main model. For any p < 1, if vm is very
high, the probability that an item arrives with v > vm (and u > um) is very
low, so that the searcher’s benefit from continuing is less than the cost c. As
before, let the smallest vm s.t. U(vm) ≤ 0 be v∗.
Formally, the searcher’s continuation value when the v-maximal item is
(um, vm) and the newly arrived item is (u, v) satisfies
U(vm) =
∫ vm
0
U(vm)fv(v) dv +
∫ v∗
vm
∫ U(v)
0
[pU(vm) + (1− p)U(v)]h(u, v) du
(3.10)
+
∫ U(vm)
U(v)
[pU(vm) + (1− p)u]h(u, v) du+
∫ 1
U(vm)
uh(u, v) du dv
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+∫ 1
v∗
∫ U(vm)
0
[pU(vm) + (1− p)u]h(u, v) du+
∫ 1
U(vm)
uh(u, v) du dv − c,
where v∗ satisfies U(v∗) = 0. Each of the terms corresponds to the optimal
sequence of actions for the searcher as described in equations (3.8) and (3.9).
For example, the first terms reads that if the new item’s v-value falls below
the v-value of the v-maximal item found so far, then the searcher optimally
continues to search (as described in equation (3.9)). The last double integral
reads that if v > v∗ (so we know that the searcher’s continuation value is
negative if he fails to hide x), the searcher stops for sure if u exceeds his
best possible continuation value U(vm) (last term). If u falls short of this
continuation value, the searchers tries to hide x. If he succeeds, he continues.
If he fails, he stops.
In a similar fashion as in the main model, I derive the differential equation
that the continuation value satisfies by differentiating (3.10) with respect to
vm and obtain the ODE
∂U(vm)
∂vm
∫ 1
vm
∫ 1
0
h(u, v) du− p
∫ U(vm)
0
h(u, v) du dv
= −
∫ 1
U(vm)
h(u, vm)(u− U(vm)) du,
with terminal condition U(v∗) = 0, or
∫ 1
v∗
∫ 1
0
uh(u, v) du dv = c. Since the RHS
of the ODE is negative and the multiplier after ∂U(vm)
∂vm
on the LHS positive,
the continuation value is unambiguously decreasing in vm. I explain why v
∗
is independent of p. The value v∗ is defined as the smallest vm such that
U(vm = v
∗) ≤ 0 so that the searcher wants to stop with any um when vm = v∗.
Suppose that vm = v
∗ and the searcher continues (so that um = 0). Then the
best continuation value that he can hope for is U(v∗) = 0. If an item (u, v)
arrives with v > v∗, the searcher optimally accepts any u because U(v) < 0
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for all v > v∗. But the expected value of u (given that v > v∗) is independent
of p, hence, v∗ is independent of p.
The comparative static derivative of U(vm) with respect to p cannot be
determined without solving for the function U(vm). I show for an example
below that, in line with intuition, the searcher’s continuation value is strictly
increasing in p for all vm < v
∗.
Example 2 (Analytic solution, continued). Suppose that the utilities are in-
dependent and h uniform on [0, 1]2. The searcher’s expected value from con-
tinuing simplifies to
U(vm)(1− vm) =
∫ 1
v∗
∫ U(vm)
0
[pU(vm) + (1− p)u] du+
∫ 1
U(vm)
u du dv − c
+
∫ v∗
vm
∫ U(v)
0
[pU(vm)+(1−p)U(v)] du+
∫ U(vm)
U(v)
[pU(vm)+(1−p)u] du+
∫ 1
U(vm)
u du dv.
The derivative of the above is
∂U(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1(1− pU(vm))−1(1− U(vm))2,
with terminal condition U(v∗) = 0, which yields v∗ = 1 − 2c. Note that the
equation collapses to equation (3.6) if p = 0.
I use the same method to solve the ODE as before, using the initial condition
U(1− 2c) = 0. The implicit solution for U(vm) is
2(1− p) U(vm)
1− U(vm) − 2p ln(1− U(vm)) = ln
(
1− vm
1− v∗
)
.
The RHS is constant in U(·) and p so the derivative dU(·)
dp
= − LHSp
LHSU(·)
> 0 as
LHSU(·) > 0 and LHSp < 0 (straightforward to verify from above). In line
with intuition, the searcher becomes unambiguously better off as his probability
of successfully hiding the items that he wants to hide increases: he is less likely
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Figure 3.3: Searcher’s cutoff u¯(vm) at hiding probabilities p = 0, 0.5, 0.999
(from lowest to highest curve respectively), for v¯ = 0, c = 1
8
. Dashed line: u˜.
to have to account for the chooser’s preferences as p increases. The result is
illustrated on Figure 3.3: higher curves stand for higher p.
Allowing the searcher to hide items acts in a similar manner as making
the agents’ preferences more aligned in the sense that the searcher’s expected
continuation value increases. However, the parametric examples illustrate that
there are differences (see Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). For a given correlation
structure, an increase in p shifts the searcher’s continuation value up, with-
out changing the value of vm above which the continuation value is zero (v
∗).
Conversely, for a given p, an increase in the correlation parameter shifts both
the searcher’s continuation value and v∗ up. The reason behind the difference
is as follows. If the utilities become more positively correlated, then a high vm
is not as great a restriction on the searcher’s problem: the probability that an
item arrives tomorrow with a v-value that exceeds vm does not change, but it is
more likely that the high v-value is accompanied by a high u-value. Thus, the
searcher’s continuation value at any given vm goes up, including at vm = v
∗. If,
instead, the probability that the searcher successfully hides an item increases,
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then if the searcher fails to hide an item with a high vm, the high vm is exactly
as great a restriction on the searcher’s continuation problem as in the original
model (i.e., where p = 0).
3.7 Conclusion
I study a sequential search problem where the preferences according to which
the final item is chosen differ from the preferences according to which search
is conducted. A natural interpretation of this set-up is that the preferences
belong to separate parties: a searcher and a chooser. Alternatively, the pref-
erences of an individual change between the search and choice stages. I show
that the optimal policy of the searcher is a cutoff rule and that the cutoff de-
pends on the items that the searcher has found so far. Due to this dependence,
the search behaviour features the discouragement effect: the cutoff decreases
weakly in time. The cutoff is characterised in detail in Section 3.5. The charac-
teristics of my model differ from two single-agent search models that feature a
time-varying cutoff (convex search costs or deadline). In particular, my model
features a cutoff that decreases endogenously over time and never generates
return to an item rejected earlier, in contrast to the other models.
I interpret some of the results in the context of the multi-selves example
presented in Introduction. The cutoff decreasing in vm means that a person
who has an investment opportunity readily available that involves minimal
paperwork (i.e., if the outside option for the chooser is high) optimally does
not even attempt to look for an opportunity with a higher return as he knows
he will choose the minimal-paperwork option when the time to invest arrives.
A person who is intimidated by paperwork optimally stops searching at an
opportunity that offers a lower return (but little paperwork) than a person
who likes paperwork: the former is less picky. He is less picky not because he
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cares less about returns, but because he anticipates that he chooses a minimal
paperwork option when investing.
The model can be extended in several ways. First, if the model is limited
to the principal-agent set-up it is reasonable to think that the principal (the
chooser) has a direct influence on the agent’s (the searcher’s) search process.
The possibilities of extending the model are rich due to the many possible
assumptions that can be made on the action space and commitment power of
the principal.
For example, the principal’s optimal restrictions on the length of search
are interesting to study because these are prevalent in real life. I have derived
partial results on the principal’s optimal minimal search duration restriction, t¯
(equivalently in this model, on the principal’s optimal restriction on the min-
imal number of options that she requires the agent to inspect). The agent’s
optimal policy is not affected by the minimal search duration restriction be-
cause after t¯ periods have passed, the agent’s problem looks exactly like for
the searcher who does not face time restrictions (as in the main part of this
Chapter).
The principal’s optimal minimal search duration restriction is more com-
plicated to derive. In a two-period model, I have shown for the same class
of joint distributions as in Section 3.5.5 that the principal’s optimal minimal
search duration restriction is shorter if the agent’s and principal’s utilities are
more positively correlated. I have not been able to derive analytic results for
the infinite-horizon model because the functional form of the searcher’s optimal
cutoff is complicated even for this simple class of joint distributions. However,
I expect the result of the two-period model to generalise because of the fol-
lowing. The minimal search duration restriction helps the principal to prevent
the agent to stop searching too early. The agent is more likely to stop too
early from the principal’s viewpoint if he inspects an item that has a low value
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for the principal and a high value for the agent. Such items are more likely
to occur if the agent’s and principal’s utilities are more negatively correlated,
thus lengthening the minimal search duration restriction that is optimal for
the principal.
Results on more general time restrictions are complex to derive because a
maximal search duration restriction (a deadline) means that the agent’s cutoff
depends directly on the amount of time available before the deadline. In fact,
it is unclear that the optimal restriction in the time dimension is a connected
interval.
Second, the model in this paper is very general with respect to the joint
distribution of utilities that is considered. If the model is restricted to some
application, an application-motivated simplifying restriction on the joint dis-
tribution would allow for a more detailed analysis of various aspects of the
optimal cutoff. Third, my model can be enriched by deriving the chooser’s
outside option from the model by considering many searchers competing for
the chooser. I conjecture that a robust equilibrium is such where each searcher
reports to the chooser as soon as he finds the first item. Fourth, my model pro-
vides a natural framework in which to think about issues related to naivete and
sophistication in a search framework. This forms part of my planned future
work.
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Chapter 4
Search with Mistakes
4.1 Introduction
The standard sequential search model with recall assumes that the person
who searches always succeeds in choosing the item that she intends to choose
from the items she has inspected, never erring. I modify the standard model
by allowing the person to make mistakes: she mostly chooses the item she
intends to choose, but sometimes makes a mistake and chooses another item.
A person may choose an unintended item for one or more of several reasons.
The person may choose an item she knows to be inferior because she trembles
or because she is inattentive. She may choose an inferior item because she
cannot determine the items’ utilities exactly or because her preferences change
between the time she assessed the items’ utilities and the time the utility of
the final choice is realised. I derive and characterise the optimal choice and
stopping rules of the person who makes choice mistakes.
The model that I use is the following. A decision-maker (DM) inspects
items over discrete time. An item is either a low- or a high-utility item. In
each period, the DM pays a constant search cost and decides whether to stop
or continue to search. If she continues, the next period arrives and she inspects
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another item. If she stops, she attempts to choose an item from amongst all
the inspected items. She chooses the intended item with probability 1− ε and
chooses uniformly among the other inspected items, i.e., makes a mistake, with
probability ε.1 By assumption, the probability of making a mistake is less than
a half, so the DM optimally attempts to choose the utility-maximising item.
Given the optimal choice rule, the DM’s optimal policy is fully characterised
by her optimal stopping rule.
I show, first, that the DM’s optimal stopping rule is a cutoff rule and the
cutoff is history-dependent. As usual, the DM’s optimal cutoff equals her ex-
pected value from continuing to search. I argue that the continuation value can
both increase and decrease in time. The DM’s continuation value is positively
related to her stopping value because she receives positive utility only when
she stops the search process. When she stops, she optimally intends to choose
the utility-maximising inspected item, but may make a mistake and choose
any other inspected item. The utility from the utility-maximising inspected
item weakly increases in time, but the utility from making a mistake can both
increase and decrease. Thus, the DM’s stopping value can both increase and
decrease in time and the optimal cutoff inherits these traits.
Second, I show that under some parameter values the erring DM stops
searching later than an unerring DM, i.e., the erring DM prefers larger choice
sets than the unerring DM. This result is in contrast to the intuition that an
erring DM prefers to simplify her choice as compared to the unerring DM by
having fewer items to choose from. The erring DM prefers larger choice sets
because she wants to insure herself against her mistakes.
Third, I show that the DM’s behaviour can exhibit regret. The DM’s
1An alternative interpretation of the choice process is akin to the two-agent or multi-selves
interpretation as in Chapter 3: the DM chooses from the choice set with probability 1 − ε
and someone else, whose preferences the DM does not know, with probability ε. I maintain
the erring single-agent interpretation throughout the paper and in Section 4.5 explain how
the results in my model differ from those in Chapter 3.
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behaviour exhibits regret if she stops when her expected value from stopping
is lower than it was in the past when she chose to continue. Regret occurs
if the DM receives low-utility items that lower both her optimal cutoff and
stopping value, but in a way that makes stopping optimal.
Finally, I explain how the characteristics of the DM’s optimal behaviour
in my model differ from an unerring DM’s optimal behaviour in some other
extensions to the sequential search model that generate a history-dependent
cutoff. Such extensions are, for example, convex search costs, a deadline, and
a deadline together with either uncertain or costly recall (see Stiglitz (1987),
Gronau (1971) and Lippman and McCall (1976), Akın and Platt (2014), and
Janssen and Parakhonyak (2014) respectively). The unique feature of my
model as compared to these is that, for a fixed utility-maximising inspected
item, the optimal cutoff can increase over time in my model, while the cutoff
weakly decreases over time in the other models. The increase is possible in
my model because a new item with a relatively high utility increases the DM’s
expected stopping value via the mistake utility. Regret cannot be generated by
extensions of the standard sequential search model where the DM can always
pick the item that she intends to from amongst the inspected items. Thus,
neither convex search costs nor a deadline alone generate regret. A deadline
and either uncertain or costly recall together can generate regret: regret occurs
if an item that was unattractive at the start of search becomes attractive if
the deadline is close, but is no longer available or is costly to retrieve.
Literature. My model is related to the well-established literature on stochas-
tic choice. I classify the best-known models into three groups following Loomes
et al. (2002). The first group contains a model where the mistake occurs in
the choice stage. In Harless and Camerer (1994) a DM makes the utility-
maximising choice with probability 1− ε and makes a mistakes with probabil-
ity ε. As Harless and Camerer (1994) study choices across pairs of items, they
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do not specify how a mistake is made among three or more items. I take the
stance that the mistake is a true tremble: if the DM does not pick the best
item for her, she is equally likely to choose among all other items. The second
group contains models where the mistake occurs in the stage of calculating
items’ utilities, such as Fechner (1860/1948), Marschak (1960), and Block and
Marschak (1960).2 The third group contains models where where the mistake
occurs in the stage of specifying the utility function, for example, Becker et al.
(1963), Loomes and Sugden (1995), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2006). In these
models, the DM’s utility function is either one of multiple functions or contains
a random element.
In another branch of related literature, stochastic choice is the result of
a constrained or non-standard optimisation problem. For example, in Smith
and Walker (1993), Mattsson and Weibull (2002), Caplin and Dean (2015),
Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), and Cheremukhin et al. (2015) stochastic choice
arises because information acquisition is costly. In Masatlioglu et al. (2012)
and Manzini and Mariotti (2014) the DM does not consider each alternative
in the choice set. In Swait and Marley (2013) the DM maximises two separate
goals. In Payro´ and U¨lku¨ (2015) the DM sometimes chooses an item that
is similar to the utility-maximising item (where similarity can be defined in
terms of utility). In Koida (2015) the DM’s choice depends on her previously
chosen mood. These models study static choice behaviour, whereas I analyse
how stochastic choice affects the optimal dynamic search behaviour of a DM.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis the DM is not the one who makes the final choice
from the choice set, but knows the preferences of the agent who makes the final
choice. An interpretation of my model is that the DM is the one who makes
2Fechner (1860/1948) proposes that a separable error term enters the DM’s estimate of
utility differences between items, whereas Marschak (1960) and Block and Marschak (1960)
propose that the error term enters the estimate of an individual item’s utility (the latter is
known as the random utility model). The well-known Luce (1959) model is equivalent to
the random utility model.
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the final choice with probability 1 − ε and does not know the preferences of
the agent who makes the final choice with the rest of the probability.
Most search models assume that the searching DM makes no mistakes. An
exception is Caplin et al. (2011), where the DM observes her utility from an
item with an error term (as in Fechner (1860/1948)). The DM’s optimal policy
is to search as in the standard model (see, e.g., McCall (1970)), except that
she applies the optimal cutoff to the observed (not true) utility of an item. In
my model, the DM can calculate an item’s utility, but trembles when choosing
(as in Harless and Camerer (1994)), which results in an optimal policy for the
DM that differs from the standard model.
The connection between regret and stochastic choice has been studied in
the past. Regret is experienced if the actual choice is inferior to a potential
choice.3 Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1985) study the static choice of
a DM who experiences regret, Irons and Hepburn (2007) study the effect of
regret preferences on optimal search behaviour, and Strack and Viefers (2015)
on dynamic decisions more generally. In these models, regret is the primitive
of the models and choice mistakes a result of regret. In my model, regret is a
result and choice mistakes the primitive of the model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model is described in
Section 4.2. A reminder of the standard sequential search model is in Section
4.3. I derive the optimal stopping rule of a DM who makes mistakes in Section
4.4 and characterise it in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
3I introduce the definitions of regret used by different authors in more detail in Section
4.5.3.
91
4.2 Model
A decision-maker searches for a good item over time. In each period of time
t = 1, 2, ... she inspects one item xt. The DM gets utility xt ∈ {L,H}, ∞ >
H > L ≥ 0, if she chooses this item.4 The probability that an item is of high
utility is P (xt = H) = p ∈ (0, 1). Search costs c > 0 per period. Search is with
recall: if the DM stops the process at time t, she can (try to) choose any of
the items that she inspected at t or earlier. Utility is realised after the choice
of an item. The choice set at t, Xt, consists of all the inspected items up to
period t: Xt = {x1, x2, ..., xt}. The DM’s problem is to decide when to stop
the search process and which item from the choice set to (try to) choose.
The DM makes mistakes when choosing. If she stops the search process
at t and intends to choose some item from the choice set, she succeeds with
probability 1−ε ≥ 1
2
. With probability ε the DM makes a mistake and chooses
any of the other items in the choice set with an equal probability. I assume
that the DM makes no mistake if she only has one item in the choice set. At
any time t, let mt denote (the utility of) the utility-maximising item in the
choice set and nt the expected utility of making the mistake. The optimal
choice rule for the DM is to try to choose mt because she is more likely to
succeed than fail (1 − ε ≥ ε). I characterise her optimal stopping rule in the
next two sections.
4.3 Benchmark: no mistakes
This section contains a brief reminder of the DM’s optimal policy in the stan-
dard sequential search model with recall, as in McCall (1970). In each period
4In what follows, I let H to stand for an item xt with utility H for brevity. The model’s
results continue to hold if xt can take more than two values. I make the binary support
assumption to simplify some proofs.
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t, the DM decides whether to stop the search process and choose the best item
she has inspected or to continue to search. She stops if the best inspected
item’s utility mt exceeds the optimal cutoff level of utility, x˜, which is equal to
her expected value from continuing, V˜ . The cutoff x˜ is stationary because the
environment is stationary. I derive the optimal cutoff x˜.
Suppose that the DM’s optimal policy is to accept the first H and continue
if she uncovers only Ls.5 Then her expected continuation value is
V˜ = pH + (1− p)V˜ − c.
With probability p, the item inspected next is H, in which case the DM stops
and gets utility H. With probability 1 − p, the next item is L, in which case
she continues and gets the same expected continuation value as at the start of
today, V˜ . She always pays the search cost c. As the optimal cutoff equals the
continuation value, the closed form for the optimal cutoff is
x˜ = H − c
p
,
which decreases in the cost of search and increases both in the utility value of
H and in the probability that an H arrives.
The assumption that guarantees that accepting the first H and continuing
after Ls is optimal is
Assumption 1. The parameter values satisfy H −L > c
p
so that the DM who
makes no mistakes optimally continues if her value from stopping is L.
I consider parameter values that satisfy Assumption 1 throughout the paper.
I summarise the DM’s optimal policy in Lemma 1.
5I make an assumption on the parameter values below that guarantees that this is the
optimal policy because other parameter values trivialise the searcher’s problem.
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Figure 4.1: Stopping value and optimal cutoff on an unerring DM as a func-
tion of time for c = 1
10
, p = 1
2
, H = 1, L = 1
4
, and (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) =
(L,H,H,L, L). Solid line: cutoff x˜; dotted line: stopping value; dots: xt.
Lemma 7. The optimal policy of a DM who makes no mistakes is to stop
searching at the earliest time T when her stopping value mT exceeds the cutoff
x˜ = H − c
p
.
A representative sequence of events is depicted in Figure 4.1. The DM’s
optimal cutoff is x˜ = 8
10
, she receives an L = 1
4
in the first period and an H = 1
in the second period. She stops in the second period because her stopping value
exceeds her continuation value. If she continued instead, her stopping value
would remain unchanged at H in all the following periods because she is always
able to choose an H from the choice set. I call a DM who makes no mistakes
an unerring DM.
4.4 Optimal policy
A decision-maker who makes choice mistakes must in each period decide whether
to stop the search process and try to pick the best item she has found so far
or continue to search. I present the optimal policy of the erring DM in the
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below Proposition and prove its optimality thereafter. The optimal policy is
characterised in Section 4.5.
Proposition 14. The optimal policy of the DM who makes mistakes is to
stop searching at the earliest time T when her stopping value (1− ε)mT + εnT
exceeds the cutoff x¯(mT , nT , T ).
As in the standard search model, in each period t the DM must compare
her expected value from stopping the search process to her expected value from
continuing with the process. Unlike in the standard model, the DM’s expected
value from stopping is not the utility of the best item found so far, mt, but is
an average between the best item’s and mistake utilities:
(1− ε)mt + εnt. (4.1)
The mistake utility at t, nt, is an average of the utilities of all the items in the
choice set, except the best one:
nt =
∑
x∈Xt\mt x
t− 1 . (4.2)
The erring DM’s stopping value can develop differently from the unerring
DM’s, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. In particular, the stopping value of an
unerring DM never decreases in time, whereas the the value of an erring DM
can decrease. Also, the the stopping value of an unerring DM depends on the
best item’s utility only, whereas the value of an erring DM depends on all the
items in the choice set.
Let the DM’s expected continuation value at time t as a function of the best
item’s utility, mistake utility, and time be denoted by V (mt, nt, t).
6 I argue
6I could equivalently express the continuation value as a function of the number of in-
spected Hs and Ls, but choose mt, nt, and t as state variables to show that the results
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Figure 4.2: Stopping value as a function of time for ε = 0.5, H = 1, L = 1
4
,
and (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (L,H,H,L, L). Dotted line: unerring agent; solid
line: erring agent; dots: xt.
that the continuation value depends on the choice set only via the best item’s
utility mt, mistake utility nt, and date t. The continuation value depends
on mt, nt, and t because the DM’s stopping value tomorrow depends on all
three. The stopping value tomorrow is fully determined by mt+1 and nt+1 (see
equations (4.1) and (4.2)). The best item’s utility tomorrow, mt+1, is fully
determined by mt and the new item’s utility xt+1 as mt+1 = max{mt, xt+1}.
The mistake utility tomorrow, nt+1, is fully determined by the mistake utility
today, the best item’s utility today, the new item’s utility, and the time period
as nt+1 =
(t−1)nt+xt+1
t
if xt+1 < mt and nt+1 =
(t−1)nt+mt
t
if xt+1 ≥ mt. The
continuation value depends on no other information, first, because the search
cost and probability of inspecting an H are constant and, second, because only
the DM’s stopping value tomorrow (and at future dates) matters as she gets
positive utility only when she stops. Altogether, at any date t the DM compares
her stopping value (1− ε)mt + εnt to the continuation value V (mt, nt, t).
extend to settings where items’ utilities can take more than two values.
The continuation value depends on the entire choice set via mt, nt, and t, whereas in
Chapter 3 the continuation value depends on a single item in the choice set.
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The continuation value can in principle be derived from the following Bell-
man equation. At any date t, for any utility of the best item mt = m ∈ {H,L}
and any mistake utility nt = n ∈ [L,H], the Bellman equation is
V (m,n, t) = pmax
{
V (H,
(t− 1)n+m
t
, t+ 1), (1− ε)H + ε(t− 1)n+m
t
}
(4.3)
+(1− p) max
{
V (m,
(t− 1)n+ L
t
, t+ 1), (1− ε)m+ ε(t− 1)n+ L
t
}
− c.
If an H arrives at t + 1, the best item in the choice set at t + 1 is H. If an
L arrives at t + 1, the best item in the choice set at t + 1 remains m. The
new item x changes the mistake value to (t−1)n+m
t
if x = H and to (t−1)n+L
t
if
x = L. Both the stopping and continuation values change accordingly. Search
cost c has to be paid per period.
The DM optimally stops at t if her expected stopping value (1−ε)mt+εnt
exceeds her continuation value V (mt, nt, t). Thus, the optimal policy is a
cutoff rule with a cutoff x¯(mt, nt, t) that is equal to the continuation value. The
optimal cutoff decreases in the cost of search c and in the mistake probability ε
because the stopping value decreases in both. An explicit form for the optimal
cutoff x¯(mt, nt, t) does not exist because equation (4.3) does not have a closed
form solution: at each date the arguments of the value function take on new
values. However, aspects of the optimal behaviour can be characterised, which
I do in the next section.
The DM who makes mistakes never wants to stop when she is sure to get
utility L if
V (L,L, t) = pmax {V (H,L, t+ 1), (1− ε)H + εL}
+(1− p) max {V (L,L, t+ 1), L} − c > L,
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holds. The condition is guaranteed to hold if (1 − ε)(H − L) > c
p
as the
continuation value after only Ls can be approximated down to
V (L,L, t) ≥ p[(1− ε)H + εL] + (1− p)L− c.
I formalise the assumption below.
Assumption 2. The parameter values satisfy (1 − ε)(H − L) > c
p
so that
the DM who makes mistakes optimally continues if her expected value from
stopping is L.
Assumption 1 is guaranteed to hold if Assumption 2 holds. A DM who
makes mistakes prefers continuing to stopping and receiving utility L if her
expected gain from waiting for an H, conditional on being able to pick that
item, exceeds the expected cost. A DM who does not make mistakes knows
that she is able to pick an H once it arrives. Thus, if the stopping value is L,
it is easier to provide incentives to continue to an unerring than an erring DM.
4.5 Characterisation
In this section I show that the erring DM’s optimal cutoff is history-dependent,
her optimal behaviour may exhibit regret, and that for some parameter values
she searches longer than an unerring DM.
4.5.1 History-dependent cutoff
I prove in Proposition 15 that as a function of time, the erring DM’s contin-
uation value, hence, her optimal cutoff can both decrease and increase. The
history-dependent cutoff used by an erring DM is in contrast to the station-
ary cutoff used by an unerring DM. In order to prove Proposition 15, I first
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establish that for a fixed time period t, the DM’s continuation value increases
in both the utility of the best item, mt, and in the mistake utility, nt.
Lemma 8. For fixed m (n) and t, the continuation value V (m,n, t) is increas-
ing in n (m).
Proof. Consider period t with mt = m and nt = n. The DM’s expected
stopping value (1−ε)m+εn unambiguously increases in m and n. Recall that
the DM’s continuation value V (m,n, t) is given by equation (4.3). I argue that
the continuation value increases in n for a fixed m and t, and increases in m for
a fixed n and t. The DM receives positive utility from the search process only
after stopping at some date. Thus, the DM’s continuation value is positively
related to future stopping values. But future stopping values unambiguously
increase in m (for a fixed n and t) and n (for a fixed m and t). Hence, the
continuation value increases in n for a fixed m and t, and increases in m for a
fixed n and t.
For any given t, the continuation value of the DM must increase in both of
its other arguments, the best item’s utility and the mistake utility. The reason
is that the DM cares only about the utility that she gets from eventually
stopping, which increases in both. We are ready to prove the main result of
this subsection.
Proposition 15. As a function of time, the DM’s cutoff x¯(m,n, t) can both
increase and decrease.
Proof. (a) A decrease is possible: I argue that for some t large enough, if
m = H and n = L, the continuation value decreases in t.
First, I show that if m = H and n = L, then for t′ large enough, the DM
prefers to stop, i.e., that for t′ large enough, V (H,L, t′) < (1− ε)H + εL. The
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continuation value at a large t = t′ is
V (H,L, t′) = pmax{V (H, (t
′ − 1)L+H
t′
, t′ + 1), (1− ε)H + ε(t
′ − 1)L+H
t′
}
+(1− p) max{V (H,L, t′ + 1), (1− ε)H + εL} − c
≈ pmax{V (H,L, t′+1), (1−ε)H+εL}+(1−p) max{V (H,L, t′+1), (1−ε)H+εL}−c
≈ max{V (H,L, t′), (1− ε)H + εL} − c,
where the first approximation is true for large enough t′ because an additional
H does not change the mistake utility much if t′ is large, which in turn implies
the second approximation: the date does not influence V (H,L, t′) for large
enough t′. But then it must be optimal for the DM to stop at t′ because the
stopping value (1 − ε)H + εL exceeds the continuation value V (H,L, t′). In
the preceding period, t′ − 1, the continuation value is
V (H,L, t′ − 1) = pmax{V (H, (t
′ − 2)L+H
t′ − 1 , t
′), (1− ε)H + ε(t
′ − 2)L+H
t′ − 1 }
+(1− p)[(1− ε)H + εL]− c > (1− ε)H + εL− c ≈ V (H,L, t′).
That is, for m = H and n = L the continuation value decreases in t at large
enough t.
(b) An increase is possible: I prove by example that it is possible that the
continuation value increases in t.
Assume that the DM wants to continue after the sequence (x1 = L, x2 =
H), or that V (H,L, 2) > (1−ε)H+εL. A sufficient condition for the assump-
tion to hold is that ε
2
(H − L) > c
p
, because
V (H,L, 2) ≥ p[(1− ε)H + εL+H
2
] + (1− p)[(1− ε)H + εL]− c.
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I show that under this assumption, the DM’s continuation value can increase
at t = 2 after x1 = L, i.e., that V (H,L, 2) > V (L,L, 1). The continuation
value after x1 = L is
V (L,L, 1) = pmax{V (H,L, 2), (1−ε)H+εL}+(1−p) max{V (L,L, 2), L}−c.
I approximate the continuation value up:
V (L,L, 1) < pmax{V (H,L, 2), (1−ε)H+εL}+(1−p) max{V (H,L, 2), L}−c
= V (H,L, 2)− c,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 8 and the equality from the assump-
tion that V (H,L, 2) > (1− ε)H + εL. Thus, the continuation value increases
in t for some realisations of the items’ values.
Lemma 8 shows that at any given time, the DM’s continuation value in-
creases in both the best item’s and the mistake utilities. The utility of the
best item in the choice set, mt, can only weakly increase in time because it
is the tth statistic in the choice set at t: for any mt, a new item has either
weakly lower value than mt, in which case mt+1 = mt, or higher value than
mt, in which case mt+1 > mt. But the utility from making a mistake, nt, can
both increase and decrease in time: it increases after the arrival of an item
with value x ∈ (nt,mt) and decreases after the arrival of an item with value
x < nt. Because of these changes, the stopping value can either increase (after
an increase in mt or nt) or decrease (after a decrease in nt). Thus, the DM’s
continuation value and optimal cutoff can both increase and decrease in time.7
Note that an increase in the cutoff is also possible for a fixed best item in the
choice set, mt: the increase happens due to an increase in the mistake utility
7In Chapter 3, the optimal cutoff can only decrease in time.
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nt. I show in Section 4.5.4 that this feature distinguishes my model from some
other search models that feature a history-dependent cutoff.
As a result, it is conceivable that for a given (mt, nt), the DM stops at
t+ 1 both if her cutoff increases and decreases. That is a direct implication of
the result that the DM’s stopping and continuation values move in the same
direction, for all values of the new item xt+1. That is, the DM’s behaviour can
potentially exhibit endogenous search fatigue.
4.5.2 Longer search
I prove that an unerring DM sometimes searches longer, i.e., prefers larger
choice sets than an unerring DM, in contrast to the intuition that the erring
DM prefers simpler choice situations.
Proposition 16. Under some parameter values, histories exist such that the
erring DM stops searching later than an unerring DM.
Proof. I first argue that the erring DM can stop strictly later than an unerring
DM. Suppose that both the erring and an unerring agents receive the sequence
(x1 = L, x2 = H). At t = 1, both agents continue under Assumption 2 on
the parameter values. At t = 2, the unerring DM stops, whereas the erring
DM continues if ε
2
(H − L) > c
p
(see the proof of Proposition 15). Thus, the
unerring DM stops earlier than the erring DM.8
Under Assumption 2, the erring DM prefers (weakly) larger choice sets
than an unerring DM because she wants to insure herself against her mistakes.
If the mistake probability is high, then it is very risky for the DM to stop
and try to pick an H if there are only a few Hs and many Ls in the choice
8Note that if Assumption 2 does not hold, but Assumption 1 does, i.e., if H − L ∈
( cp ,
c
p(1−ε) ), then the erring DM stops at t = 1 with probability one, while the unerring DM
stops at t = 1 only if she uncovers an H.
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set. If the probability of an H arriving is large enough, the DM prefers to
continue searching in order to improve her mistake utility and insure herself
against trembles.9 Note that the intuition behind this result is similar to that
in the directed search model of Galenianos and Kircher (2009), where searching
agents can visit multiple firms. In particular, in Galenianos and Kircher (2009)
an agent visits both a low- and high-priced firm that in equilibrium serve the
agent with a low and a high probability respectively. She visits the low-priced
firm to try to get a good deal and insures herself against the possibility of not
being able to buy at the low-priced firm by also visiting a high-priced firm.
4.5.3 Regret
I show that an erring DM may regret her earlier decision to continue. I define
regret analogously to the definition of regret over past decisions used in Strack
and Viefers (2015): the DM experiences regret when her utility from stopping
is lower than it was any time in the past.
Definition 2 (Regret). The DM’s behaviour exhibits regret when stopping in
period T if her expected stopping value was higher any time in the past, i.e., if
maxt<T (1− ε)mt + εnt > (1− ε)mT + εnT .
In Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1985) the DM experiences regret
if the realised payoff from an (action) choice is lower than from a potential
(action) choice. The erring DM clearly experiences regret in this sense because
she makes mistakes. In Irons and Hepburn (2007) the DM experiences regret
if the maximal expected utility from searching the entire set of items is higher
than when stopping. The erring DM clearly may experience regret in this sense
(if the items’ utilities can take more than two values or if Assumption 2 fails)
9In Chapter 3, the searching agent’s cutoff is below the standard model’s cutoff so he
never stops searching later than in the standard model.
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because she uses a cutoff that is below the maximal potential utility. I thus
adopt the above notion of regret which is analogous to that used in Strack and
Viefers (2015).
Proposition 17. The erring DM’s optimal behaviour can exhibit regret.
Proof. Suppose that the erring DM started with the sequence (L,H,H), opti-
mally continued, and thereafter received only Ls. Then at t = 3 her stopping
value was (1− ε)H + εL+H
2
but she optimally chose to continue. But at some
large t = t′, her continuation value is (1− ε)H + ε (t′−2)L+H
t′−1 , which for t
′ large
enough is approximately equal to (1 − ε)H + εL. Recall from the proof of
Proposition 15 that there exists a time t′ large enough such that a DM with
m = H and n = L wants to stop at t′. Hence, there also exists a time t′′ > t′
large enough such that a DM with m = H and n ≈ L wants to stop at t′′. But
then the optimal policy of the DM who sees the sequence (L,H,H,L, L, L, ...)
and stops at t′′ exhibits regret.
Suppose that the erring DM inspects some Hs, but not early enough to
warrant stopping. If she then receives multiple Ls in a row, her stopping value
decreases, but so does her continuation value. If the DM receives enough Ls,
she stops, despite her stopping value being lower than before she inspected the
sequence of Ls. The erring DM can experience regret because her stopping
and continuation values move in the same direction: a bad item makes both
stopping and continuing less valuable. For an unerring DM, the continuation
value is constant so the DM never regrets having continued in the past.10
10In Chapter 3, the searching agent can experience regret because he is not in charge of
the final choice.
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4.5.4 Other models with a history-dependent cutoff
I explain how the characteristics of the DM’s optimal behaviour in my model
differ from an unerring DM’s optimal behaviour in some other search models
that generate a history-dependent cutoff. Such models are, for example, a
model with a deadline (see Gronau (1971) and Lippman and McCall (1976); I
call it the pure deadline model below), convex search costs (see Stiglitz (1987)),
and a combination of a deadline and costly or uncertain recall (see Janssen and
Parakhonyak (2014) and Akın and Platt (2014) respectively). I show that the
unique feature of my model is that the DM’s cutoff can increase in time when
the utility from the best item in the choice set remains unchanged.
I first explain how the stopping value changes in time in these models. In
the pure deadline and convex search costs’ models, the DM’s stopping value
is the best item’s utility found so far (mt) because returning to an item found
earlier is always possible and costless. In the costly recall model, the stopping
value is the maximum of the value of the item found today and the best item
found earlier minus the recall cost (max{mt−1 − b, xt}, where b is the cost of
recall). In the uncertain recall model, the stopping value is either the value of
the item found today or the best item found so far (xt or mt).
These differences in the stopping values produce different outcomes in terms
of the optimal cutoff’s development in time and regret. In all of the models,
the optimal cutoff can decrease in time. In case of a deadline, the DM’s
continuation value, thus, optimal cutoff, decreases because her opportunities
to search further are restricted from some period onwards. In case of convex
search costs, the continuation value decreases because observing another item
becomes more costly over time. However, in only my model can the cutoff
increase in time for a fixed utility-maximising item in the choice set (mt).
For a fixed mt, an increase in the cutoff happens in my model if the mistake
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value nt increases because nt affects future stopping values, thus, the expected
continuation value. But in the other models, the future stopping value depends
on the past only via mt, which increases in time.
Regret can be generated in the models with uncertain or costly return, but
not in the pure deadline and convex search costs’ models. The pure deadline
and convex search costs’ models do not generate regret because the DM’s stop-
ping value weakly increases in time so whenever she stops, her past stopping
value cannot have been higher and thus cannot trigger regret. The uncertain
and costly return models can generate regret. If recall is uncertain, regret is
triggered when an item that was unacceptable in terms of utility in the past
becomes both acceptable (because the cutoff has decreased) and unavailable. If
recall is costly, regret is triggered when an item that was unacceptable in terms
of utility in the past becomes acceptable (because the cutoff has decreased)
since now it costs to retrieve the item. In my model, regret is triggered when
the stopping value decreases due to the arrival of low-utility items.
4.6 Conclusion
Economic agents sometimes choose items that they did not intend to choose,
either because they are not able to determine which item has the highest util-
ity, their utility assessment changes between the choice and utility realisation
phases, they tremble or are inattentive. This paper investigates what happens
if a decision-maker (DM) who searches for a good item makes mistakes when
choosing. The erring DM’s optimal policy is a cutoff rule, as in the standard
sequential search model, but unlike in the standard model, the cutoff is history-
dependent. The erring DM’s cutoff can both increase and decrease in time.
The value of the best item in the choice set weakly increases in time, but the
value from making a mistake can both increase and decrease. Thus, the DM’s
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stopping value can both increase and decrease in time and the optimal cutoff
inherits these traits. The DM may experience regret: regret occurs if she stops
the process at some period t, despite the stopping value having been higher in
the past, when she continued. A DM who makes mistakes can search longer,
or prefer larger choice sets, than a DM who makes no mistakes.
I conclude by discussing the robustness of my model’s results to alternative
modelling choices.
More possible utilities. If the items’ utilities can take on more than two
possible values (e.g., xt ∼ F with support [x, x¯], 0 < x < x¯ <∞ and F ′(x) > 0
for all x ∈ [x, x¯]), all of the model’s results continue to hold.
Other mistake processes. Other plausible mistake processes are such that
the probability that the DM chooses a particular item is positively related to
its utility. A candidate is, for example, a version of Luce (1959) model where
the probability that an item is chosen from a choice set X is proportional to its
utility, i.e., P (x ∈ X is chosen) = x∑
y∈X y
. This choice process means that the
stopping and continuation values, thus the optimal cutoff of the DM, depend
on the entire choice set that she has collected. The results of my model are
robust to the change.
Mistake processes such that the DM’s continuation value does not depend
on the entire choice set she has collected are, for example, the DM choosing the
second-best item or, more generally, among the n items with utility just below
the best, if she fails to choose the best item. These processes would represent
an almost-rational DM. However, both of these processes are arbitrary and the
analysis thus omitted.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
This section contains the proofs and some formal calculations to accompany
the informal arguments made in the body of the Chapter.
A.1 Single-buyer problem
Proof of Proposition 1. The explicit form of the cutoff is easily obtained by
using equation (2.1) for the buyer’s beliefs and the mean qualities in the ex-
pression for his continuation value where q1 = q¯. The expected quality that
the buyer accepts, Eq, is
Eq :=
∑
s
P (s)[(1− Fs(q¯))EFs(q|q > q¯) + Fs(q¯)δEFs(q)]
= pi
[(
1− q¯
a
)
q¯ + a
2
+
q¯
a
δ
a
2
]
+ (1− pi)
[
(1− q¯) q¯ + 1
2
+ q¯δ
1
2
]
,
which, after some manipulation, simplifies to the expression in the body of the
Chapter.
To see the comparative statistics’ result, take the derivative of the optimal
cutoff and the expected accepted quality with respect to the prior odds, ω.
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The derivatives are
∂q¯
∂ω
=
δa(a− 1)
2(a+ ω)2
,
and
∂Eq
∂ω
=
1
2a(1 + ω)2
{ (a− 1)
2(a+ ω)
[2(a+ ω)(a+ q¯2)− δa(ω + 1)q¯]
+(ω + 1)[ω(aδ − q¯)q¯′ + a(δ − q¯)q¯′]},
where q¯′ := ∂q¯
∂ω
. The first derivative is clearly positive because a > 1. The
second derivative is positive because in the first squared brackets the first
term is larger than the second, factor by factor, and in the second squared
brackets, the optimal cutoff is less than the discount factor.
A.2 Equilibrium existence
Proof of Proposition 2. In order to show that an equilibrium in cutoff strate-
gies exists, I need to show that the best response of a buyer to others’ using a
cutoff strategy (q¯B, q¯G) is to use a cutoff strategy (Part a), and that this cutoff
strategy is (q¯B, q¯G) (Part b). Part c shows uniqueness for the known-state
regime.
Part a. A cutoff strategy is a best response to others’ using a cutoff strategy
(q¯B, q¯G) with q¯G ≥ q¯B.
First, I derive the parts of equilibrium that are common for the four regimes.
When the common parts end, I show separately for each regime that either
a sufficient condition (denoted (SC)) or a necessary and sufficient condition
(denoted (NC)) for the best response of a buyer to be a cutoff strategy is
satisfied.
Suppose that all young buyers but one, b, use the cutoffs (q¯G, q¯B) with
q¯G ≥ q¯B when young. Buyer b who observes quality q1 ∈ [0, 1] and signal
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realisation i ∈ {G,B} decides whether to accept q1 or continue, taking other
buyers’ actions as given.1 His best response is to accept q1 if q1 exceeds his
continuation value, V (q1, i), and to continue otherwise.
2 A sufficient condition
for b’s best response to be a cutoff rule is
(SC): V (q1, i) decreases weakly in q1 for i = G,B.
A necessary and sufficient condition for b’s best response to be a cutoff rule is
(NC): for i = G,B, there exists a unique qˆi such that for all q1 < qˆi, the buyer’s
continuation value is higher than q1, or q1 < V (q1, i), and for all q
′
1 ≥ qˆi,
the value is lower than q′1, or V (q
′
1, i) ≤ q′1.
I show that the sufficient condition (SC) is satisfied for the known-state,
no-signals’ and trade-signal regimes ((i) to (iii) below) and that the necessary
and sufficient condition (NC) is satisfied for the exogenous-signal regime (iv).
The continuation value of b equals the discounted expected value of q2 (i.e.,
mean quality) because b accepts any quality when old. After q1 and signal
realisation i, given that others use cutoff strategy (q¯G, q¯B), the continuation
value is
V (q1, i) = δ[pi(q1, i)EHγ (q) + (1− pi(q1, i))EHβ(q)],
where Hs is the distribution of qualities induced by strategy (q¯G, q¯B) in state
s (derived below, see (A.2)) and pi(q1, i) is b’s posterior belief that the state
is good after quality q1 and signal realisation i. As EHγ (q) > EHβ(q) must
hold when all buyers (but one) use a cutoff strategy, the continuation value
decreases in q1 if pi(q1, i) decreases in q1.
1Recall that b optimally accepts q1 ≥ 1 under all information regimes as q1 ≥ 1 exceeds
the discounted mean qualities. If others use cutoff strategies, then the mean quality that
b faces is smaller than under the entry distribution, EHs(q) < EFs(q), and EFs(q) ≤ 1 for
s = γ, β.
2The continuation value could equivalently be expressed as a function of posterior beliefs,
but since this would increase the notational burden, I express the value as a function of q1
and i.
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I derive b’s beliefs. I focus on the posterior odds instead of the posterior
beliefs because the two are equivalent (especially, the posterior increases iff
the posterior odds increase), but the odds easier to interpret. A young buyer
updates his belief that the true state is good based on the signal realisation i
and q1. After any q1 ≤ 1 and realisation i, the buyers’ posterior odds are
pi(q1, i)
1− pi(q1, i) = ω
hγ(q1)
hβ(q1)
P (i|γ)
P (i|β) . (A.1)
Random matching means that the buyer observes q1 in state s with a probabil-
ity equal to the equilibrium density of q1, hs(q1). Hence, the odds of observing
quality q1 are
hγ(q1)
hβ(q1)
. The final term in (A.1) is the odds of observing signal
outcome i. For all the regimes except the trade-signal regime, this term is
clearly a constant because the precision of the signal is exogenously given. I
argue that the term is constant also for the trade-signal regime. Under the
trade-signal regime, the probabilities of observing outcomes G and B are de-
termined by the probability that a randomly chosen seller trades, ts. But the
behaviour of all agents but b is fixed in this step and b has measure zero so the
odds of observing outcome i are constant in q1 (ts is derived formally below).
Hence, in order to show that pi(q1, i) decreases weakly in q1, I need to show
that hγ(q1)
hβ(q1)
decreases weakly in q1 (or that the odds of q1 do not affect the
posterior).
I derive the equilibrium distribution of sellers to determine whether the
odds of q1,
hγ(q1)
hβ(q1)
, weakly decrease in q1. An intuitive way to derive hs(q) is
to impose the stationarity condition: the distribution of sellers is independent
of the time period only if the inflow of sellers of a certain quality equals the
outflow of sellers of that quality. For any q, an amount fs(q) of sellers with
quality q enter. If buyers use the cutoff strategy (q¯B, q¯G) with q¯B ≤ q¯G, a
seller of quality q < q¯B trades with a buyer only if he meets an old buyer. In
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equilibrium, there is a fraction hs(q) of these sellers in the market and because
of random matching, each is equally likely to meet any buyer. The probability
of meeting an old buyer is Os
1+Os
(where Os is the amount of old buyers in state
s) as the total number of buyers (and sellers) in the market is 1+Os. The total
number of sellers with quality q in the market is hs(q)(1 + Os). Altogether,
an amount hs(q)Os sellers with quality q < q¯B trade in each period. Hence,
the equilibrium density for sellers with quality q < q¯B is determined by the
equality fs(q) = hs(q)Os. A seller of q ∈ [q¯B, q¯G) trades with an old buyer
and a young buyer who has observed the bad signal outcome. By a similar
argument as in the previous case, for these sellers the equilibrium density is
determined by the equality fs(q) = hs(q)(Os + P (B|s)). A seller of quality
q ≥ q¯G trades with any buyer so the equilibrium density is determined by the
equality fs(q) = hs(q)(Os + 1). In sum, the equilibrium density of qualities in
state s, hs(q), is
hs(q) =

fs(q)O
−1
s if q < q¯B,
fs(q)(Os + P (B|s))−1 if q ∈ [q¯B, q¯G),
fs(q)(Os + 1)
−1 if q ≥ q¯G.
(A.2)
The equilibrium density is a piecewise constant weakly decreasing function in
each state as O−1s ≥ (Os + P (B|s))−1 ≥ (Os + 1)−1. In equilibrium, qualities
lower than a cutoff are overrepresented as compared to the entry distribution:
buyers impose a negative payoff externality on others.
Now I show separately for the known-state, no-signals’, and trade-signal
regimes that the odds of quality q1 weakly decrease in q1 or that they do not
matter for the posterior odds.
(i) The posterior odds of b are constant under the known-state regime,
regardless of the odds of q1: in (A.1), the final term is equal to either zero
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or plus infinity, hence, the posterior odds are constant in q1. The sufficient
condition (SC) is satisfied for the known-state regime: b’s continuation value
is weakly decreasing in q1 as it is independent of q1. Let q¯γ denote the cutoff
used in the good state and q¯β the cutoff used in the bad state under the
known-state regime.
(ii) Under the no-signals’ regime, a single cutoff is used (q¯B = q¯G =: q¯)
because the signal is perfectly uninformative. Hence, in state s the amount of
old buyers, ONs , is derived by integrating hs(q) from zero to q¯ and solving for
ONs :
ONs =
∫ q¯
0
hNs (q) dq = Fs(q¯)
1
ONs
,
which gives,
ONs =
√
Fs(q¯). (A.3)
Note that ONγ < O
N
β as a > 1.
Using (A.2), we get the odds of q1 under the no-signals’ regime:
hNγ (q1)
hNβ (q1)
=

ONβ
aONγ
if q1 < q¯,
1+ONβ
a(1+ONγ )
if q1 ≥ q¯.
In order to show that the odds of q1 weakly decrease in q1, it is sufficient to
check that the odds of q1 = 0 are at least as high as the odds of q1 = q¯N ,
or equivalently, that
ONβ
aONγ
≥ 1+O
N
β
a(1+ONγ )
. But the inequality holds as ONγ < O
N
β .
Altogether, b’s continuation value decreases (weakly) in q1 under the no-signals’
regime so the sufficient condition (SC) is satisfied.
(iii) Under the trade-signal regime, assume that a trade is good news (tγ >
tβ) and that the cutoff used by buyers who have observed a trade, q¯T , is higher
than the cutoff used by buyers who have observed no trade, q¯N (in terms of
the above notation, q¯G = q¯T and q¯B = q¯N). Then the missing probability in
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the equilibrium distribution of qualities, (A.2), is P (B|s) = 1− ts, where ts is
the probability of observing a trade. The odds of quality q1 are, explicitly
hTγ (q1)
hTβ (q1)
=

OTβ
aOTγ
if q1 < q¯N ,
(OTβ +1−tβ)
a(OTγ +1−tγ) if q1 ∈ [q¯N , q¯T ),
1+OTβ
a(1+OTγ )
if q1 ≥ q¯T .
(A.4)
To get an explicit form of the distribution, I derive the probability of observing
a trade and the amount of old buyers.
The probability of observing a trade is the equilibrium probability that a
randomly chosen seller trades in a period because a buyer does not observe the
quality of the seller whose trade/no trade he observes. The total amount of
sellers that trade and exit in a period is one because the market is stationary
and the entry amount of sellers is equal to one. The total amount of sellers is
equal to the amount of buyers, 1 + Os, in state s. Hence, the probability of
observing a trade in state s is
ts =
1
1 +OTs
. (A.5)
Note that OTγ < O
T
β implies that tγ > tβ, as assumed above.
The amount of old buyers in the market equals the amount of sellers that
are carried from one period to the next. This amount is made up, first, of all
the sellers with quality q < q¯N that have entered the market and have always
met young buyers, and, second, of all the sellers with quality q ∈ [q¯N , q¯T ) that
have entered and have always met young buyers who have observed trades. The
probability that a seller who entered j periods ago has always met young buyers
is (1 +Os)
−j and that he has always met young buyers who have observed
trades is tjs (1 +Os)
−j. In sum, the amount of sellers that are carried from one
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period to the next is
OTs =
∞∑
j=1
Fs(q¯N)
(
1
1 +OTs
)j
+ (Fs(q¯T )− Fs(q¯N))
(
ts
1 +OTs
)j
=
1
OTs
Fs(q¯T ) + (1 +O
T
s )Fs(q¯N)
2 +OTs
. (A.6)
The last fraction decreases in OTs and as fewer sellers both with qualities below
q¯N and below q¯T enter the market in the good state, it must be that O
T
γ < O
T
β .
I now show that the odds of q1, (A.4), decrease (weakly) in q1. The first
inequality that has to be satisfied is
OTβ
aOTγ
>
(OTβ +1−tβ)
a(OTγ +1−tγ) . After cross-multiplying,
inserting the equation for ts, and collecting terms, the inequality simplifies to
OTβ
OTγ
1 +OTγ
> OTγ
OTβ
1 +OTβ
,
which holds as OTβ > O
T
γ . The second inequality that has to be satisfied
is
(OTβ +1−tβ)
a(OTγ +1−tγ) >
1+OTβ
a(1+OTγ )
. After cross-multiplying and collecting terms, the
inequality simplifies to
tγ(1 +O
T
β ) > tβ(1 +O
T
γ ),
which holds as OTβ > O
T
γ and tγ > tβ. In sum, the odds
hTγ (q1)
hTβ (q1)
decrease
(weakly) in q1. Altogether, under the trade-signal regime b’s continuation value
decreases (weakly) in q1 so that the sufficient condition (SC) is satisfied and
b’s best response is a cutoff rule if others use strategy (q¯T , q¯N) with q¯T > q¯N .
(iv) Under the exogenous-signal regime, assume that all buyers but b opti-
mally use strategy (q¯G, q¯B) with q¯γ > q¯G > q¯B > q¯β. I show that the necessary
and sufficient condition for the best response for b to be a cutoff strategy (NC)
holds under the exogenous-signal regime with pG = 1 and pB ∈ (0, 1). Recall
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(NC): for signal realisation i = B,G there exists a unique qˆi such that for all
q1 < qˆi, b’s continuation value is higher than q1, or q1 < V (q1, i), and for all
q′1 ≥ qˆi, b’s continuation value is lower than q′1, or V (q′1, i) ≤ q′1.
As before, a sufficient condition for the existence of such qˆi is that pi
E(q1, i),
weakly decreases in q1. The sufficient condition holds for i = B: if pG = 1,
then b’s belief after B and any q1 is zero, pi
E(q1, B) = 0, as he knows that the
state is bad (in (A.1), P (B|γ) = 1− pG = 0).
Suppose b observed i = G. I show that the sufficient condition that the
odds of q decrease weakly in q does not hold, but the necessary and sufficient
condition (NC) holds. To see that, write down the buyer’s odds of observing
q1 explicitly:
hEγ(q1)
hEβ(q1)
=

OEβ
aOEγ
if q1 < q¯B,
OEβ+pB
aOEγ
if q1 ∈ [q¯B, q¯G),
1+OEβ
a(1+OEγ )
if q1 ≥ q¯G.
Comparing the odds of q1 = 0 and q1 = q¯B, we see that the odds of q1 do
not weakly decrease in q1. I show that a unique qˆi as required by (NC) exists
nevertheless.
In order to do so, I establish that the amount of old buyers is smaller in the
good than in the bad state state so that the odds of q1 are lowest for q1 ≥ q¯G.
Similarly to the trade-signal regime, the amount of old buyers, OEs , is equal
to the amount of sellers that are carried from one period to the next. This
amount is made up of all the sellers with quality q < q¯B that have always met
young buyers, and of all the sellers with quality q ∈ [q¯B, q¯G) that have always
met young buyers who have observed signal realisations G. That is,
OEs =
∞∑
j=1
Fs(q¯B)
(
1
1 +OEs
)j
+ (Fs(q¯G)− Fs(q¯B))
(
P (G|s)
1 +OEs
)j
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=
1
OEs
P (G|s)OEsFs(q¯G) + (1 +OEs )(1− P (G|s))Fs(q¯B)
1 +OEs − P (G|s)
. (A.7)
In the good state, P (G|γ) = 1 so the last fraction simplifies to Fγ(q¯G). In the
bad state, P (G|β) = 1 − pB and I show that, as a function of OEs , the last
fraction in (A.7) exceeds Fγ(q¯G) for all O
E
s . To see that, note that if s = β,
the fraction increases in OEs and at O
E
s = 0 the fraction equals Fβ(q¯B). But
Fβ(q¯B) exceeds Fγ(q¯G) because the thresholds are ordered q¯γ > q¯G > q¯B > q¯β
and under the known-state regime, Fγ(q¯γ) = Fβ(q¯β).
3 Hence, OEγ < O
E
β must
hold. But this implies that the odds of q1 = q¯G are lower than of q1 = 0.
I now show that the necessary and sufficient condition (NC) holds after
i = G. Since q¯G is an optimal cutoff used by other buyers, it must be that after
observing (q1, i) = (q¯G, G) the buyers are just indifferent between accepting
the offer q1 = q¯G and continuing, or V
E(q¯G, G) = q¯G. Buyer b’s continuation
value after G is piecewise constant because the beliefs are piecewise constant
(see (A.1) and (A.2) in conjunction). Hence, it is clear that for all q′ ≥ q¯G,
the constant continuation value V E(q′, G) is less than the increasing q′. I
need to show that for all q < q¯G, the continuation value exceeds q, i.e., that
V E(q,G) > q. To see that this holds, note that the odds of q1, hence, the
continuation value, are lowest for q′ ≥ q¯G. Hence, for all q < q¯G, it must
be that the continuation value V E(q,G) is higher than V E(q¯G, G). But the
continuation value V E(q¯G, G) is equal to q¯G so is higher than q. In sum, the
unique qˆi that satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition is qˆi = q¯G. This
completes the proof that under the exogenous-signal regime with pG = 1 and
pB ∈ (0, 1), the necessary and sufficient condition (NC) holds: a buyer’s best
response is a cutoff rule if others use strategy (q¯G, q¯B) with q¯γ > q¯G > q¯B > q¯β.
This completes Part a of the proof.
3I show that Fγ(q¯γ) = Fβ(q¯β) under the known-state regime in the proof of Proposition
3 and do not repeat the argument here to save space.
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Part b. Equilibrium cutoff qualities.
Let us treat the four regimes together again. An equilibrium cutoff q¯i
equals the buyer’s continuation value after observing q1 = q¯i and realisation i
for i = G,B:
q¯i = δ[pi(q¯i, i)EHγ (q) + (1− pi(q¯i, i))EHβ(q)]. (A.8)
I show that this equation has a solution for i = G,B. At q¯i = 0, the RHS
of equation (A.8) is positive because either pi(q¯i, i) or 1 − pi(q¯i, i) is positive.
At both q¯i = 0 and q¯i = 1, the RHS is smaller than one because EHs(q) <
EFs(q) ≤ 1 and δ < 1. Hence, the LHS and RHS of equation (A.8) cross
at least once so that an equilibrium in cutoff strategies exists under all four
regimes.
I need to verify that the equilibrium cutoffs satisfy the assumptions that
I made above: that q¯T > q¯N under the trade-signal regime and that q¯γ >
q¯G > q¯B > q¯β under the exogenous-signal regime. First, under the trade-signal
regime, it is sufficient to show that piT (q¯T , T ) > piT (q¯N , N) as EHγ (q) > EHβ(q)
(see (A.8)). Inserting the definition of ts, (A.5), and h
T (q), (A.4), into (A.1),
yields
piT (q¯T , T )
1− piT (q¯T , T ) = ω
hTγ (q¯T )
hTβ (q¯T )
tγ
tβ
=
ω
a
(
1 +OTβ
1 +OTγ
)2
, (A.9)
and
piT (q¯N , N)
1− piT (q¯N , N) = ω
hTγ (q¯N)
hTβ (q¯N)
1− tγ
1− tβ =
ω
a
(
2 +OTβ
2 +OTγ
)
. (A.10)
But cross-multiplying and simplifying
(
1+OTβ
1+OTγ
)2
>
2+OTβ
2+OTγ
shows that it holds if
OTγ < O
T
β (which was established in Part a) so indeed pi
T (q¯T , T ) > piT (q¯N , N).
Second, consider the exogenous-signal regime. I show that q¯γ > q¯G and
q¯B > q¯β in the proof of Proposition 8 (after presenting the explicit equation
that the equilibrium cutoffs satisfy under the two regimes). For q¯G > q¯B, it
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is sufficient to show that piE(q,G) > piE(q, B) for any q < 1. But this clearly
holds as piE(q,G) > 0 (see (A.1) for P (G|γ) = pG = 1) and piE(q, B) = 0.
This completes the proof of the existence of an equilibrium in cutoff strate-
gies for all four regimes.4
Part c. Equilibrium uniqueness under the known-state regime.
A simple argument shows that the unique equilibrium under the known-
state regime is in cutoff strategies. For any fixed behaviour of other buyers, b’s
continuation value, i.e., the discounted mean quality is constant as he knows
the state: hence, b’s optimal strategy is a cutoff strategy.
A.3 Known state and no signals
Proof of Proposition 3. I derive the explicit forms of the cutoff qualities for
the known-state regime (Part 1) and the equation that the cutoff solves for the
no-signals’ regime (Part 2). To do that, I simplify equation (A.8) in the proof
of Proposition 2 by deriving the mean quality in state s and buyers’ beliefs
under both regimes. The equilibrium distribution of qualities is derived as a
side-product.
Part 1. Known-state regime.
Under the known-state regime, all buyers know the state after the signal
realisation: their posterior belief is piK(q1, G) = 1 if s = γ and piK(q1, B) = 0
if s = β. A buyer uses cutoff q¯γ after realisation G and q¯β after realisation B,
and each satisfies equation (A.8). The equilibrium density (A.2) in state s is
4Note that the existence proof for the known-state regime does not depend on the entry
distributions Fγ and Fβ .
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explicitly,
hKs (q) =

fs(q)(O
K
s )
−1 if q < q¯s,
fs(q)(O
K
s + 1)
−1 if q ≥ q¯s.
(A.11)
The density is piecewise constant so that the mean quality under the equilib-
rium distribution (A.11) is
EHKs (q) = H
K
s (q¯s)
q¯s
2
+ (1−HKs (q¯s))
x+ q¯s
2
,
where x = 1 if s = β and x = a if s = γ. The probability that a young buyer
becomes old, i.e., observes an unacceptable offer q1 < q¯s, H
K
s (q¯s), is equal
to the equilibrium amount of old buyers, OKs , because the measure of young
buyers is one. The probability is derived by integrating hKs (q) from zero to q¯s
and solving for OKs :
HKs (q¯s) = O
K
s =
∫ q¯s
0
hKs (q) dq = Fs(q¯s)
1
OKs
,
which gives,
OKs =
√
Fs(q¯s). (A.12)
Hence, the mean quality in state s simplifies to
EHKs (q) = xO
K
s
(OKs )
2
2
+ x(1−OKs )
1 + (OKs )
2
2
=
x+ q¯s −√xq¯s
2
.
Plugging this (and the correct constant belief) into (A.8) and simplifying gives
that the equilibrium cutoff in state γ, q¯γ, solves
q¯γ =
δ
2− δ (a−
√
aq¯γ),
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and in state β, q¯β, solves
q¯β =
δ
2− δ (1−
√
q¯β).
The explicit solutions to these are given in the statement of the Proposition.
Note that q¯γ = aq¯β means that Fγ(q¯γ) = Fβ(q¯β).
Part 2. No-signals’ regime.
Under the no-signals’ regime, the signal is perfectly uninformative. A
buyer’s posterior belief is piN (q1, G) = piN (q1, B) and q¯G = q¯B =: q¯. The
equilibrium cutoff solves equation (A.8) with belief piN (q¯) that satisfies
piN (q¯)
1− piN (q¯) = ω
1 +
√
q¯
a+
√
q¯a
. (A.13)
The mean qualities are derived in the same way as under the known-state
regime as a single cutoff is used in one state under both regimes. Thus, q¯
solves
q¯ =
δ
2− δ [pi(q¯)(a−
√
aq¯) + (1− pi(q¯))(1−√q¯)], (A.14)
The exact expression in the Proposition is obtained by plugging pi(q¯), (A.13),
into (A.14). The equilibrium distribution is obtained by substituting K with
N and q¯s with q¯ in (A.11).
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that the cutoff q¯ can be written as in equation
(A.14). Note that a − √aq > 1 − √q for all q ∈ (0, 1) and both sides of
this inequality decrease in q. Hence, q¯ > δ
2−δ (1 −
√
q¯) and q¯ < δ
2−δ (a −
√
aq¯).
Recall that the known-state cutoffs were defined by q¯β =
δ
2−δ (1 −
√
q¯β) and
q¯γ =
δ
2−δ (a−
√
aq¯γ). Hence, the inequality q¯ >
δ
2−δ (1−
√
q¯) implies that q¯ > q¯β
and the inequality q¯ < δ
2−δ (a−
√
aq¯) implies that q¯ < q¯γ.
Proof of Proposition 4. The expected delay in the two regimes is derived by
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plugging equation (A.12) or (A.3) into equation (2.3). To show that DN > DK,
I show that DN |a=1 = DK and ∂DN∂a > 0 for δ > 23 and ∂D
N
∂a
< 0 for δ < 2
3
.
First, note that if a = 1, then the good distribution Fγ is the same as
the bad distribution Fβ, which translates directly into Hγ(q) = Hβ(q). Hence,
a−√aq = 1−√q and q¯ = q¯β so that DN |a=1 = DK.
Second, I show that the derivative ∂D
N
∂a
is positive for δ > 2
3
and negative
for for δ < 2
3
. Under the no-signals’ regime, the derivative of the expected
delay is
∂DN
∂a
=
pi
2
1
a
√
aq¯
(
a
∂q¯
∂a
− q¯
)
+
1− pi
2
1√
q¯
∂q¯
∂a
.
I derive ∂q¯
∂a
. By inserting pi(q¯) and multiplying by a positive amount, equation
(A.14) can be rewritten as
C := pi(1+y)[δ(a−√ay)−(2−δ)y2]+(1−pi)(a+√ay)[δ(1−y)−(2−δ)y2] = 0,
(A.15)
where y :=
√
q¯. The two terms in the squared brackets are positive and
negative respectively.
Totally differentiating C and using equation (A.15) to substitute terms that
have multiplier 1− pi with terms that have multiplier pi, I get
∂q¯
∂a
=
y2(1 + y)[2δa+ 2
√
ay(2− δ) + (2− δ)y2][(2− δ)y2 − δ(1− y)]
aC2
> 0,
where y :=
√
q¯ and
C2 := (1 + y)(
√
a+ y)[(2− δ)y2 − δ(1− y)][δ√a+ 2(2− δ)y]
+[δ(a−√ay)−(2−δ)y2]{(√a+y)[2δ+(2−δ)y(2+y)]+(1+y)[(2−δ)y2−δ(1−y)]}.
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Showing that ∂D
N
∂a
> 0 is equivalent to showing that
C3 := a
∂q¯
∂a
{(√a+ y)[(2− δ)y2 − δ(1− y)] + (1 + y)[δ(a−√ay)− (2− δ)y2]}
−y2(√a+ y)[(2− δ)y2 − δ(1− y)] > 0,
where I have again used equation (A.15) to substitute terms that have multi-
plier 1−pi with terms that have multiplier pi and then multiplied by a positive
term. Plugging in the expression for ∂q¯
∂a
, collecting terms and dividing with
positive amounts (2− δ)y2 − δ(1− y), and δ(a−√ay)− (2− δ)y2, I get that
C3 > 0 is equivalent to
(3δ − 2)[2√ay(√a− 1) + y2(a− 1)] > 0,
which holds iff δ > 2
3
because a > 1. This completes the proof.
A.4 Trade signal
Proof of Proposition 5. I first show that in every equilibrium under the trade-
signal regime, a trade is good news, q = q¯N is better news than q = q¯T , and
q¯T > q¯N holds (Part 1). I then derive the exact forms of the equations that
the equilibrium cutoffs and distribution of qualities satisfy (Part 2).
Part 1. I show that under the trade-signal regime, in all equilibria in cutoff
strategies, trade is good news, q = q¯N is better news than q = q¯T , and q¯T > q¯N .
The existence of such an equilibrium was proven in Proposition 2.
In order to do so, I consider all the possible characterisations and show that
the only possible combination is the one above. First recall that the relative
size of the equilibrium cutoff q¯i is determined by how optimistic a young buyer
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is after observing quality q1 = q¯i and signal outcome i as opposed to q1 = q¯j
and signal outcome j. That is, if q1 = q¯i is better news than q1 = q¯j and signal
outcome i better news that j, then cutoff q¯i is definitely higher than cutoff
q¯j. In the other cases, the relative magnitude of the cutoffs is ambiguous.
Therefore, an exhaustive list of the cases that I need to consider is
(i) T is better news than N and q1 = q¯T is better news than q1 = q¯N
(together implying that q¯T > q¯N).
(ii) T is better news than N and q1 = q¯T is worse news than q1 = q¯N and
(a) q¯T > q¯N , or
(b) q¯T < q¯N .
(iii) T is worse news than N and q1 = q¯T is worse news than q1 = q¯N (together
implying that q¯T < q¯N).
(iv) T is worse news than N and q1 = q¯T is better news than q1 = q¯N and
(a) q¯T > q¯N , or
(b) q¯T < q¯N .
I show in turn that all of the cases but (ii)(a) lead to a contradiction.
(i) T is better news than N and q1 = q¯T is better news than q1 = q¯N
(together implying that q¯T > q¯N), i.e., tγ > tβ and
hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
> hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
.
We know from Lemma 4 that in any equilibrium under a regime with a
binary signal such that P (B|β) > P (B|γ), if Oγ < Oβ (so that tγ > tβ)
and the equilibrium cutoffs satisfy q¯B < q¯G, the odds of q = q¯B are higher
than of q = q¯G, i.e., q = q¯B is better news than q = q¯G. Substituting N
for B means that if P (N |β) = 1 − tβ > P (N |γ) = 1 − tγ and q¯N < q¯T ,
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then hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
< hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
, which contradicts the initial assumption about the
relative size of the odds.5
(ii) T is better news than N and q1 = q¯T is worse news than q1 = q¯N , i.e.,
tγ > tβ and
hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
< hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
.
(a) q¯T > q¯N : in the proofs of Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 5 together I showed
that T is better news than N and q1 = q¯T is worse news than
q1 = q¯N are consistent with q¯T > q¯N .
(b) q¯T < q¯N : I show that assuming q¯T < q¯N leads to a contradiction.
Consider a young buyer who observes q1 = q¯T . We know that he
is just indifferent between accepting this quality and continuing if
he has observed signal outcome T , i.e., q¯T = V
T (q1 = q¯T , T ). But
trade being good news means that for any given q ∈ [0, 1], a buyer
who observes q and T is more optimistic than a buyer who observes
q and N , i.e., V T (q, T ) > V T (q,N) for all q ∈ [0, 1]. But then
a buyer who observes q1 = q¯T and signal outcome N must strictly
prefer accepting this quality to continuing as q¯T = V
T (q1 = q¯T , T ) >
V T (q1 = q¯T , N). This is a contradiction because q¯T < q¯N means
that the buyer should instead prefer to continue after q1 = q¯T and
N .
(iii) T is worse news than N and q1 = q¯T is worse news than q1 = q¯N (together
implying that q¯T < q¯N), i.e., tγ < tβ and
hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
< hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
.
An analogous argument to that provided for (i) (where now T is substi-
tuted for B) proves that this case is impossible.6
5Note that if
fγ(q)
fβ(q)
increases in q, Lemma 4 is no longer guaranteed to hold.
6This proof relies on the assumption that
fγ(q)
fβ(q)
is constant in q, but for general distri-
butions Fγ and Fβ such that Fγ first-order stochastically dominates Fβ , (iii) is ruled out in
(iv)(b).
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(iv) T is worse news than N and q1 = q¯T is better news than q1 = q¯N , i.e.,
tγ < tβ and
hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
> hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
.
(a) q¯T > q¯N : By an analogous argument as in (ii)(b), q¯T > q¯N leads to
a contradiction.
(b) q¯T < q¯N : I argue that q¯T < q¯N and tγ < tβ together lead to a
contradiction. I use an argument analogous to that in the proof of
Lemma 2: I derive the equation that the amount of old sellers in
state s must satisfy and show that it leads to Oγ < Oβ. But here,
Oγ < Oβ contradicts the assumption that tγ < tβ as ts = (1+Os)
−1.
The amount of old buyers in the market is equal to the amount of
sellers that are carried from one period to the next. This amount
is made up of all the sellers with quality q < q¯T that have entered
and always met young buyers and of all the sellers with quality
q ∈ [q¯T , q¯N) that have entered and always met young buyers who
have observed no trades. The probability that a seller who entered
j periods ago has always met young buyers is (1 +Os)
−j and that
he has always met young buyers who have observed no trades is
(1− ts)j (1 +Os)−j. In sum, the amount of sellers that are carried
from one period to the next is
Os =
∞∑
j=1
Fs(q¯T )
(
1
1 +Os
)j
+ (Fs(q¯N)− Fs(q¯T ))
(
1− ts
1 +Os
)j
=
1
Os
(1 +Os)Fs(q¯T ) +O
2
sFs(q¯N)
1 +Os +O2s
.
Equivalently, the amount of old sellers in state s satisfies the equa-
tion
O2s =
(1 +Os)Fs(q¯T ) +O
2
sFs(q¯N)
1 +Os +O2s
. (A.16)
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I show that equation (A.16) implies that Oγ < Oβ, which contra-
dicts the assumption that tγ < tβ. The derivative of the RHS of
(A.16) with respect to Os is
∂RHS
∂Os
=
Os(2 +Os)(Fs(q¯N)− Fs(q¯T ))
(1 +Os +O2s)
2
,
which is positive for all Os. As a function of Os, the RHS of (A.16)
evaluated at s = γ is lower than the RHS evaluated at s = β because
fewer sellers both with qualities below q¯N and below q¯T enter the
market in the good state than in the bad state (for all Fγ and Fβ
such that Fγ first–order stochastically dominates Fβ). But the LHS
of (A.16) increases in Os so that the solutions to equation (A.16)
in the two states must satisfy Oγ < Oβ. But this contradicts the
assumption that tγ < tβ because ts = (1 +Os)
−1.7
Altogether, only case (ii)(a), i.e., T is better news than N , q1 = q¯T is worse
news than q1 = q¯N , and q¯T > q¯N , is possible in equilibrium.
Part 2. I derive the system of equations that the equilibrium cutoffs q¯T and
q¯N satisfy. I write out the mean quality in state s and the beliefs relevant for
the cutoffs, and then plug them into equation (A.8). Most of the detail that I
need for the derivation is presented in the proof of Proposition 2.
First, I derive the mean quality in state s if the equilibrium distribution
is described by two cutoffs as in (A.2) (the derivation is valid both for the
7Note that this proof does not rely on the assumption about the informativeness of
different qualities so that it also rules out (iii) for general distributions Fγ and Fβ such that
Fγ first-order stochastically dominates Fβ .
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trade-signal and the exogenous-signal regimes). I rewrite the density, (A.2), as
hs(q) =

fs(q)O
−1
s if q < q¯B,
fs(q)O
−1
s
(
1− P (B|s)
P (B|s)+Os
)
if q ∈ [q¯B, q¯G),
fs(q)O
−1
s
(
1− 1
Os+1
)
if q ≥ q¯G.
Denoting fs(q) =
1
x
where x = 1 if s = β and x = a if s = γ and using the
above equation for hs(q), the mean quality in state s can be written as
EHs(q) = O−1s
[
EFs(q)−
P (B|s)
P (B|s) +Os
∫ q¯G
q¯B
q
x
dq − 1
1 +Os
∫ x
q¯G
q
x
dq
]
=
1
2xOs
[
x2 − P (B|s)
P (B|s) +Os (q¯
2
G − q¯2B)−
1
1 +Os
(x2 − q¯2G)
]
. (A.17)
Under the trade-signal regime, no trade is bad news so the term P (B|s)
P (B|s)+Os in
the mean is 1−ts
1−ts+Os =
1
2+Os
, where the last step follows from plugging in the
equation for ts, (A.5). Plugging the explicit term into (A.17) gives the exact
form of the expected value of EHs(q) used in the statement of the Proposition.
The beliefs of the buyers that are relevant for the equilibrium cutoffs, i.e.,
after observing (q1, i) = (q¯T , T ) and (q¯N , N) were derived earlier and the result
was equations (A.9) and (A.10). Using equations (A.17), (A.9), and (A.10) in
(A.8), gives the two first equations in the statement of the Proposition.
I derive the last two equations in the statement of the Proposition. The
amount of old buyers is given by equation (A.6), which can be simplified to
Os =
1
x
q¯T + (1 +Os)q¯N
Os(2 +Os)
,
by plugging in Fs(q¯i) =
q¯i
x
, where x = 1 if s = β and x = a if s = γ, and
collecting terms. Rearranging the equation for s = γ completes the system
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of equations in the Proposition. The exact form of the equilibrium density of
qualities is obtained by plugging P (B|s) = 1 − ts = Os1+Os into equation (A.2)
and rearranging the density for q ∈ [q¯N , q¯T ).
The proofs of Lemmas 2, 3, and 5 (and a specific version of Lemma 4) ap-
pear in the proof of Proposition 2, but I restate them here for the completeness
of the argument.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that q¯T > q¯N and tγ > tβ. The amount of old
buyers in the market is equal to the amount of sellers that are carried from
one period to the next. These sellers consist of those with quality q < q¯N
that have ever entered and always met young buyers, and those with quality
q ∈ [q¯N , q¯T ) that have ever entered and always met young buyers who observed
good news: trades.
In state s the per-period probability that a seller meets a young buyer
is (1 +Os)
−1 and that he meets a young buyer who has observed a trade is
ts (1 +Os)
−1 because matching is random, the amount of young buyers is one,
and the total amount of buyers is 1+Os. Since meetings are independent across
periods, the probability that a seller who entered j periods ago has always met
young buyers is (1 +Os)
−j and that he has always met young buyers who
observed trades is tjs (1 +Os)
−j. Thus, the amount of sellers that are carried
from one period to the next is
Os =
∞∑
j=1
Fs(q¯N)
(
1
1 +Os
)j
+ (Fs(q¯T )− Fs(q¯N))
(
ts
1 +Os
)j
=
1
Os
Fs(q¯T ) + (1 +Os)Fs(q¯N)
2 +Os
, (A.18)
where I have inserted the equilibrium probability of a trade, (A.19) in the proof
of Lemma 3, in the last step. The last fraction in (A.18) decreases in Os and
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as fewer sellers both with qualities below q¯N and below q¯T enter the market in
the good state, it must be that Oγ < Oβ.
8
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that Oγ < Oβ. The probability of observing a
trade is the equilibrium probability that a randomly chosen seller trades in a
period. Mass one of sellers that trade (and exit) in a period because the market
is stationary and mass one of sellers is enter. The total amount of sellers is
equal to the amount of buyers, 1 + Os, in state s, because equal amount of
buyers and sellers enter and, in equilibrium, a buyer and a seller leave the
market together. Hence, the probability of a trade in state s is
ts = (1 +Os)
−1. (A.19)
A trade is, thus, more probable in the good state because Oγ < Oβ.
9
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that q¯B < q¯G and Oγ < Oβ. The odds of observ-
ing quality q are obtained by inserting the equilibrium density, equation (A.2)
in the Appendix, into hγ(q)
hβ(q)
:
hγ(q)
hβ(q)
=

fγ(q)
fβ(q)
Oβ
Oγ
if q < q¯B,
fγ(q)
fβ(q)
Oβ+P (B|β)
Oγ+P (B|γ) if q ∈ [q¯B, q¯G),
fγ(q)
fβ(q)
Oβ+1
Oγ+1
if q ≥ q¯G.
I show that hγ(q¯B)
hβ(q¯B)
> hγ(q¯G)
hβ(q¯G)
holds. The inequality is explicitly
Oβ+P (B|β)
a(Oγ+P (B|γ)) >
Oβ+1
a(Oγ+1)
. Now the LHS of this inequality is larger than
Oβ+P (B|γ)
a(Oγ+P (B|γ)) as P (B|β) >
P (B|γ). But then the initial inequality must hold because ∂
∂z
Oβ+z
Oγ+z
∝ −(Oβ −
Oγ) < 0 as Oβ > Oγ.
10
8The proof uses only the assumption that Fγ first-order stochastically dominates Fβ .
9The proof uses only the assumption that Fγ first-order stochastically dominates Fβ .
10The proof relies on the assumption that
fγ(q)
fβ(q)
= 1a is constant in q. The proof still holds
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Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that Oγ < Oβ, tγ > tβ, and
hγ(q¯N )
hβ(q¯N )
> hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
. The
relative size of the cutoffs depends only on the relative size of the buyers’ beliefs
after observing q1 = q¯T and a trade as opposed to q1 = q¯N and no trade. A
young buyer’s posterior odds that are relevant for the equilibrium cutoffs are
(see equations (A.9) and (A.10) in the Appendix)
pi(q¯T , T )
1− pi(q¯T , T ) = ω
hγ(q¯T )
hβ(q¯T )
tγ
tβ
=
ω
a
(
1 +Oβ
1 +Oγ
)2
,
and
pi(q¯N , N)
1− pi(q¯N , N) = ω
hγ(q¯N)
hβ(q¯N)
1− tγ
1− tβ =
ω
a
(
2 +Oβ
2 +Oγ
)
.
It is straightforward to verify that pi(q¯T ,T )
1−pi(q¯T ,T ) >
pi(q¯N ,N)
1−pi(q¯N ,N) as Oγ < Oβ so that
the optimal cutoffs satisfy q¯N < q¯T .
Proof of Proposition 7. The expected delay is obtained by plugging equation
(A.6) into (2.3).
The proof of DT > DN holds for pi = 1
2
and all a, δ such that OTγ >
1
2
, for
which the condition q¯β >
a
4
is sufficient (I show below that a(OTγ )
2 > q¯N > q¯β).
Note that a necessary condition for q¯β >
a
4
to hold is that δ > 2
3
as q¯β|δ= 2
3
= 1
4
.
The proof is in four steps. I first show that a sufficient condition for DT >
DN is that OTβ > O
N
β (Step 1). Then I approximate O
T
β down to O˜
T
β (Step 2).
The rest of the proof shows that O˜Tβ > O
N
β (Steps 3 and 4). Hence, O
T
β > O
N
β
must hold.
Step 1. It is sufficient to show that OTβ > O
N
β .
Recall that the expected delay is D = piOγ + (1 − pi)Oβ. Under the no-
signals’ regime, a(ONγ )
2 = (ONβ )
2 = q¯. Under the trade-signal regime, the
if
fγ(q¯B)
fβ(q¯B)
is not “too much lower” than
fγ(q¯G)
fβ(q¯G)
, i.e., holds for general entry distributions Fγ
and Fβ if the entry densities’ ratio
fγ(q)
fβ(q)
does not grow “too quickly” in q.
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equations for OTs are, explicitly:
(OTβ )
2 =
q¯T + (1 +O
T
β )q¯N
2 +OTβ
, (A.20)
and
a(OTγ )
2 =
q¯T + (1 +O
T
γ )q¯N
2 +OTγ
, (A.21)
so that a(OTγ )
2 > (OTβ )
2 as OTγ < O
T
β and q¯T > q¯N . Note that equation (A.21)
proves that a(OTγ )
2 > q¯N as claimed at the start of the proof. Hence, in order
to show that DT > DN , it is sufficient to show that OTβ > O
N
β .
Step 2. I approximate OTβ down to O˜
T
β by approximating q¯N and q¯T down.
As I deal almost solely with the trade-signal regime in this step, I suppress the
superscript T .
Consider the trade-signal regime. Let q˜i equal
q˜i = δ
[
pi(q˜i, i)
2
a(1− O˜γ + O˜2γ) +
1− pi(q˜i, i)
2
(1− O˜β + O˜2β)
]
, (A.22)
for i = T,N , where O˜s on the RHS is the amount of old buyers in state s if the
cutoffs are q˜i instead of q¯i. I show that q˜i is less than the equilibrium cutoff q¯i.
The equilibrium cutoff q¯i satisfies
q¯i = δ
[
pi(q¯i, i)EHγ (q) + (1− pi(q¯i, i))EHβ(q)
]
. (A.23)
I show that EHγ (q) > a2(1 − Oγ + O2γ) and EHβ(q) > 12(1 − Oβ + O2β). The
expected value of q in state s can be written as
EHs(q) =
1
2xOs
[
x2 − x
2 − q¯2T
1 +Os
− q¯
2
T − q¯2N
2 +Os
]
,
where x = a if s = γ and x = 1 if s = β, so that EHs(q) > x2 (1 − Os + O2s) is
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equivalent to
x2 − x
2 − q¯2T
1 +Os
− q¯
2
T − q¯2N
2 +Os
> x2Os(1−Os +O2s).
Rearranging the inequality and using equations (A.20) and (A.21), I can in-
stead show that
q¯T
q¯T + (1 +Os)q¯N
>
1
2 +Os
,
which holds as q¯T > q¯N . Hence, the RHS of equation (A.23) is approximated
down by substituting EHs(q) with x2 (1−Os +O2s) for s = γ, β:
q¯i > δ
[
pi(q¯i, i)
2
a(1−Oγ +O2γ) +
1− pi(q¯i, i)
2
(1−Oβ +O2β)
]
:= Y (q¯i).
(A.24)
A sufficient condition for Y (q¯i) to be monotonically increasing in the equilib-
rium cutoff q¯i is that 2Oγ > 1 as
∂Y (q¯i)
∂q¯i
=
δ
2
{
∂pi(q¯i, i)
∂q¯i
[a(1−Oγ +O2γ)− (1−Oβ +O2β)]
+
∂Oγ
∂q¯i
pi(q¯i, i)a(2Oγ − 1) + ∂Oβ
∂q¯i
(1− pi(q¯i, i))(2Oβ − 1)
}
,
and ∂Os
∂q¯i
> 0, ∂pi(q¯i,i)
∂q¯i
> 0, and 2Oβ > 1. First,
∂Os
∂q¯i
> 0, as
∂Os
∂q¯i
=
k
2xOs(2 +Os) + xO2s − q¯N
> 0,
where k = 1 for i = T and k = 1 + Os for i = N , and x = a for s = γ and
x = 1 for s = β.
Second, ∂pi(q¯i,i)
∂q¯i
> 0 as
∂pi(q¯T , T )
∂q¯T
∝ (1 +Oγ)∂Oβ
∂q¯T
− (1 +Oβ)∂Oγ
∂q¯T
> 0,
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if
4(aOγ −Oβ) + 7(aO2γ −O2β) + 3(aO3γ −O3β) + q¯N(Oβ −Oγ) > 0.
Since aOγ >
√
aOβ, aO
2
γ > O
2
β, and aO
3
γ >
O3β√
a
, the LHS of the above is greater
than
4Oβ(
√
a− 1) + 3O3β
1√
a
(1−√a) ∝ 4√a− 3O2β,
which is positive. Hence, ∂pi(q¯T ,T )
∂q¯T
> 0.
Third, ∂pi(q¯N ,N)
∂q¯N
> 0. A sufficient condition for the derivative
∂pi(q¯N , N)
∂q¯N
∝ (2 +Oγ)∂Oβ
∂q¯N
− (2 +Oβ)∂Oγ
∂q¯N
,
to be positive is that ∂pi(q¯T ,T )
∂q¯T
> 0, which is satisfied.
Finally, 2Oβ > 1 as O
2
β > q¯N > q¯β and q¯β >
1
4
for all δ > 2
3
. Altogether,
∂Y (q¯i)
∂q¯i
> 0 for sure if 2Oγ > 1.
The RHS of expression (A.24), Y (q¯i), evaluated at q¯i = 0 is greater than
zero and at q¯i = 1, less than one. Hence, the cutoff that solves equation
(A.22), q˜i, is less than q¯i. Note that q¯γ > q˜T > q˜N > q¯β holds (because q˜T
can be approximated up to q¯γ by setting pi(q˜T , T ) = 1 and q˜N down to q¯β by
setting pi(q˜N , N) = 0). Hence, q¯N > q¯β holds, which was claimed at the start
of this proof.
The amount of old buyers in state s if the cutoffs are q˜i instead of q¯i, O˜
T
β ,
is, explicitly,
(O˜Tβ )
2 =
q˜T + (1 + O˜
T
β )q˜N
2 + O˜Tβ
, (A.25)
with O˜Tβ < O
T
β because Oβ(q¯i) increases in the cutoff q¯i. Hence, to prove the
Proposition, it suffices to show that O˜Tβ > O
N
β . Recall that q¯β ≥ 14 for all
δ ∈ [2/3, 1] so that O˜Tβ ,
√
aO˜Tγ >
1
2
.
Step 3. I write comparable equations for ONβ and O˜
T
β .
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Consider the no-signals’ regime. Suppressing the superscript N , I can
rewrite the equation for q¯, (A.14), as
2O2β = δ[1−Oβ +O2β + pi(q¯)(a− 1 +Oβ −
√
aOβ)] := Z1(Oβ), (A.26)
by multiplying the equation through by 2 − δ, substituting Oγ with Oβ√a , and
collecting terms.
Consider the trade-signal regime and suppress T . I insert q˜i as defined by
equation (A.22) into the equation for (O˜Tβ )
2, (A.25), and rearrange to get an
expression comparable to equation (A.26):
2O2β = δ[1−Oβ +O2β +
pi(q˜T , T ) + (1 +Oβ)pi(q˜N , N)
2 +Oβ
(a−1+aO2γ−O2β +Oβ−aOγ)],
(A.27)
where Oβ := O˜
T
β and Oγ := O˜
T
γ .
Step 4. In a sequence of algebra-heavy steps, I show that, as a function of
Oβ, the RHS of equation (A.27) is higher than the RHS of equation (A.26) for
all Oβ. This implies that O˜
T
β > O
N
β .
Consider equations (A.26) and (A.27) as functions of Oβ. Since the last
term on the RHS of equation (A.27) increases in Oγ if Oγ >
1
2
and Oγ >
Oβ√
a
under the trade-signal regime, I approximate the RHS of equation (A.27) down
by substituting Oγ with
Oβ√
a
in the last term:
1−Oβ + pi(q˜T , T ) + (1 +Oβ)pi(q˜N , N)
2 +Oβ
(a− 1 + aO2γ −O2β +Oβ − aOγ)
> 1−Oβ+pi(q˜T , T ) + (1 +Oβ)pi(q˜N , N)
2 +Oβ
(a−1+O2β−O2β+Oβ−
√
aOβ) := Z2(Oβ).
To show that (O˜Tβ )
2 > (ONβ )
2, it is sufficient to show that Z2(Oβ) > Z1(Oβ)
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for all Oβ. Equivalently, it is sufficient to show that
pi(q˜T , T ) + (1 +Oβ)pi(q˜N , N)
2 +Oβ
> pi(q¯). (A.28)
Inequality (A.28) can be rewritten by using equations (A.13), (A.9), (A.10)
(and because under the no-signals’ regime Oγ =
Oβ√
a
) as
(1 +Oβ)
(1 +Oβ)2 + a(1 +Oγ)2
+
(2 +Oβ)
(2 +Oβ) + a(2 +Oγ)
>
(2 +Oβ)
(1 +Oβ) + a+
√
aOβ
,
(A.29)
for all Oβ and Oγ := O˜
T
γ as defined by
a(O˜Tγ )
2 =
q˜T + (1 + O˜
T
γ )q˜N
2 + O˜Tγ
. (A.30)
Note that a(O˜Tγ )
2 > (O˜Tβ )
2. After cross-multiplying inequality (A.29) and
collecting terms, it becomes
a2
[
(1 +Oβ)
(
1 +
Oβ√
a
)
(2 +Oγ)− (1 +Oγ)2(2 +Oβ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
+ a(Oβ −Oγ)(1−Oβ −O2β) +
√
a(2 +Oβ)(O
2
β −
√
aO2γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
−√a(√aOγ −Oβ)(2 +Oβ)[1 + (1 +Oβ)2 + a(1 +Oγ)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
> 0.
I show separately that A1 > 0 and A2 + A3 > 0.
Step 4a. A1 > 0.
Showing that A1 > 0 is equivalent to showing that
A1
a
√
a
> 0 or, after
expanding the LHS of A1
a
√
a
> 0 and collecting terms, that
2(O2β −
√
aO2γ)− (
√
a− 1)OγOβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
+
√
a(Oβ −Oγ)− (2 +OγOβ)(
√
aOγ −Oβ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
> 0.
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The first part, B1, is greater than
B′1 := 2(O
2
β −
√
aO2γ)− (
√
a− 1)O2β =
1√
a
[(3
√
a− a)O2β − 2aO2γ],
as Oγ < Oβ. Inserting the equations for O
2
β and aO
2
γ, (A.25) and (A.30) re-
spectively, B′1 can be rewritten as
B′1 =
(3
√
a− a)(2 +Oγ)[q˜T + (1 +Oβ)q˜N ]− 2(2 +Oβ)[q˜T + (1 +Oγ)q˜N ]√
a(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
> −2(Oβ −Oγ)(q˜T − q˜N)√
a(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
=: B′′1 ,
where the last step follows from 3
√
a−a ≥ 2 for all a ∈ (1, 2]. Hence, B1 > B′′1 .
The other part, B2, can be written as
B2 =
√
a(Oβ −Oγ)− (2 +OγOβ) (Oβ −Oγ)(q˜T − q˜N)
(
√
aOγ +Oβ)(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
,
where the fraction is a rewritten version of the difference of equations (A.30)
and (A.25).
Now A1 = a
√
a(B1 + B2) > a
√
a(B′′1 + B2) > 0 and showing the last
inequality is equivalent to showing that B′′1 +B2 > 0, or
√
a(Oβ −Oγ)− (2 +OγOβ)(Oβ −Oγ)(q˜T − q˜N)
(
√
aOγ +Oβ)(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
− 2(Oβ −Oγ)(q˜T − q˜N)√
a(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
> 0.
I approximate the LHS down in several steps and show that the resulting
expression is positive.
First, I show that (
√
a−1)q˜N > q˜T − q˜N or,
√
aq˜N > q˜T . Showing the latter
is equivalent to showing that
√
api(q˜N , N) > pi(q˜T , T ), or
√
a
2 +Oβ
2 +Oβ + a(2 +Oγ)
>
(1 +Oβ)
2
(1 +Oβ)2 + a(1 +Oγ)2
.
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Cross-multiplying the inequality and collecting terms gives
(
√
a− 1)(2 +Oβ)(1 +Oβ)2 + a[2(
√
a− 1)(1 +OγOβ)− 2(O2β −
√
aO2γ)
+(4 +OγOβ)(
√
aOγ −Oβ) +
√
aOβ −Oγ] > 0,
which holds as
√
a− 1 > O2β −
√
aO2γ. Hence, I can substitute (q˜T − q˜N) with
(
√
a − 1)q˜N and, instead of B′′1 + B2 > 0, show that the following inequality
holds:
B′2 := a−
(
√
a− 1)q˜N [
√
a(2 +OγOβ) + 2(
√
aOγ +Oβ)]
(
√
aOγ +Oβ)(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
> 0.
The LHS of this inequality can be approximated down by making the nu-
merator of the negative fraction larger and the denominator smaller:
B′2 > a−
(
√
a− 1)O2β[
√
a · 3 + 2(√a+ 1)]
(Oβ +Oβ) · 2 · 2 ∝ 8a− (
√
a− 1)Oβ(5
√
a+ 2),
where the substitutions work because q˜N < O
2
β (follows from equation (A.25)),
√
aOγ > Oβ, and Oγ, Oβ ∈ (0, 1). The last expression can in turn be approxi-
mated down by making the negative part larger:
8a− (√a− 1)Oβ(5
√
a+ 2) > 8a− 5a− 2,
as
√
a− 1 < 1, Oβ < 1, and
√
a < a. But 3a− 2 is positive, which concludes
the proof that A1 > 0.
Step 4b. A2 + A3 > 0. Recall that
A2 + A3 = a(Oβ −Oγ)(1−Oβ −O2β) +
√
a(2 +Oβ)(O
2
β −
√
aO2γ)
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−√a(√aOγ −Oβ)(2 +Oβ)[1 + (1 +Oβ)2 + a(1 +Oγ)2].
I will show that a more stringent condition than A2 +A3 > 0 holds by approx-
imating
√
aOγ −Oβ up.
The term
√
aOγ − Oβ is proportional to the difference between equations
(A.30) and (A.25):
√
aOγ −Oβ = (Oβ −Oγ)(q˜T − q˜N)
(
√
aOγ +Oβ)(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
=
(Oβ −Oγ)(pi(q˜T , T )− pi(q˜N , N))
(
√
aOγ +Oβ)(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
δ
2
[a(1−Oγ +O2γ)− (1−Oβ +O2β)] =: B3
where the last step follows from plugging in the definitions of q˜T and q˜N ,
equation (A.22). I approximate B3 up by showing that pi(q˜T , T )− pi(q˜N , N) <
Oβ−Oγ
3
. To approximate the difference pi(q˜T , T )−pi(q˜N , N) up, I insert equations
(A.9) and (A.10) and collect terms:
pi(q˜T , T )− pi(q˜N , N) = a(Oβ −Oγ)[3 + 2(Oβ +Oγ) +OγOβ]
[(1 +Oβ)2 + a(1 +Oγ)2][2 +Oβ + a(2 +Oγ)]
.
Hence, after collecting terms, pi(q˜T , T )− pi(q˜N , N) < Oβ−Oγ3 is equivalent to
a− 2 + aOγ(1− a) + 2a(1− a) + a− 4Oβ + aOβ(1− 2Oβ) + a(1− 2aOγ)
< 2O2β+Oβ(1+Oβ)
2+aO2γ(2+Oβ)+aOγOβ(1+Oβ)+a
2Oγ[(1+2Oγ)+(1+Oγ)
2].
The LHS of the last inequality is negative because 2 ≥ a > 1, 2Oβ > 1 and
2aOγ > 1 as 2
√
aOγ > 1. Hence, the inequality holds, or pi(q˜T , T )−pi(q˜N , N) <
Oβ−Oγ
3
.
Return to B3. By the last approximation, we know that
B3 <
(Oβ −Oγ)2
3(
√
aOγ +Oβ)(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
δ
2
[a(1−Oγ +O2γ)− (1−Oβ +O2β)],
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and by approximating the last term on the RHS up, that
B3 <
δ(Oβ −Oγ)2
6(
√
aOγ +Oβ)(2 +Oβ)(2 +Oγ)
(a− 1),
where I have used the fact that −(aOγ − Oβ) + aO2γ − O2β < 0 (as Oγ < Oβ).
I approximate the RHS up further by reducing the denominator so that
B3 <
δ(Oβ −Oγ)2
6 · 2Oβ · (2 +Oβ) · 2(a− 1) =
δ(Oβ −Oγ)2(a− 1)
24Oβ(2 +Oβ)
,
as Oγ ≥ 0 and
√
aOγ > Oβ. Altogether, I have shown so far that
√
aOγ −Oβ < δ(Oβ −Oγ)
2(a− 1)
24Oβ(2 +Oβ)
.
Return to A2 + A3. We now know that
A2 + A3 > a(Oβ −Oγ)(1−Oβ −O2β) +
√
a(2 +Oβ)(O
2
β −
√
aO2γ)
−√aδ(Oβ −Oγ)
2(a− 1)
24Oβ
[1 + (1 +Oβ)
2 + a(1 +Oγ)
2].
Instead of showing that A2 + A3 > 0, I show that the RHS is positive, or,
(2 +Oβ)(O
2
β −
√
aO2γ)−
√
aOβ(Oβ −Oγ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B4
+
√
a(Oβ −Oγ)(1−O2β)−
δ(Oβ −Oγ)2(a− 1)
24Oβ
[1 + (1 +Oβ)
2 + a(1 +Oγ)
2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B5
> 0.
I show in turn that B4 > 0 and B5 > 0.
I rewrite
√
aB4 > 0 and insert the definitions of O
2
β and aO
2
γ to get
√
aB4 = (2 +Oβ)
√
a
q˜T + (1 +Oβ)q˜N
2 +Oβ
− (2 +Oβ) q˜T + (1 +Oγ)q˜N
2 +Oγ
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− Oβ
Oβ +Oγ
(
a
q˜T + (1 +Oβ)q˜N
2 +Oβ
− q˜T + (1 +Oγ)q˜N
2 +Oγ
)
> 0.
Multiplying the inequality through with (2 + Oγ)(2 + Oβ)(Oβ + Oγ) and col-
lecting terms yields
B4 ∝
√
a(2 +Oγ)[q˜T + (1 +Oβ)q˜N ][(2 +Oβ)(Oβ +Oγ)−
√
aOβ]
−(2 +Oβ)[q˜T + (1 +Oγ)q˜N ][(2 +Oβ)(Oβ +Oγ)−Oβ] > 0.
As Oβ > Oγ, the above inequality holds for sure if I replace (1 + Oγ)q˜N with
(1 +Oβ)q˜N in the second row, or (after collecting terms), equivalently, if
[Oγ(2 +Oβ) + (1 +Oβ)Oβ](
√
aOγ −Oβ)
+(
√
a− 1)
[
1√
a
(4
√
aOγ − aOβ) +OγOβ(2−
√
a) +Oβ(2−
√
a) + 2O2β
]
> 0.
The inequality holds as 4
√
aOγ > 2 > aOβ. Hence, B4 > 0.
Finally, I need to show that B5 > 0. I approximate B5 down by approxi-
mating its second, the negative, term up:
B5 >
√
a(Oβ −Oγ)(1−O2β)−
δ(Oβ −Oγ)2(a− 1)
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2
· 12,
where I used Oβ ∈ [12 , 1) and 1 + (1 + Oβ)2 + a(1 + Oγ)2 < 12 because aO2γ <
q˜T < 1. Hence, it is sufficient to show that
B′5 :=
√
a(1−O2β)− δ(Oβ −Oγ)(a− 1) > 0.
But Oγ >
Oβ√
a
so B′5 is greater than
√
a(1−O2β)− δ
(
Oβ − Oβ√
a
)
(a− 1)
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∝ a(1−O2β)− δ
(√
a− 1)Oβ(a− 1) > a(1−O2β)− δ12Oβ,
where the last follows from noting that
√
a − 1 < 1
2
and a − 1 ≤ 1. Since
q˜T > O
2
β and q¯γ > q˜T , it is sufficient to show that
2a(1− q¯γ)− δ
√
q¯γ > 0,
or that
2a > 2aq¯γ + δ
√
q¯γ. (A.31)
The LHS is constant in δ, but the RHS increases in δ as q¯γ increases in δ. The
derivative of q¯γ is proportional to
∂q¯γ
∂δ
∝ (2− δ)
[
4− 2δ −
√
δ(8− 3δ)− δ(4− 3δ)√
δ(8− 3δ)
]
+ 2δ[4− δ−
√
δ(8− 3δ)].
(A.32)
Since δ(8 − 3δ) increases in δ, I know that √δ(8− 3δ) ∈ (2,√5) for all δ ∈
[2/3, 1] and
√
5 < 2.25. Hence, the RHS of (A.32) is greater than
1
2
[
(2− δ)(8− 8δ − 4.5 + 3δ2) + δ(7− 4δ)]
∝ 7 + 10δ2 − 12.5δ − 3δ3 > 7(1− δ)2 + 3δ2(1− δ) > 0,
so that ∂q¯γ
∂δ
> 0.
Hence, it is sufficient to show that inequality (A.31) holds for δ = 1, or,
equivalently, that
4 > 2a(3−
√
5) +
√
2(3−√5)
a
. (A.33)
The derivative of the RHS of (A.33) with respect to a is proportional to 4a
3
2 (3−
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√
5)−
√
2(3−√5). But
a
3
2 (3−
√
5)−
√
2(3−
√
5) > 2(3−
√
5)−
√
2(3−
√
5) > 0,
where the first inequality follows from a > 1 and the second from 2(3−√5) > 1.
Hence, the RHS of (A.33) increases in a so that it is sufficient to show that
inequality (A.33) holds for a = 2, which is true.
Altogether, this shows that B5 > 0, which in turn proves that A2 +A3 > 0,
as required. This completes the proof of the Proposition.
I now prove that the trade-signal regime can be more efficient than the
no-signals’ regime if the quality distribution has binary support as claimed on
p. 43.
Claim 1. In a model where the quality distribution has binary support, the
trade-signal regime can be more efficient than the no-signals’ regime.
Proof. Consider the same model as in the main part of the paper, except that
now qualities can take two values, q ∈ {qL, qH}. In the bad state, all entering
sellers offer quality qL and in the good state, a fraction xγ offer the high
quality qH and the rest offer quality qL. Let xβ := 0 so that I can treat the two
states simultaneously below. Since the aim of this claim is to demonstrate a
possibility result, i.e., that the trade-signal regime can be more efficient than
the no-signals’ regime, I assume (for simplicity) that a buyer’s utility from the
qualities are u(qL) =
1
2
and u(qH) = 1 and that the prior odds ω equal to one.
Note that, as in the main model, old buyers optimally accept all qualities and
a young buyer optimally accepts qH . I show that in a region of the parameter
space where the unique equilibrium under the no-signals’ regime is such that
a young buyer rejects a low quality with probability one, an equilibrium exists
under the trade-signal regime such that a young buyer rejects a low quality
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with probability less than one. That is, a buyer is less likely to delay under
the trade-signal regime.
First, consider the no-signals’ regime and recall that we look for an equi-
librium where a young buyer rejects qL with probability one. Let p be the
probability with which the young buyer accepts qL. A buyer’s utility from
accepting q1 = qL is
1
2
. His continuation value after receiving q1 = qL is
WN (p) = δ
[
pi(qL)
(
1− λγ + λγ 1
2
)
+ (1− pi(qL))1
2
]
,
where the posterior belief pi(qL) is the probability that the state is good after
q1 = qL and λγ is the equilibrium proportion of low-quality sellers. Both
depend on p. A buyer gets utility one only if the state is good and he meets a
high-quality seller tomorrow. Otherwise, he gets utility of a half.
The optimal probability for a young buyer to reject q1 = qL is p = 0
if WN (p = 0) ≤ 1
2
. But if all buyers accept low qualities, the equilibrium
distribution is the same as the entry distribution and λγ(p = 0) = 1− xγ.
The optimal probability is p = 1 if WN (p = 1) ≥ 1
2
. If all young buyers
reject the low quality, then the equilibrium amount of old buyers is
Os = λs =
1 +Os − xs
1 +Os
,
where the last equality follows from noting that the only high-quality seller
in the market are those who just entered, in the amount xs. The solution is
λγ(p = 1) =
√
1− xγ. The posterior odds of a buyer after observing q1 = qL
are
pi(qL)
1− pi(qL) = λγ,
because the buyer receives a low-quality offer with probability λγ in the good
state and probability one in the bad state.
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Thus, the equilibrium probability that a young buyer rejects qL is one if
the young buyer does not want to deviate, i.e., if WN (p = 1) ≥ 1
2
which can
be rearranged to give
δ >
1
1 +
√
1−xγ√
1−xγ+1
(1−√1− xγ) := δ¯N2 .
Likewise, we get that the equilibrium probability that a young buyer rejects
qL is zero if
δ <
1
1 + 1−xγ
1−xγ+1xγ
:= δ¯N1 .
Hence, the equilibrium where a young buyer delays with certainty exists if
δ > δ¯N2 and is unique if δ¯
N
1 < δ¯
N
2 (the latter holds for all xγ ≤ x¯2). I now
show that for some xγ ≤ x¯2 and δ > δ¯N2 , an equilibrium under the trade-signal
regime exists such that a young buyer delays with probability less than one.
Consider the trade-signal regime. I derive the conditions under which in
equilibrium a young buyer continues after q1 = qL if he observes a trade and
accepts q1 = qL if he observes no trade. His continuation value after observing
q1 = qL and signal outcome i is
W T (i) = δ
[
pi(qL, i)
(
1− λγ + λγ 1
2
)
+ (1− pi(qL, i))1
2
]
,
where the posterior belief pi(qL, i) is the probability that the state is good
after q1 = qL and signal outcome i, and λγ is the equilibrium proportion of
low-quality sellers. I will derive them now.
A young buyer only becomes old if he observes q1 = qL and trade so the
amount of old buyers is
Os = λsts,
where ts is the probability of observing a trade in state s. The probability of
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observing a trade is ts =
1
1+Os
because amount one of buyers trade and exit
in each period and the total amount of buyers is 1 +Os. Thus, the amount of
old buyers can be solved from the equation Os(1 +Os)
2 = 1 +Os − xs, which
gives a unique solution Os that decreases in xs. Since xγ > xβ, Oγ < Oβ so
that trade is indeed good news as I assumed earlier.
A buyer’s posterior odds are
pi(qL, T )
1− pi(qL, T ) = λγ
tγ
tβ
=
(1 +Oγ − xγ)(1 +Oβ)
(1 +Oγ)2
,
after a trade and
pi(qL, N)
1− pi(qL, N) = λγ
1− tγ
1− tβ =
(1 +Oγ − xγ)(1 +Oβ)Oγ
(1 +Oγ)2Oβ
,
after no trade. A buyer is more optimistic after a trade, or pi(qL, T ) > pi(qL, N)
because Oγ < Oβ.
Altogether, it is optimal for a young buyer to continue after observing
q1 = qL and a trade if W
T (T ) ≥ 1
2
and to accept q1 = qL after observing
q1 = qL and no trade if W
T (N) ≤ 1
2
. The conditions can be rearranged to give
δ ≥ 1
1 +
(1+Oγ−xγ)(1+Oβ)
(1+Oγ)2+(1+Oγ−xγ)(1+Oβ)
xγ
1+Oγ
=: δ¯T1 ,
and
δ ≤ 1
1 +
(1+Oγ−xγ)(1+Oβ)Oγ
(1+Oγ)2Oβ+(1+Oγ−xγ)(1+Oβ)Oγ
xγ
1+Oγ
=: δ¯T2 .
The fact that there are more old buyers in the bad state guarantees that
δ¯T1 < δ¯
T
2 always holds.
Finally, to prove that the trade-signal regime can be more efficient than
the no-signals’ regime, I need to show that within the region of the parameter
space where in the unique equilibrium under the no-signals’ regime young
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Figure A.1: Trade-signal regime is more efficient than no-signals’ regime if
xγ ∈ (x¯1, x¯2) and δ ∈ (δ¯N2 , δ¯T2 ): δ¯N2 (red), δ¯T1 (dashed) and δ¯T2 (black).
buyers delay with certainty, an equilibrium of the above type exists under the
trade-signal regime. That is, I need to show that δ¯N2 < δ¯
T
2 is possible for some
xγ ≤ x¯2. Figure A.1 illustrates that there exists a unique x¯1 < x¯2 such that if
xγ = x¯1, then δ¯
N
2 = δ¯
T
2 and for all xγ > x¯1, δ¯
N
2 < δ¯
T
2 , as required.
Here, I formally prove that payoff externalities matter for the efficiency
results as claimed on pp. 43 and 47.
Claim 2. For any private signal precisions pG ∈ [0, 1] and pB ∈ [0, 1] with
pG ≥ 1− pB, if we assume that the equilibrium distribution is the same as the
entry distribution, the delay is independent of pG and pB.
Proof. Consider the exogenous signal regime with some given P (G|γ) = pG ∈
[0, 1] and P (B|β) = pB ∈ [0, 1] with pG ≥ 1− pB (so that G is at least weakly
better news than B) and assume that the equilibrium distribution in state s is
given by Fs. I aim to show that the delay, D
E , is independent of both pG and
pB.
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The buyers’ equilibrium beliefs are derived analogously to equation (A.1),
except that now the equilibrium density of any q ∈ [0, 1] is one in the bad state
and 1
a
in the good state. Hence, the belief after (q¯G, G), or equation (A.35),
becomes
pi(q¯G, G)
1− pi(q¯G, G) = ω
fγ(q¯G)
fβ(q¯G)
pG
1− pB = ω
pG
a(1− pB) ,
and the belief after (q¯B, B) is
pi(q¯B, B)
1− pi(q¯B, B) = ω
fγ(q¯B)
fβ(q¯B)
1− pB
pG
= ω
1− pB
apG
.
The buyer’s expected value of continuing in state γ is a
2
and in state β is 1
2
. An
equilibrium cutoff must again equal a buyer’s discounted expected continuation
value, which, after collecting terms, gives
q¯G =
δa
2
ωpG + (1− pB)
ωpG + a(1− pB) ,
and
q¯B =
δa
2
ω(1− pG) + pB
ω(1− pG) + apB .
Since a buyer becomes old only if he observes an unacceptable offer when
young, the probability of becoming old in state s is
Os = P (G|s)Fs(q¯G) + P (B|s)Fs(q¯B).
As a result, the expected delay is explicitly
D = pi
[
pG
q¯G
a
+ (1− pG) q¯B
a
]
+ (1− pi) [(1− pB)q¯G + pB q¯B]
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which can be rearranged to give
D = 1 + (1− pi)1
a
{q¯B [ω(1− pG) + apB] + q¯G[ωpG + a(1− pB)]} = 1 + δ
2
,
where the last step follows from inserting the explicit solutions for q¯G and q¯B
and collecting terms.
A.5 Exogenous signal
Proof of Proposition 8. I derive the system of equations that the equilibrium
cutoffs q¯G and q¯B satisfy. I write out the mean quality in state s and the beliefs
relevant for the cutoffs, and then plug them into equation (A.8). Most of the
detail that I need for the derivation is presented in the proofs of Proposition 2
and of Proposition 5.
The derivation of the mean quality in the proof of Proposition 5, (A.17),
works for the exogenous-signal regime, too, hence, I can plug in the exogenous
signal’s precision into (A.17) to get
EHγ (q) =
a2Oγ + q¯
2
G
2aOγ(1 +Oγ)
, (A.34)
and
EHβ(q) =
1
2Oβ
[
1− pB
pB +Oβ
(q¯2G − q¯2B)−
1
1 +Oβ
(1− q¯2G)
]
.
Since the posterior of a buyer is zero after B, the explicit form for EHβ(q)
plugged into (A.8) gives the second equation in the statement of the Proposi-
tion.
After (q1, i) = (q¯G, G) the buyers’ beliefs are, explicitly,
pi(q¯G, G)
1− pi(q¯G, G) = ω
hγ(q¯G)
hβ(q¯G)
pG
1− pB =
ω
a
1 +Oβ
1 +Oγ
1
1− pB , (A.35)
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which are used in the first equation in the statement of the Proposition. To
obtain the exact version of the first equation, I need to derive the explicit
form of the probability of becoming old in the good state. As only signal
realisation G occurs in the good state, only cutoff q¯G is used in the good state
so the derivation of Oγ works exactly as under the known-state and no-signals’
regimes. Accordingly, the functional form of Oγ is the same under the three
regimes:
Oγ =
√
Fγ(q¯G). (A.36)
I simplify equation (A.7) for s = β:
O2β =
(1− pB)Oβ q¯G + pB(1 +Oβ)q¯B
Oβ + pB
. (A.37)
Equation (A.37) is the third equation in the statement of the Proposition. To
get the exact form of the first equation, I use (A.36) in (A.34) and (A.35) that,
together with the second equation in the statement of the Proposition, in turn
are plugged into (A.8). This completes the proof of the Proposition.
In order to complete the proof of Proposition 2, I need to show that q¯γ > q¯G
and q¯B > q¯β.
I first show that show that q¯γ > q¯G. Under the exogenous-signal regime,
the cutoff q¯G satisfies
q¯G = δ[αEHEγ (q) + (1− α)EHEβ (q)],
for an appropriate α so that the cutoff is less than the discounted mean quality
in the good state: q¯G < δEHEγ (q). Using, (A.34) and (A.36), the discounted
mean quality in the good state can be written explicitly as
δEHEγ (q) =
δ
2
(a−√aq¯G + q¯G),
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so that
q¯G <
δ
2− δ (a−
√
aq¯G).
But recall that under the known-state regime, cutoff q¯γ satisfies equation
q¯γ =
δ
2− δ (a−
√
aq¯γ).
As δ
2
(a−√aq) decreases in q, it must be that q¯G < q¯γ.
Finally, I show that q¯B > q¯β. Under the exogenous-signal regime, the cutoff
q¯B satisfies
q¯B = δEHEβ (q),
and under the known-state regime, the cutoff q¯β satisfies
q¯β = δEHKβ (q).
I compare the mean quality in the bad state in the case where the buyers who
know that the state is bad use the optimal cutoff q˜ and others use q¯G > q˜ (as
is the case under the exogenous-signal regime) to the case where all buyers use
cutoff q˜ (as is the case under the known-state regime). In case both cutoffs
q˜ and q¯G are used, the qualities q > q˜ that are left on the market by some
buyers increase the discounted mean quality in the market (because q˜ equals
the discounted mean quality) . Thus, the mean quality must be higher in the
market where some buyers use cutoff q˜ and others q¯G > q˜ as compared to a
market where all buyers use cutoff q˜. Hence, it must be that q¯B > q¯β.
Proof of Proposition 9. The expected delay is obtained by plugging equation
(A.7) into (2.3). I show that the exogenous-signal regime with pG = 1 and
pB = 1− η for η > 0 small is more efficient than the known-state regime, i.e.,
DE < DK, (Part 1). I then prove that the exogenous-signal regime with pG = 1
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and pB = 1−η for η > 0 small is more efficient than the the no-signals’ regime
if δ > 2
3
(Part 2a) and with pG = 1 and pB = 1 − η for η ≈ 1 if δ < 23 (Part
2b).
Consider the exogenous-signal regime with pG = 1 and pB = 1 − η, η ∈
(0, 1). Recall that pG = 1 means that in the good state only cutoff q¯G is used
and Oγ =
√
Fγ(q¯G) (see (A.36)). Hence, for any η ∈ (0, 1), if the precision of
the exogenous signal is pG = 1 and pB = 1− η, the expected delay under the
exogenous-signal regime is
DE = pi
√
q¯G
a
+ (1− pi)Oβ,
where Oβ = (1 − η) q¯BOβ + η
(
q¯B
Oβ
+ q¯G−q¯B
Oβ+1−η
)
(which is obtained by plugging
pB = 1− η into (A.37)).
Part 1. DE < DK if the precision of the exogenous signal is pG = 1 and
pB = 1− η for η > 0 small.
If pG = pB = 1, then D
E = DK. I show that DE < DK for pG = 1 and
pB = 1 − η for η > 0 small by proving that the derivative of DE with respect
to η is negative as η → 0.
The derivative of the expected delay under the exogenous-signal regime
with respect to η is
∂DE
∂η
=
pi
2
q¯′G√
aq¯G
+ (1− pi)O′β ∝
ω
2
q¯′G√
aq¯G
+O′β, (A.38)
where q¯′G :=
∂q¯G
∂η
and O′β :=
∂Oβ
∂η
. I use the rewritten versions of the three
equations in the statement of Proposition 8 to derive the missing derivatives
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in equation (A.38). The equations give
Y1 := O
2
β(Oβ + 1− η)− q¯B(Oβ + 1)(1− η)− q¯GηOβ = 0,
Y2 := 2q¯B − δq¯2BO−1β − δ(q¯2G − q¯2B)(Oβ + 1− η)−1 − δ(1− q¯2G)(Oβ + 1)−1 = 0,
Y3 := ω(1 +Oβ)[δ(a+ q¯G −
√
aq¯G)− 2q¯G] + 2η(q¯B − q¯G)(a+
√
aq¯G) = 0.
The derivatives required for ∂D
E
∂η
are obtained by totally differentiating Y1
through Y3. In the limit as η → 0, q¯B → q¯β (so that O2β → q¯B) and q¯G → q¯γ,
so that the derivatives become
lim
η→0
O′β =
q¯′B(Oβ + 1) + (q¯G − q¯B)Oβ
2Oβ(Oβ + 1)
,
lim
η→0
q¯′B = −
δ
2(Oβ + 1)
q¯BO
′
β(Oβ + 1)
2 + (q¯2G − q¯2B)(O′β − 1) + (1− q¯2G)O′β
Oβ + 1− δOβ ,
and
lim
η→0
q¯′G =
4(q¯G − q¯B)(a+√aq¯G)
ω(1 +Oβ)
[
δ
(
2−
√
a
q¯G
)
− 4
] .
Inserting the second into the first, we get
lim
η→0
O′β =
(q¯G − q¯B)(2q¯B − 2δq¯B + 2Oβ + δq¯G)
δ + 8q¯B − 3δq¯B + 4q¯BOβ − δq¯BOβ + 4Oβ .
Thus, in the limit, the derivative ∂D
E
∂η
is proportional to
lim
η→0
∂DE
∂η
∝ − 2(a+
√
aq¯G)
(4
√
aq¯G − 2δ√aq¯G + δa)+
(1 +Oβ)(2q¯B − δq¯B + 2Oβ + δq¯G)
δ + 8q¯B − 3δq¯B + 4q¯BOβ − 2δq¯BOβ + 4Oβ .
I show that the cross-multiplied version of the RHS is negative. Using the
identities 2q¯B = δ − δOβ + δq¯B and aq¯B = q¯G that hold in the limit η → 0, I
rewrite the RHS as
−√aq¯G[9δ(1−Oβ) + 8q¯BOβ(1− δ) + 4q¯B(1− δ)]− δq¯GOβ[2(1− q¯G) + 2− δa]
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−4q¯G(1−Oβ)− δq¯G[2(1− q¯G) + 2
δ
− δa]− q¯G(2− δ)− δ
√
aq¯G(1− δ)
−δ2q¯2G(Oβ + 1)− 2δ2q¯B q¯G,
which is negative as a ≤ 2 and δ < 1. Hence, the delay is shorter for precision
pG = 1 and pB = 1− η with η > 0 small enough than for precision pG = 1 and
pB = 1, or, D
E < DK if pG = 1 and pB = 1− η for η > 0 small.
Part 2a. For δ > 2
3
, DE < DN if the precision of the exogenous signal is
pG = 1 and pB = 1− η for η > 0 small.
Recall that under the exogenous-signal regime the expected delay is
DE = pi
√
q¯G
a
+ (1− pi)Oβ.
Now limη→0DE = DK and we know from Proposition 4 that DK < DN if δ > 23 .
Since everything is continuous, if pG = 1 there exists a small neighbourhood
of pB = 1 s.t. D
E < DN .
Part 2b. For δ < 2
3
, DE < DN if the precision of the exogenous signal is
pG = 1 and pB = 1− η for η ≈ 1.
I first take the limits of the exogenous-signal regime’s cutoffs as η → 1. By
plugging η = 1, or pB = 0, into the system of equations that determines the
cutoffs of the exogenous-signal regime (see Proposition 8), I get

q¯G =
δ
2
ω(1 +Oβ)(a−√aq¯G + q¯G) + (a+√aq¯G)q¯B
ω(1 +Oβ) + (a+
√
aq¯G)
,
q¯B =
δ
2Oβ
[
1− 1− q¯
2
G
1 +Oβ
]
,
O2β = q¯G.
Combining the three equations, I get that in the limit as η → 1, q¯G is defined
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by the following equation:
lim
η→1
q¯G =
δ
2
ω(1 +
√
q¯G)(a−√aq¯G + q¯G) + (a+√aq¯G)(1−√q¯G + q¯G)
ω(1 +
√
q¯G) + (a+
√
aq¯G)
,
which is identical to the equation that defines the equilibrium cutoff under the
no-signals’ regime, q¯ (see Proposition 3). Hence, limη→1 q¯G = q¯. However, note
that the limit of q¯B is much smaller than q¯:
lim
η→1
q¯B =
δ
2
(1−√q¯ + q¯),
which is much smaller than q¯ because a−√aq¯ + q¯ > 1−√q¯ + q¯.
Since everything is continuous, we know that there exists a neighbourhood
of η = 1 s.t. for pG = 1 and pB = 1 − η, q¯G ≈ q¯, but q¯B < q¯, so that
O2β < q¯G ≈ q¯. Accordingly, the expected delay under the exogenous-signal
regime with this precision is
DE |η≈1 = pi
√
q¯G
a
+ (1− pi)Oβ ≈ 1 + pi
√
q¯
a
+ (1− pi)Oβ,
which is smaller than DN because Oβ <
√
q¯.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
This section contains the proofs that were omitted in the body of the Chapter.
B.1 Imperfectly correlated preferences
The following provides sufficient conditions for the searcher’s cutoff u¯(vm) to
be concave and is a corollary to Proposition 10.
Corollary 2. Sufficient conditions for the cutoff u¯(vm) to be concave are: (a)
monotone increasing hazard rate for fv:
∂
∂vm
fv(vm)
1−Fv(vm) ≥ 0, and (b)
∂g(u|vm)
∂vm
≥ 0
for all u ∈ [u¯(vm), 1].
Proof. I derive the sufficient conditions for u¯(vm) to have a negative second
derivative. Differentiating equation (3.5) gives
∂2u¯(vm)
∂v2m
= −
(
∂
∂vm
fv(vm)
1− Fv(vm)
)∫ 1
u¯(vm)
g(u|vm)(u− u¯(vm)) du
− fv(vm)
1− Fv(vm)
[∫ 1
u¯(vm)
∂g(u|vm)
∂vm
(u− u¯(vm))− g(u|vm)∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
du
]
,
which is negative for sure if (a) ∂
∂vm
fv(vm)
1−Fv(vm) ≥ 0 and (b)
∂g(u|vm)
∂vm
≥ 0 for
u ∈ [u¯(vm), 1] as ∂u¯(vm)∂vm < 0. For example, log-concave distributions satisfy (a)
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and independent u and v satisfy (b).
Claim 3. For u independent of v and h uniform on [0, 1]2, the searcher’s cutoff
is given by equation (3.7).
Proof. I solve the differential equation for u¯(vm) as follows. Rewrite (3.6) as
dy
dx
= −1
2
(1− x)(1− y)2,
and rearrange to separate the variables:
(1− y)−2 dy = −1
2
(1− x) dx.
I use the standard method, integrating and rearranging, to solve the above
equation. Integrating both sides of the equation yields
(1− y)−1 = 1
2
ln(1− x) + k,
where k is a constant and which can be rearranged to yield
y = 1−
{
1
2
ln(1− x) + k
}−1
. (B.1)
The constant k is pinned down by the initial condition u¯(v∗) = u¯(1− 2c) = 0:
k = 1− 1
2
ln(1− v∗).
Inserting k to (B.1) and reverting to the original notation yields the result.
B.2 Characterisation
This section contains the omitted details of Section 3.5.
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B.2.1 The searcher is less picky if the preferences are
misaligned
Proposition 12. The searcher is less picky if the agents’ preferences are mis-
aligned as compared to when they are perfectly aligned, i.e., max{u˜, v¯} > u¯(vm)
for all vm.
Proof. I show that u˜ > u¯(vm) for all vm. Recall that u˜ is the optimal cutoff
if the searcher could choose himself and equals the searcher’s value from the
search process. Recall that u¯(vm) is the optimal cutoff if the chooser chooses
instead of the searcher and equals the searcher’s value from the search process.
The proof is by noting that the searcher can do as least as well in the absence
of a chooser as in the presence of her.
Let us call a searcher who can choose himself A and call a searcher who
searches for a chooser B. Consider a sequence of items drawn from the dis-
tribution H with misaligned preferences (u1, v1), (u2, v2), (u3, v3), etc., that
is relevant for B and the equivalent sequence (u1, u1), (u2, u2), (u3, u3), etc.,
relevant for A. A can mimic the behaviour of B by using the cutoff u¯(v1) in
the first period, cutoff u¯(max{v1, v2}) in the second, and so on. However, A
can do strictly better in expectation as he can ignore the v-value of the items.
For example, if v1 > v
∗, then u¯(v1) = 0 so that B would accept (u1, v1) even
if u1 ≤  for  > 0 very small. A can do better by continuing to search. The
probability of an item with u1 <  and v1 ≥ v∗ occurring is positive under H
because of the full support assumption. Since A’s value from searching equals
u˜, B’s value equals u¯(v¯), and u¯(vm) decreases in vm, it must be that u˜ ≥ u¯(vm)
for all vm.
159
B.2.2 The searcher prefers more aligned preferences
For positive correlation parametrised by q, the differential equations that pin
down the solution are, for vm < vˆ,
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1(1− q)(1− u¯(vm))2,
with initial condition u¯(vˆ) = vˆ, and for vm ∈ (vˆ, v∗),
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1[(1− q)(1− u¯(vm))2 + 2q(vm − u¯(vm))],
with initial condition u¯(v∗) = 0. The differential equations do not have man-
ageable closed form solutions (i.e., the solutions are nonlinear functions involv-
ing Bessel and gamma functions) and are thus omitted.
For negative correlation parametrised by r, the relevant system of equa-
tions depends on the size of c (or, more precisely, on whether the curve u¯(vm)
intersects with the line 1− vm). For c large enough, the curve and line do not
intersect and the differential equation that pins down the solution is for any
vm < v
∗,
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1[(1− r)(1− u¯(vm))2 + 2r(1− vm − u¯(vm))],
with initial condition u¯(v∗) = 0. Again, the differential equation does not have
a manageable closed form solution and is omitted.
For small search cost, the curve u¯(vm) and line 1−vm intersect. Let u¯(vˆi) =
1− vˆi for i = 1, 2 such that vˆ1 < vˆ2. The differential equation that pins down
the solution is for vm < vˆ1 and vm ∈ (vˆ2, v∗)
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1[(1− r)(1− u¯(vm))2 + 2r(1− vm − u¯(vm))],
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with initial conditions u¯(vˆ1) = 1 − vˆ1 and u¯(v∗) = 0 for vm < vˆ1 and vm ∈
(vˆ2, v
∗) respectively, and for vm ∈ (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∂u¯(vm)
∂vm
= −1
2
(1− vm)−1(1− r)(1− u¯(vm))2,
with initial condition u¯(vˆ2) = 1− vˆ2. The solutions to these equations are not
informative and thus omitted.
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